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ABSTRACT
Good governance is of paramount importance to the survival and success of parks 
in achieving the dual mandate of conservation and recreation. However, there 
exists a lack of research on governance regarding the implications of outsourcing 
visitor services to private companies. The case study research explored the 
perceived implications of British Columbia’s Provincial Parks’ outsourcing model on 
the nine UNDP criteria for good governance. Interviews were conducted with six 
government employees, three private contractors, and six members of conservation 
and recreation non-governmental organizations. The findings revealed distinct 
variations in satisfaction with governance principles based on stakeholder group. 
The participants were all deeply passionate for parks yet felt powerless to influence 
the direction and management of BC Parks due to the high level of political control 
which prioritized the focus placed on each governance principle. Future parks 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Delivery of Public Services
Since the mid-1970s, North American government agencies have faced 
increased scrutiny by proponents of privatization to address ostensible inefficiencies 
in their operating structures and to inject competition into the public sector 
(Crompton, 1999). The political pressure associated with these criticisms of 
government led public managers to seek alternatives to the traditional model of 
direct delivery of public services by government agencies, alternatives that 
sometimes include the commercial sector (Glover & Burton, 1998). Forms of 
privatization, therefore, have become increasingly commonplace in the public sector 
(Crompton, 1998).
Outright privatization refers to the sale of public services, buildings or land to 
the private sector, including the not-for-profit and commercial sectors (Crompton, 
1999). More generally, however, privatization is understood as a multitude of 
alternatives that involve private organizations, including cross sector alliances, 
regulated monopolies, and divestiture (Glover & Burton, 1998).
The shift in the role of government in the delivery of public services and the 
public sector’s increasing adoption of business principles has been demonstrated by 
provincial parks in Canada. On the one hand, Ontario Parks embodies the 
traditional role of government in terms of both arranging and producing visitor 
services in provincial parks. On the other hand, British Columbia (BC) Parks has 
adopted an outsourcing model with visitor services provided by private, for-profit 
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contractors. The variety of management arrangements has stimulated discussion 
among many academics, practitioners, and citizens. How were decisions to adopt 
an outsourcing model made? What are the implications of these new, more 
commercial management models? What are the implications for governance? 
1.2 Governance of Parks and Protected Areas
Governance is regarded as a process concerning the interactions in society 
regarding how decisions in society are made, by whom and in what capacity, and 
how decision-makers are held accountable (IOG, 2007). The Fifth World Parks 
Congress (Durban, 2003) identified governance as “central to the conservation of 
protected areas throughout the world” (WCPA, 2003, p.32). Moreover, good 
governance is of paramount importance to the survival and success of parks and 
protected areas in achieving their goals of conservation and recreation (Dearden, 
Bennett, & Johnston, 2005).
Based on good governance criteria developed by the United Nations 
Development Programme (1997), Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003) articulated 
five principles of sound governance for parks and protected areas: Legitimacy and 
Voice, Direction, Performance, Accountability, and Fairness. Hannah (2006) applied 
the principles to evaluate private protected areas in Canada and found overall good 
governance, with Direction and Legitimacy as the highest ranked principles and 
Performance as the weakest principle. Hannah’s research serves as evidence that 
Graham et al.’s principles can be used to evaluate governance of protected areas. 
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Further analysis of the governance of public protected areas in Canada was 
recommended as a noteworthy future research direction.
There exists a worldwide trend of an increased role of the private sector in 
parks and protected area management, yet “the nature of that involvement 
remains only partially known” (Dearden, et al., 2005, p.98). Given the increasing 
presence of private sector involvement within the profession of parks and protected 
areas, Eagles (2008a) argued that 
greater understanding is needed on the role of government and the 
private sector in the provision of parks, recreation and tourism 
services and the inclusion (or exclusion) of private-type services and 
management models… and [an overall] understanding of the 
governance of protected areas (p.56).
No comprehensive study has yet been undertaken to assess the repercussions of an 
outsourcing model on governance. Furthermore, to my knowledge, no studies have 
focused on how different stakeholders perceive the effects of outsourcing services.
Clearly, a decision to privatize has implications for many stakeholders. 
Stakeholders connected to governance-related issues include: elected officials, 
public administrators, private citizens, civil society, and the for-profit and not-for-
profit partners (including the media). My interest in this study is in government 
employees of the park agency, private contractors from the commercial sector and 
members of conservation and recreation-based non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).
Specific government agencies are charged with the management of specific 
parks and protected areas for the broad purposes of conservation and recreation. 
An agency’s decision to outsource services does not relinquish the responsibility of 
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management (Domberger & Jensen, 1997). The agency must remain in a 
regulatory role; supervising and monitoring the services and the private company. 
Monitoring is of utmost importance in all outsourcing models in order to ensure the 
contractors follow the contract stipulations and the prescribed duties. A lack of 
monitoring would lead to the inability to evaluate many governance principles due 
to lack of information. Thus, government employees can directly comment on the 
effects of outsourcing visitor services to private contractors.
Rather than the government directly arranging and producing all services in 
parks, specific responsibilities can be outsourced through a commercial contract. 
Parks continue to be held as a merit good owned by the government, with the 
private contractors providing particular services. The contractors can offer their 
opinions regarding the bidding process, the role of monitoring, interactions with 
visitors and their overall perception of the outsourcing model. 
Members of conservation and recreation-based NGOs hold various and vested 
interests in the management of parks and protected areas. NGOs are comprised of 
private citizens assembled together to assert a collective voice to government and 
the public regarding their points of view and concerns regarding park management. 
NGOs serve as advocates, watchdogs, and commentators on the management of 
parks. The members of NGOs are often vocal with their perspectives regarding the 
perceived effects of outsourcing visitor services to commercial contractors.
The research is a response to the need to understand the implications of the 
outsourcing management model on governance from different stakeholders’ points 
of view. More specifically, the research investigated the perceptions of the 
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implications on governance when visitor services are outsourced to the commercial 
sector, in the context of British Columbia Provincial Parks.
1.3 Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the case study research was to explore the perceived 
implications of an outsourcing model on governance by members of three groups: 
government employees of BC Parks, private contractors, and members of 
conservation and recreation non-governmental organizations. More specifically, the 
following research questions were investigated:
1. How do government employees of BC Parks, the private contractors, and 
members of non-governmental organizations perceive the implications of BC 
Parks’ outsourcing model of service delivery on the principles of governance: 





2. How do the perspectives of the government employees of BC Parks, private 
contractors, and members of NGOs compare and contrast?
3. How do government employees of BC Parks perceive:
a. the performance of the private contractors?
b. the role of non-governmental organizations in BC Parks?
4. How do BC private contractors perceive:
a. the BC Parks agency?
b. the role of non-governmental organizations in BC Parks?
5. How do members of non-governmental organizations perceive: 
a. the BC Parks agency?
b. the performance of the private contractors?
c. their role in BC Parks? 
d. other NGOs?
6. How does monitoring fit within the outsourcing model and the concept of 
governance?
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An outsourcing model for parks and protected areas yields implications for both 
conservation and recreation management. Thus investigating the implications of an 
outsourcing model is important to all citizens, whether or not they are recreation 
users in parks. Since the residents of British Columbia are the owners of BC Parks, 
this research served as an assessment of the governance of BC Parks.  
Furthermore, examining the various perceptions regarding the outsourcing 
arrangements for providing visitor services in provincial parks in British Columbia 
has added to the general body of literature surrounding governance of parks and 
protected areas. Moreover, from a park planning perspective, BC Parks benefitted 
from the research by expanding all stakeholders’ understanding of the perceived 
implications of commercial contractors providing visitor services.
7
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, I review relevant literature pertaining to the implications of 
privatization on governance. This review includes a brief overview of the evolving 
role of government in the provision of public goods and services, followed by an 
introduction of the concept of privatization (its ideological foundation and its 
emergence in parks) and an overview of the various models of management of 
parks and protected areas. These topics are followed by an exploration of the 
notion of governance, the principles of sound governance, and their relevance to 
parks management. Finally, the potential implications of a parks agency adopting 
an outsourcing model on governance are investigated.
2.1 Delivery of Public Goods and Services
The role of the government in the provision of public goods and services is a 
subject of passionate debate and discussion among scholars, policymakers, and 
practitioners. Historically, the production of goods and services by government was 
believed necessary to counteract the flaws inherent in a market economy (Walsh, 
1995). In particular, the market was believed to fail in certain instances, such as 
the equitable distribution of resources. Certain services, such as health care and 
education, carry such moral significance in society that government intervention 
was deemed necessary to ensure equitable, fair and just access for all citizens 
(Walsh, 1995).
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Proponents of privatization, in response, identified several deficiencies with 
the traditional model of direct provision and argued for the “reinvention” of 
government (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) through the adoption of market 
mechanisms in the public sector. Government’s monopolistic system of planned 
production, they argued, is implicitly inefficient. With no competitors, and thus no 
incentive to keep costs down, operations are presumably ineffective and wasteful 
(Walsh, 1995). Government’s traditional arrangement of direct delivery can be 
ameliorated, proponents of privatization suggested, through market mechanisms, 
such as outsourcing the production of certain public services to the commercial 
sector (Walsh, 1995).
All told, this debate reflects the politics of public service provision and the 
contested role of the public sector in service delivery. Whenever one discusses the 
role of government, one must naturally consider the role of the private sector, too. 
As Moore (1995, p. 29) wrote, 
It is not enough to say that public managers create results that are 
valued; they must be able to show that the results obtained are worth 
the cost of private consumption and unrestrained liberty forgone in 
producing the desirable results.
When is it appropriate for government to provide service directly? When is it 
appropriate for the commercial sector to do so? These questions have encouraged 
scholars and practitioners for years. 
During the golden age of the welfare state (1945-1975), government more 
often than not served as the direct provider of public goods and services (Glover, 
1999a). Consumption of services, such as recreation and parks, was considered 
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beneficial to individuals and society (based on moral and social reasoning). As a 
result, government was expected to address broader social conditions to ensure 
equal access for the general public; the free market, by contrast, presumably 
disregarded the needs of disadvantaged members of society, unless addressing 
them was a profitable venture (Self, 1993). 
After World War II, North America experienced a post-war prosperity the 
blooming of the middle class and a superior standard of living (Shultis, 2003). With 
an increase in disposable income and leisure time, combined with the 
transportation advances of the car, the North Americans masses increasingly visited 
the parks and national historic sites. Furthermore, the people who worked at parks 
were respected and considered dedicated civil servants (More, 2005).
However, economic stagnation in the mid-1970s resulted in increased 
inflation, interest rates, unemployment, and declining incomes (Lindberg & Maier, 
1986). Free market economists attributed the declines to factors such as 
globalization, a waning labour influence, technological advances, and immigration 
(Teeple, 1995). As a result, a conservative backlash against government gained 
ground. Conservative politicians such as Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and 
Brian Mulroney, condemned the “nanny state” for its large deficits and overall 
inefficiency, while advocating for smaller government (Shultis, 2005). Driven by 
their rhetoric, conservative groups, espousing neo-conservative doctrine, began to 
demand decreased taxes, smaller government, increased fiscal responsibility and 
accountability, increased public-private partnerships, and limited intervention in the 
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economic and social lives of citizens. In short, critics of the welfare state argued the 
structure of the government removed the motivation for politicians and bureaucrats 
to be fiscally responsible and efficient. The validity of public services was not being 
challenged, but rather the methods of delivery were questioned. As a result, 
alternatives to the traditional model were sought (Burton & Glover, 1999).
In response, governments began to embrace the enabling authority of the 
state (Burton & Glover, 1999). This “authority” distinguished between arranging
services and producing them, thereby allowing government to make the argument 
that it needed to arrange services, but not necessarily produce them. Barnett and 
Carmichael (1997), proponents of privatization, remarked the two key roles of the 
government employing the enabling authority were to: (1) facilitate the production 
of services for the public; and (2) provide opportunities for competition for service 
producers. For Barnett & Carmichael, the primary objective of the enabling 
authority of the state is economic, making cost efficiency the principal 
consideration. Irrespective of the preferred producer of the service, the enabling 
authority of the state is evidenced by the variety of forms of public leisure service 
delivery currently in use by governments that span the ideological spectrum (see 
Burton & Glover, 1999; Walsh, 1995).
2.2 The Faces of Privatization 
Not surprisingly, the adoption of business principles by the public sector has 
been a source of contention among practitioners and academics. Many academics 
assert such principles are incongruent with the aims of government because they 
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threaten traditional notions of equity, citizenship, and democracy (More, 2002; 
Hemingway, 1999; Saul, 1994; Murdock, 1994; Smale & Reid, 2002). Proponents 
of privatization, by contrast, contend the adoption of business principles improves 
service quality, responsiveness, and overall efficiency (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; 
Crompton, 1999; Savas, 1987). These positions represent different lenses through 
which to understand the consequences of privatization. 
Samson (1994) identified three such “faces” or lenses. First, privatization can 
be viewed solely through an economic lens. Conservative politicians and free 
market economists adopt the perspective that privatization is a technique to solve 
economic problems. The scope is intentionally limited to disregard the ripple effects 
of privatization and the underlying ideology. Privatization is solely regarded from an 
economic standpoint and evaluated by the paramount criteria of cost-effectiveness. 
The second face of privatization is understood as a relational process because 
it focuses on the broader range of social impacts and effects of privatization 
(Samson, 1994). The sociological face is often adopted by progressive policy 
makers who are aware of the creation of disenfranchised classes through cuts to 
social services thus decreasing social justice. Nevertheless, the negative social 
consequences of privatization are often downplayed, given that such cuts do not 
enhance politicians’ popularity.
The third and final face of privatization is a combination of the first two faces 
and also regarded as a hegemonic project. It is regarded as a process of using the 
dogma of privatization to change the values, perceptions, and ideology of the public 
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and private sectors (Samson, 1994). The public perception of the government 
shifted over the past 30 years from that of a provider of social services as a means 
of correcting the flaws of the market economy to an inefficient and wasteful 
bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the perception of the commercial sector shifted from 
distrust due to its emphasis on profit, to being praised for efficiency, innovation, 
and responsiveness.
Samson’s three faces offer different lenses through which we can understand 
privatization. They also reflect different perspectives politicians, managers, scholars 
and citizens can hold. The embrace of privatization in North America reflects the 
significance of Samson’s first face of privatization, which praised privatization as an 
economic solution to an economic problem.
2.3 Privatization in Parks and Recreation
A public good is one that benefits an entire populace, rather than simply 
those individuals who partake of the service (Crompton & Lamb, 1986; Walsh, 
1995). Public goods are distinguished by joint and non-exclusive consumption 
(Peston, 1972), whereas private goods, are characterized by individual and 
exclusive consumption (Savas, 2000). Parks, recreation and tourism services are 
generally considered merit goods, which fall along the middle of the public-private 
spectrum (Burton & Glover, 1999) since conservation serves the public good and 
recreation serves the individual users. 
Parks have a dual mandate of conservation and recreation. Conservation 
primarily serves the public good by protecting the functioning of essential 
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ecosystems required for survival of humanity (i.e. cycles and systems of water, air, 
nutrient as well as the native components). And recreation, primarily benefits the 
user, thus the introduction and societal acceptance of user fees in parks.
In 1998, John Crompton, identified four forces that he believed led to the 
emergence of privatization in parks and recreation in North America: (i) a shortage 
of tax funds; (ii) convergence of political thinking; (iii) recognition of the traditional 
model as a monopoly and its associated inefficiencies; and, (iv) the awareness of 
the distinction between arranging for a service and producing a service.
Crompton (1998) argued the initial force behind the privatization of parks 
and recreation services stemmed from frustration with the traditional model of 
direct service delivery and the shortage of tax funds. He argued the economic 
regression and the tax revolt of the late 1970s and early 1980s in the USA led 
concerned taxpayers to scrutinize the inefficiencies of the traditional model of 
service delivery. For this reason, Crompton believed government appropriations to
parks and recreation agencies steadily decreased. Meanwhile, the responsibilities of 
managers dramatically increased, including more land to manage and demand for 
high quality services through the use of commercial sector skills (such as target 
marketing) resulting in the expectation of public administrators to more with less. 
Thus, new alternatives to service delivery were sought. In Crompton’s words, 
The emergence of privatization was a natural response to these perceived 
limitations of direct provision. At the same time, it embraced two pervasive 
tenets of American lore – that government is inherently wasteful because it 
lacks the incentive of the profit motive, and that private enterprise is 
inherently efficient because inefficiency is not tolerated in the market-place 
(p.92).
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This observation is consistent with Samson’s (1994) third face of privatization 
regarding the shift in perceptions of the characteristics and capabilities of the public 
and commercial sectors. Once more, privatization is justified as the solution to 
economic problems, while not revealing the potential negative implications (these 
are explored below).
Crompton (1998) identified the convergence of political agendas as the 
second force behind the privatization of parks and recreation in the USA. As he saw 
it, support for the privatization of public services grew across the political spectrum 
in the 1980s. Privatization was perceived by politicians as the solution to a cost-
effective delivery of public services, increased choice for participants, opportunities 
for private sector involvement and reducing the size of the government. 
The third force that fuelled the advancement of privatization was the 
recognition of the inefficiencies associated with monopolistic direct delivery 
(Crompton, 1998). Monopolies are believed to lack the incentive to be cost-efficient 
and responsive to the needs of clients. Competition, by contrast, represents the 
stimulus for improved efficiency, responsiveness, innovation, and service quality. 
Accordingly, the public began to question why these principles were not applied to 
the public sector. Opponents to privatization called for a renewed commitment to 
the re-distribution of wealth and continued equal access to services (Ravenscroft, 
1993). However, their voices were drowned out by calls to privatize services. 
Privatization was heralded as an economic strategy; it would inject competition into 
the public sector to forward cost-efficiency in the delivery of public services.
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The fourth and final force of the emergence of privatization, according to 
Crompton, was the awareness of the distinction between arranging the provision of 
a service and its production. Government agencies, it was argued, should be 
responsible for recognizing the need for a service, while producing the service 
should be the responsibility of another (commercial) provider (Drucker, 1969). 
Crompton articulated the justification for this distinction:
The provision decisions deals with social goods, contending values, who 
should benefit and who should pay, equity, income redistribution, and other 
issues that are inherently political. In contrast, the production decision is 
mainly an economic issue, concerned with how the political service objective 
can be most effectively and efficiently delivered (p.99).
Savas (1987), one of the most ardent advocates of privatization, vindicated that 
privatization helped restore government to its foundational purpose: “to steer, not 
to man the oars” (p.290).
Decisions in government reflect the current hegemonic socio-political 
ideology. Neo-conservative proponents have stimulated a decreased budget and 
fewer government employees for parks management. Furthermore, parks are 
experiencing increased visitation levels, large park lands to manage, ennoble goals 
expressed in mandates and Parks Acts (i.e.: restoration or maintenance of 
ecological integrity) and a demand for high quality visitor services (Eagles, 2008a; 
More, 2005). In order to cope, parks agencies are encouraged to act as a business 
through user fees, partnerships (with not-for-profit and private sectors) marketing 
strategies, business plans, and customer-oriented philosophies.
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Crompton (1998) discussed his perception regarding the evolution of the role 
of the government in the delivery of public services. The economic and social 
paradigm supported a decrease in societal taxes, political support for privatization, 
increased dissatisfaction regarding inefficiencies of the public sector, and the 
recognition of the enabling authority of the state. Therefore, the growing perception 
that the traditional role of direct provision was unsustainable resulted in the 
adoption of various alternative arrangements for the delivery of public services 
(along the public-private spectrum).
2.4 Models of Service Delivery in Parks
More (2005) identified five common management models for the provision of 
parks and protected areas, ranging along the public – private continuum: (i) Fully 
Public, (ii) Public Utilities, (iii) Outsourcing, (iv) Private Ownership, and (v) Fully 
Private (see Figure 1). A description of each model will follow. 
Figure 1: Management models for parks and protected areas
Public Private
Fully Public Public Utilities Outsourcing Private Ownership Fully Private
(More, 2005)
The Fully Public model recognizes park management as a “legitimate government 
function to be fully financed through taxes” (More, 2005, p.15). The state owns the 
land while a government agency manages the resources. Supporters of the Fully 
Public model articulate how every citizen is an equal and an owner of parks. Critics 
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of the Fully Public model attest that non-users are burdened with the cost of paying 
for park management while not directly benefitting. Furthermore, the parks agency 
is a monopoly and thus lacks the incentive to be efficient and to be responsiveness 
to the public needs (More, 2005).
The Public Utilities model regards park management as comparable to 
government-run public services such as water, electricity and gas financed 
(partially or fully) through user fees. In this model, a primary objective of park 
management is to become financially self-sufficient, so as not to burden non-users 
through taxes. With the traditional public utilities approach, fees help reduce use 
and aid in conservation of the finite resource. However, with parks and protected 
areas, a dual goal of conservation and recreation is often mandated. Thus, 
participation and use of parks and outdoor recreation is encouraged. Even so, some 
research has demonstrated that user fees discourage park visitation and outdoor 
recreation participation among low-income users (More & Stevens, 2000). However, 
other academics challenge More’s (2005) claims, arguing for example that research 
was based on hypothetical situations, rather than real experiences. Other 
academics have disregarded More’s claims since previous research indicated that 
the transportation and equipment costs served more as deterrents than do user 
fees (Greswell, 2004).
Outsourcing is the third management model, based on the principle of the 
enabling authority of the state. The government recognizes the need for a service 
and arranges the private sector produce it. Companies compete for the right to 
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produce the service. Outsourcing can decrease costs and allow for flexibility and 
responsiveness to clients. It is now common for park agencies to outsource services 
to private, for-profit companies, such as: food stores, restaurants, equipment 
rentals, trip guiding, specialized recreation services, transport, infrastructure 
construction, and maintenance (Eagles, 2009). However, Conlin and Berstein 
(2004) remarked on the potential long-term social costs of outsourcing given that 
commercial companies tend to pay lower wages and offer fewer benefits than 
government which can result in reduced local economic impact and a deterioration 
of service quality over time.
Private Ownership of parks and protected areas by not-for-profit 
organizations is the fourth management model. The organizations must be 
financially self-sustaining, relying on membership fees, donations and volunteers. 
Thus the organizations are constantly focused on raising money and consequently 
can develop close ties with industry (potentially succumbing to commercialization) 
or become a corporate industry itself.
The fifth and final management model is Fully Private ownership of parks and 
protected areas, operated and managed (More, 2005). The extent of land that can 
be conserved under the Fully Private management model is questionable 
considering only areas that are profitable will receive attention. The Fully Private
model raises concerns regarding equity and access. The private sector operates on 
the principle of profit, and thus people who are unable (or not willing) to pay are 
excluded, thus potentially disadvantaging people of low income from visiting parks.
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For this research project, I am particularly interested in More’s (2005) 
Outsourcing model because it represents the current management arrangement for 
BC provincial parks system. Outsourcing presumably has its own unique 
implications, implications that have not been explored in any great depth within the 
context of parks and protected areas. Furthermore, very few studies have focused 
on how different stakeholders perceive such implications. In particular, I am 
interested in examining the various participants’ perceptions regarding an 
outsourcing model’s implications for governance. How should parks be provided, 
financed, and managed? How should power be exercised? Which stakeholders 
should be part of the decision making and in what capacity? These are questions of 
governance that, in my view, warrant attention.
Parks represent a plethora of meanings to citizens, including wilderness, 
community social function, hunting preserve, business and profit, physical and 
emotional health, ecological preservation, recreation, meaning of life, protecting 
native people and their lands, historical and cultural preservation (Eagles & McCool, 
2002). Since parks represent an array of meanings to many people, which values 
prevail and why? Who are the decision-makers regarding the management of BC 
Parks? Who is invited to the table and in what capacity? How are decision-makers 
held accountable? The utilization of the concept of governance in the proposed 
research will aid in answering such questions. 
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2.5 Governance
In ancient Athens, government was the process for discussing and resolving 
issues of public concern. In the modern era however, government has developed 
into a distinct entity, requiring representation of citizens (rather than direct 
involvement). The Institute on Governance articulates the important distinction 
between government and governance; the former as an institution and the latter a 
process. The terms are not synonymous. Graham et al. (2003) defined governance 
as: 
The interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine 
how power and responsibility are exercised, how decisions are taken, and 
how citizens or other stakeholders have their say. It is about power, 
relationships and accountability: who has influence, who decides, and how 
decision-makers are held accountable (Graham, et al., 2003, p.2-3).
It is a process of making decisions about the future, determining who should be 
involved in the process and how decision-makers are held responsible (Graham, et 
al.).
The United Nations Development Programme (1997) developed a list of 10 
characteristics of good governance, which Graham, et al. (2003) collapsed into five 
principles of sound governance for parks and protected areas (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: The five principles of sound governance
Principles of Criteria
Sound Governance
Legitimacy and Voice - Public participation
- Consensus orientation







- Rule of Law
(Graham, et al., 2003, p.8)
The principle of Legitimacy and Voice is characterized by the approaches used for 
public participation and the degree of consensus-oriented decision-making. Public 
participation means all people should have a voice in decision-making, either 
directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests 
(UNDP, 1997). Consensus-oriented decision-making is the ability to mediate 
differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the 
group (UNDP, 1997). 
The principle of Direction involves an overall strategic vision towards decision 
making; looking constructively towards the future, with consideration of the 
historical, cultural and social complexities of each situation (UNDP, 1997).
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Performance involves three very important governance criteria: 
responsiveness to stakeholders, effectiveness and efficiency of operations (Graham, 
et al., 2003). Responsiveness occurs when institutions and processes try to serve 
all stakeholders using a proactive manner regarding complaints and public 
criticisms (UNDP, 1997). Effectiveness involves the capacity to realize 
organizational objectives (UNDP, 1997). Efficiency refers to making the best use of 
resources or the capability of acting or producing effectively with a minimum 
amount or quantity of waste, expense or unnecessary effort (UNDP, 1997).
Accountability involves accountability and transparency to stakeholders 
(Graham, et al., 2003). Accountability is the requirement that officials answer to 
stakeholders on the disposal of their powers and duties, act on criticisms or 
requirements made of them and accept responsibility for failure, incompetence or 
deceit (UNDP, 1997). Transparency is the sharing of information and acting in an 
open manner (UNDP, 1997).
Fairness deals with equity amongst stakeholders and the overall application 
of the rule of law (Graham, et al., 2003). Equity is just treatment, requiring that 
similar cases are treated in similar ways (UNDP, 1997). Application of the rule of 
law refers to legal frameworks being fair and enforced impartially (UNDP, 1997).
The principles are intended to be internationally relevant and applicable in 
parks and protected areas. Graham, et al. (2003) recognized the inherent 
difficulties and controversies in obtaining their goal of world-wide principles. First, 
some principles overlap and possibly counteract each other. For example, a mass 
23
undertaking and emphasis on public participation would decrease the level of 
efficiency. Therefore, balance and judgment must be used in the application of the 
principles. Furthermore, societies place various levels of importance on different 
principles depending upon what is culturally valued. Thus, the concept of 
internationally-accepted principles of sound governance brings about a discussion of 
values, cultural perspectives and desired socio-economic outcomes. 
Graham, et al. (2003) concluded that there is no “one size fits all” approach 
to governance. The principles are only guidelines and are intended to be applied 
with cultural, societal, and developmental considerations in mind. Furthermore, the 
“devil is in the detail” given that the application of the principles is quite complex. 
Graham, et al. also argued that governance is the means to desired outcomes and 
an end in itself. Through sound governance, parks and protected areas can be 
successfully managed. Success is evaluated based on the level of achievement of 
the objectives of protected areas and the level of adherence to the principles of 
sound governance. Unfortunately, the specific criteria to evaluate the level of 
adherence to the principles and thus the level of good governance has yet to be 
firmly established (Hannah, 2006), thereby further adding to the divergence 
regarding stakeholders’ perception of governance.
2.6 Stakeholders in Governance
Before I explore the potential implications of models of service delivery on 
the governance of parks and protected areas, it is necessary to examine the people 
and agencies that have a stake in the governance process (see Figure 2). 
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Governance occurs within the four sectors of society represented by citizens and 
agencies: government, business, civil society (including the voluntary or not-for-
profit sector) and the media. These sectors are embedded in traditions, past 
historical events, culture, and technological advancements (Graham, et al., 2003). 
Figure 2: Agents involved in Governance 
(Graham, et al., 2003, p.3)
The borders separating the different sectors are permeable, as power and 
responsibilities can shift among stakeholders. The depiction of the actors involved 
in governance has been drawn to denote their relative power in Canadian society. 
The agents traditionally involved in the governance process of parks and protected 
areas include a government agency, private contractors, conservation and 
recreation non-governmental organizations, and local communities.
The private sector’s increased involvement in the provision of public goods 
(i.e. education, health, parks) represents a “classic example of a governance 











(NGOs) in protected area governance (Graham, 2002, pg.5; Alcorn, Luque, & 
Weisman, 2003). NGOs are a part of civil society. They articulate concerns 
regarding the consequences of private sector principles and values in the delivery of 
public services and question whether or not such partnerships are appropriate 
(Alcorn, et al.).
The United Nations has recognized the important role NGOs play in 
environmental protection, management and stewardship (Deacon, 2004; WCED, 
1987). NGOs involved in the environmental movement are highly diverse, occurring 
at various levels (local, national, regional, and international groups) and charged 
with various missions (i.e., environmental protection, species-at-risk) (Jasanoff, 
1997). Alcorn, et al. (2003) noted the two main types of NGOs that participate in 
protected area management: 
(a) nongovernmental organizations, associations and/or federations that 
represent the collective interests of certain groups affected by or interested 
in protected areas, including community-based organizations; and 
(b) nongovernmental organizations led by a private board of directors, with 
missions to perform services in and around protected areas (p.3). 
NGOs are involved with protected are governance in three principal manners: (1) 
affecting policy making, (2) designing and implementing projects, and (3) 
influencing the actions of private companies, political parties and government 
agencies (Alcorn, et al., 2003).
NGOs have influenced governance through the use of four tactics: (i) setting 
agendas and communicating them to citizens, governments and private companies 
through lobbying, press declarations, petitions, blockades and litigation; (ii) 
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negotiating outcomes with government and in some cases also private sector 
actors; (iii) conferring legitimacy on negotiated outcomes, which helps build public 
trust in the agency; and (iv) implementing solutions that governments will not or 
cannot do themselves, including land acquisition, stewardship, education, research 
and monitoring (Simmons, 1998; Whitelaw, Vaughan, Craig, & Atkinson, 2003; 
Alcorn, et al., 2003).
Graham et al. (2003) argued that the concept of governance opens the door 
for the “discuss[ion] of the role of government in coping with public issues and the 
contribution that other players may make” (p.29). The five principles of sound 
governance are internationally relevant and applicable in a wide range of parks and 
protected area circumstances. To recapitulate, governance in the context of parks 
and protected areas refers to decisions about direction (i.e., how to deliver, finance 
and manage visitor services in parks), how power is exercised (i.e., the level of 
authority held by the various agents), and who is involved in the process (i.e. which 
stakeholders are invited to the table and in what capacity).
2.7 Governance Models in Parks and Protected Areas
An investigation of Glover and Burton’s (1998)1 alternatives for delivery of 
public services, Graham et al.’s (2003) principles of sound governance, and More’s 
(2005) management models led Eagles (2008a) to new areas of governance 
research. Eagles investigated governance of parks and protected areas with a focus 
on: 1) the identity and role of the owner of the land and resources; 2) the source of 
                                      
1 A typology of alternative forms of public leisure services delivery, distinguished by the 
level of competition, the nature of the good, and the level of government control.
27
the income for management; and 3) the type of management body. Eagles 
proposed eight models of management exist widely in parks and protected areas 
including: Golden Era of National Parks, Parastatal, Non-Profit Organizations, 
Ecolodge, Public and For-Profit, Private Combination, Public and Non-Profit Private 
Combination, and Aboriginal and Government. The Public and For-Profit Private 
Combination model is the most relevant to the proposed research and will now be 
investigated further.
The Public and For-Profit, Private Combination Model has government 
ownership of the resources, funding through societal taxes and user fees, and 
management by both a government agency and a private, for-profit corporation 
(Eagles, 2008a). This model is the most common approach used today in North 
America and is similar to More’s (2005) outsourcing model. Taxes are primarily 
intended for managing the natural and cultural resources while user fees are 
principally aimed for tourism and visitor services. In actuality, the sources of 
income have funded both resource and tourism management (Eagles, 2008a). 
Canadian examples of the Public and For-Profit, Private Combination Model are the 
Ontario and British Columbia provincial parks systems. Government agencies own 
and manage the resources; however, significant differences exist in these two 
provinces approaches to the management of finances and tourism. 
To illustrate, in the mid-1990s, the Ontario Parks Director and the Harris 
government adopted an entrepreneurial approach to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Ontario Parks. The management structure of the parks agency was 
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changed so that parks could retain all of the earned income and place it into a 
special purpose account which would carry over, year to year. For the most part, 
Ontario Parks operates under the traditional model of direct provision, (arranging 
and producing visitor services themselves) with minimal partnerships with private 
contractors (Eagles, 2008a).
Whereas in the early-1980s, the BC government made a policy change and 
began to transfer front country visitor services in provincial parks to for-profit 
companies. By 1989, all front country visitor services were managed by private 
contractors known as Park Facility Operators (PFOs) (FORUM Consulting Ltd., 
2008). BC Parks oversaw the private companies and focuses its efforts on ecological 
and resource management of the parks and monitoring the private contractors. This 
management model falls under More’s (2005) Outsourcing model and Eagles’ 
(2008a) Public and For-Profit, Private Combination Model.
These provincial examples bring about questions regarding the role of the 
parks government agency and awareness of the different approaches to 
management (Eagles, 2008a). Other concerns include the acceptability and 
appropriateness of an Outsourcing model and a government agency’s adoption of 
commercial-sector principles.
2.8 Implications of Models of Service Delivery on Governance
Presumably, the models of service delivery for parks and protected areas 
presented by More (2005) and Eagles (2008a) have various implications for the five 
principles of governance: Legitimacy and Voice, Direction, Performance, 
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Accountability and Fairness. What follows is a review of literature associated with 
the implications of an outsourcing model on the principles of governance.
The implications of outsourcing park services on the principle of Fairness has 
stirred considerable debate, since parks are generally considered a merit good, 
some fear outsourcing services may threaten equitable access to parks and their 
services. Outsourcing services is customarily perceived as a means of improving 
efficiency, thus positively impacting upon the principle of Performance. However, 
with an increased understanding and recognition of the government’s responsibility 
and cost of monitoring contractors, the relative success of outsourcing services has 
begun to be questioned. Within the outsourcing model, the principle of Legitimacy 
and Voice is negatively impacted due to the different values between the 
commercial and public sectors. A nominal amount of research has been conducted 
to determine the ramifications of outsourcing on governance on the principle of 
Direction, thus yielding a lack of consensus in the literature. And of all the 
principles, outsourcing services most negatively impacts upon the principle of 
Accountability.
Eagles (2009a) evaluated the eight widely used management models’ (in 
parks and protected areas) level of adherence to the criteria of sound governance. 
Eagles’ concluded efficiency ranked the highest importance of all governance 
principles and transparency ranked the lowest. 
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2.8.1 Legitimacy and Voice
The category of Legitimacy and Voice is characterized by the approaches 
used for public participation and the degree of consensus in decision-making 
(Graham, et al., 2003; UNDP, 1997). Public participation means all citizens should 
have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate 
institutions that represent their interests (UNDP, 1997). Consensus-oriented 
decision-making is the ability to mediate differing interests to reach a broad 
consensus on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, on 
policies and procedures (UNDP, 1997).
Participatory democracy is inherently inefficient (Albert & Hahnel, 1991).  It 
involves a myriad of citizens working towards consensus-based decisions, which 
require time, effort, skill in its facilitation and dedication to the process. 
Government agencies include public participation in decision-making and are open 
to public scrutiny regarding finances (More, 2005). Most parks and recreation 
agencies are mandated to solicit public participation (i.e. during the creation of a 
park management plan) whereas private contractors have no such requirements. 
Since commercial organizations are driven by profit, efficiency is highly valued. 
Informed speculation reveals public participation and consensus in decision-making 
do not coincide well with the values of commercial organizations. They prefer the 
vote with your wallet type of public input.
While the government is expected to solicit public input, the form of 
participation can vary, as articulated by Arnstein’s ladder (1969), from 
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nonparticipation (manipulation and therapy), to degrees of tokenism (informing, 
consultation, and placation) and finally degrees of citizen power (partnership, 
delegated power and citizen control). Outsourcing services has the potential to 
lower the degree of public participation, if it allows for participation at all (Hodge & 
Greve, 2007). It is unlikely for private contractors to solicit broad public 
participation, aside from satisfaction surveys.
The principle of Legitimacy and Voice is especially relevant and applicable to 
the role of civil society in the governance process. If the government is charged 
with the responsibility of protecting and presenting areas of natural and cultural 
significance, agents such as non-governmental organizations serve as 
commentators and watchdogs of government agency’s actions and policies. Yet 
outsourcing services can weaken the authority of such stakeholders (i.e. NGOs and 
politicians) who can influence public sector activities but have more difficulty 
influencing commercial companies (Harland, et al., 2005).
2.8.2 Direction
The governance principle of Direction encompasses the criterion of strategic 
vision (Graham, et al., 2003; UNDP, 1997). Good strategic vision involves leaders 
and citizens having a broad and long-term perspective on good governance, along 
with a sense of what are needed for such development. There is also an 
understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that 
perspective is grounded (UNDP, 1997). Ultimately, strategic vision is about 
outcomes. Parks and protected areas are guided by the dual goals of conserving 
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areas of natural and cultural significance for future generations as well as providing 
recreation opportunities for all citizens.
There has been limited research conducted to determine the implications of 
outsourcing services on strategic vision. Harland, et al., (2005) asserts that if basic 
services are outsourced, government employees can redirect their focus on core 
competencies and the long-term improvement of services. Yet, if numerous public 
services are outsourced, it reduces overall government control, known as 
“privatisation by stealth’” (pg.839). If commercial companies have leverage over 
the parks agency, it may negatively impact the agency’s long-term vision for park 
(Harland, et al.).
The strategic vision of a parks agency may be reflected in its strategic 
planning. If an outsourcing model involves renewing contracts after relatively short 
periods (e.g., 3-5 years), a contractor will only plan for the short term with the 
intent to renew its contract. The government agency that arranges the service is 
unlikely to consider long-term planning because it will defer to the contractor to 
manage the resource (Glover, 2008).
More (2005) advocates the public model approach, where parks are funded 
through taxes, enables the “undertak[ing] of non-economic (unprofitable) goals, 
such as the preservation of biodiversity or ecosystem integrity” (p.15). The 
privatization of parks and recreation services has the possibility of threatening the 
conservation mandate of parks and protected areas. Privatization increases the 
probability of commercialization due to the focus on profit, and thus increasing the 
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need for amenities (roads, shops, restaurants, parking lots, etc.) which has 
detrimental effects on the mandate of conservation and the ecological integrity of 
the ecosystem (More, 2005).
2.8.3 Performance
The governance principle of Performance encompasses three criteria: 
efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness (Graham, et al., 2003). In the context 
of parks and protected areas, the indicators refer to the efficiency and effectiveness 
of operations, and responsiveness to stakeholders. Privatization of public services 
ostensibly increases financial efficiency due to the driving force of competition 
(which increases choice, responsiveness and innovation) and thus presumably 
improved effective delivery of services (Glover, 1999a). 
2.8.3.1 Efficiency
Efficiency refers to “the relationship between inputs and outputs and the 
amount of effort, expense, or waste involved in delivering a service” (Crompton & 
Lamb, 1986, p.80). In other words, it involves making the best use of resources. 
Eagles (2009) asserted financial efficiency is the pivotal governance criterion as it is 
the highest-valued in society. Furthermore, he affirmed that outsourcing services is 
designed to increase efficiency.
The neo-conservatism ideology asserts that privatization increases efficiency; 
namely it improves cost savings (Glover, 1999a). Recognizing the distinction 
between arranging for a service and providing the service permits the government 
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to decide what services to offer, while allowing private and not-for-profit companies 
to provide the services more efficiently than could the government. Commercial 
organizations typically have a lower cost of delivery than government in part due to 
specialization and taking advantage of economies of scale (Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse, 2002).
Since the government lacks the profit incentive, it is inherently wasteful 
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). On the other hand, the private sector thrives on the 
principles of efficiency, competition and consumer choice (Glover, 1999a). “The 
purpose of the market is, precisely, that the inefficient shall fail, and the efficient 
expand” (Walsh, 1997, p.34). Outsourcing services decreases the traditional 
bureaucratic structure of the government and allows for the displacement of 
inefficient employees. Furthermore, improved efficiency is often correlated to a 
similar amelioration in effectiveness and responsiveness (Glover, 1999a).
The potential increase in efficiency under the outsourcing model is not due to 
the shift in sectors (public to private) but rather can be attributed to the 
introduction of competition over monopoly (Greene, 2002). And for privatization to 
fulfill the promise of improved efficiency, the conditions of competition and 
government capacity must be present (Van Slyke, 2003; Kettl, 1993). Yet 
competition is not always present in outsourcing scenarios and there often exists a 
lack of managerial knowledge regarding contract management (Van Slyke, 2003). 
Privatization was initially heralded as the panacea to inefficient government 
agencies. Numerous scholars cited success stories of accrued cost-savings due to 
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privatization (Savas, 2000; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Dilger, et al., 1997; 
Lampone, 1995). Yet, there exists a lack of consensus in the academic literature on 
the magnitude of expected cost savings to the government and moreover, 
increasing evidence that cost savings have been overestimated (Jensen & 
Stonecash, 2005; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Kremic, Tukel, & Rom, 2006). 
Furthermore, recent research suggests the cost of monitoring negates the supposed 
dramatic improvement in efficiency (Marvel & Marvel, 2007). Sclar (2000, ¶5) 
postulates
Why did things not turn out as well as the privatization advocates predicted? 
For one thing, tasks that make up the bulk of public services are often more 
complex than privatization advocates maintain, and the complexity translates 
into extra costs to administer the contracting process, monitor work and 
evaluate performance. These can outweigh savings from lower production 
costs.
Monitoring private contractors accrues additional public management costs (Van 
Slyke, 2003). Furthermore, if the cost of monitoring contractors is not adequately 
factored into the parks agency’s budget, the contractors operate independently of 
the agency (Eagles, 2009). The limited empirical research demonstrating the 
magnitude of cost-savings in park agencies due to outsourcing furthers the 
assertion that the privatization movement is inherently ideological, rather than 
solely based in economic rationalizations (Samson, 1994; Van Slyke, 2003).
2.8.3.2 Effectiveness 
Effectiveness refers to “end results and the impact of a service on a clientele” 
(Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p.80). Effectiveness involves producing desired results 
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that meet needs. Outsourcing services has the potential to positively impact upon 
the effectiveness of operations of services at a park agency (Eagles, 2009).
Outsourcing basic services in park agencies (i.e. custodial services) to 
commercial companies allows government staff to concentrate on specialized 
positions (i.e. scientists and rangers), thus enabling the agency to more effectively 
achieve their mandated goals (Cavers, 2004; Harland, Knight, Lamming, & Walker, 
2005).
In the evaluation of effectiveness, the agency must investigate the outcomes 
– individuals’ experiences – and the achievement of a broader impact regarding the 
societal objectives of parks (Glynn & Murphy, 1996). However, a lack of monitoring 
of the contractors raises the question regarding the relative effectiveness of 
outsourced services (Marvel & Marvel, 2007; Van Slyke, 2003). To ensure effective 
service delivery, “the monitoring of privatized services must begin with the 
tendering/bidding process and must continue indefinitely as services are delivered 
by private producers” (Glover, 1999a, p.16). Thus proper monitoring of contractors 
is needed to ensure quality of services. 
2.8.3.3 Responsiveness 
Responsiveness occurs when institutions and processes try to serve all 
stakeholders using a proactive manner regarding complaints and public criticisms 
(UNDP, 1997). Responsiveness refers to how willing an organization and its 
employees are willing to help customers and provide prompt service (Parasuraman, 
Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985).
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Many contend that outsourcing services to private contractors improves 
responsiveness and service quality due to the focus on client satisfaction (Osborne 
& Gaebler, 1992; Crompton, 1999; Savas, 1987). Because private companies are 
driven by profit, organizations thus value the importance of being responsive to 
clients’ demands and criticisms to ensure repeat business, positive word of mouth, 
and ultimately the renewal of its contract. Therefore, the combined government-
private management arrangement results in a strong level of responsiveness 
(Eagles, 2009).
2.8.4 Accountability
The governance principle of Accountability includes the criteria of being 
accountable and transparent to all stakeholders (Graham et al., 2003; UNDP, 
1997). Eagles (2009) concluded that of all the governance criteria, accountability 
and transparency ranked the weakest, for all eight management models (for parks 
and protected areas). The low score may be indicative of its relative importance in 
society.
2.8.4.1 Accountability
Accountability is the requirement that officials answer to stakeholders on the 
disposal of their powers and duties, act on criticisms or requirements made of them 
and accept responsibility for failure, incompetence or deceit (UNDP, 1997). 
Accountability refers to the obligation to answer for one’s decisions and actions to 
stakeholders (Barton, 2006).
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Outsourcing services has the potential to lower accountability, if government 
relinquishes their responsibilities. Domberger and Jensen (1997) attest the public 
sector may outsource the responsibility of providing the service, but the 
responsibility of accountability still remains with the government. Therefore, the 
regulatory role of monitoring the private contractor must remain since it is pivotal 
to fulfilling the obligation of accountability
Outsourcing services, in fact, has the potential to enhance public-sector 
accountability through the review of standards, performance monitoring, and the 
establishment of policies and mechanisms for redress (Domberger & Jensen, 1997). 
Yet governments often underestimate the cost of monitoring into the budget. In the 
case of insufficient funds to monitor, private contractors operate autonomously of 
the parks agency, resulting in lowered accountability (Eagles, 2009). 
2.8.4.2 Transparency
Transparency refers to the sharing of information and acting in an open 
manner (UNDP, 1997). Private companies have no mandated responsibilities to be 
transparent to the public. Contractors are only obligated to report to their 
shareholders and the parks agency. Thus outsourcing services has the potential to 
lower the level of transparency (Eagles, 2009; Hodge & Greve, 2007).
2.8.5 Fairness
The principle of Fairness refers to the criteria of equity and rule of law 
(Graham, et al., 2003). The principle of equity is one of the most contentious issues 
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regarding the implications of a government agency contracting out services to a 
private, for-profit company. As for rule of law in provincial parks, provincial and 
federal laws, as well as the regulations in the Parks Act must be abided by and 
enforced impartially.
Crompton and Lamb (1986) asserted that “primary concern should be given 
to equity, then to effectiveness, and finally to efficiency” when prioritizing indicators 
of a government agency’s performance (p.168). Equity is based on the principles of 
fairness and justice in the distribution and allocation of public services (Crompton & 
Lamb).
Privatization is considered equitable if the fairness of allocation is defined by 
market equity (Glover, 1999a). The market equity model refers to the distribution 
of services “to groups or neighbourhoods in proportion to the tax or fee revenues 
that they produce” (Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p.158). Therefore, people pay only 
for the services they want and are not burdened with funding services they do not 
consume. Proponents of privatization believe that targeted programs (vouchers, 
free or discount days) would be effective in reaching low income users (LeRoy, 
2005; Glover, 1999a). Yet More (2002) noted that targeted programs lack empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that the initiatives indeed help increase participation 
among low-income users.
Privatization is considered inequitable if the fairness of allocation is defined 
by equal opportunity or compensatory equity (Glover, 1999a). The equal 
opportunity model refers to “allocating equal amounts of services to all citizens 
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regardless of need or amount of taxes paid” (Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p.156). This 
approach is not reflective of the unequal socio-economic status of citizens and thus 
further increases the gap (Glover, 1999a).
The adoption of commercial sector principles in the public sector impacts 
upon the foundational notion of equity in government services. Privatization has the 
potential to affect disadvantaged people who cannot afford to pay for services, 
thereby resulting in a world of leisure gainers (wide variety of opportunities and 
choices) and leisure losers (minimum amount of services available) (Glover, 1999b; 
Ravenscroft, 1993). This approach to service delivery reflects the concept of 
creaming, whereby contractors provide services that appeal to the users most likely 
and able to pay and “tend to ignore services that are most difficult to deliver or 
customers who are difficult to serve” (Crompton, 1999, p.240). Furthermore, 
outsourcing visitor services to a private company can reduce equity due to the need 
of full cost recovery (including paying the contract fee to the park agency) plus a 
profit (Eagles, 2009). Thus, people who are unable to pay or programs with lower 
attendance are likely to be ignored with the public sector’s adoption of commercial 
sector principles (Glover, 1999b).
2.8.6 Overall
In this chapter, the management model of outsourcing has been evaluated 
using the principles of sound governance. The principle of Fairness has the potential 
to reduce equity if the fairness of allocation is defined by market equity, and 
through the presence of creaming. Within the outsourcing model, the implications 
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on the principle of Performance ranged depending upon the criteria. Outsourcing 
yields a small improvement in efficiency, the potential to improve effectiveness (but 
requires monitoring) and a positive impact on responsiveness. The implications of 
outsourcing services results in a lowered level of adherence to the principle of 
Legitimacy and Voice, since the commercial sector values efficiency over public 
participation and consensus-orientation in decision-making. It appears the principle 
of Direction is negatively impacted, due to short-term contracts and potential loss 
of government control to the commercial sector. Accountability is indubitably 
negatively impacted by the outsourcing management model. 
The government agency’s monitoring of private contractors and their services 
appears to be of paramount importance for the outsourcing model to be successful.
Monitoring allows managers to determine the degree of efficiency gains or losses, 
the effectiveness of outsourced services, and retains their ability to be accountable 
to stakeholders. As for BC Parks, Cavers (2004) concluded the monitoring of 
contractors was insufficient. Years of downsizing park staff and budget, left BC 
Parks unable to monitor contractors and enforce regulations.
Historically, the focus of research has been on equity, efficiency, 
effectiveness in relation to parks and protected areas (Glover, 1999a; Crompton & 
Lamb, 1986). However, the governance principles indicate there is more to take 
into consideration. The debate continues regarding the appropriateness and 
implications of the various governance models for parks and protected areas. 
Therefore, the development of a better understanding of the implications of British 
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Columbia’s provincial parks’ outsourcing model on governance from the perceptions 




The research investigated the perceived implications of an outsourcing model 
of parks and recreation services on governance. British Columbia Provincial Parks 
was chosen as the case study for this research since front country visitor services 
have been outsourced to the commercial sector for over twenty years.
This chapter introduces the philosophical framework of social 
constructionism, case study methodology, the methods of interviews, and 
document analysis. The history of the BC Parks agency is then presented with a 
focus on the shift towards to the adoption of privatization. The procedures used for 
recruiting and interviewing are presented. A description is offered regarding the 
strategies and procedures for establishing trustworthiness. Finally, the limitations of 
the study are discussed.
3.2 Philosophical Framework
The philosophical framework adopted for this study was social 
constructionism. Social constructionism asserts that individuals co-create subjective 
meanings of experiences in their attempts to understand and make sense of the 
world in which they live (Patton, 2002). It assumes everyone is born into a social 
and culturally-constructed set of norms. These norms serve as a starting point from 
which social actors recognize, produce and reproduce social actions. Because an 
individual’s social reality is believed to be socially determined, social constructivists 
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aim to problematize the idea that material objects have an essence. Thus, 
researchers who adopt this anti-essentialist philosophical framework seek to explain 
how their research participants interpret or construct their inter-subjective realities 
in specific linguistic, social, and historical contexts (Schwandt, 2001). The 
assumptions associated with a social constructionist framework are reflected in my 
choice of methodology and methods.
3.3 Case Study Methodology 
A case is a single, specific, unique phenomenon, bounded by time, place, 
event or activity (Creswell, 2003; Stake, 1995). Case study research is an 
intensive, holistic, and in-depth investigation of a single unit – the case (Feagin, 
Orum & Sjoberg, 1991; Stake, 1995). Case study research is a "systematic inquiry 
into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and explain the 
phenomenon of interest" (Bromley, 1990, p.302). A fundamental goal of case study 
research is to “generate knowledge of the particular” (Stake, 1995, pg.20). The 
case study of BC Parks was an example of More’s (2005) outsourcing model. The 
phenomenon studied were the perceived implications of an outsourcing model on 
the principles of governance.
The research can be classified as an instrumental case study (Stake, 1995),
whereby the purpose was to examine the implications of an outsourcing model via 
the case study BC Parks. Instrumental case study refers to an interest in a 
particular case (BC Parks) with an examination of an issue for insights (implications 
of an outsourcing model on governance). The purpose of the instrumental case 
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study was to explore BC Parks in-depth to provide insight into and understanding of 
the perceived implications of an outsourcing model on governance. 
The BC Parks case study was a multi-perspective analysis of the voice and 
perspective of government employees, private contractors, and members of NGOs, 
and the interactions between them (Feagin, et al., 1991). Guided by the tenets of 
social constructivism, the participants’ perceptions of the phenomenon were sought.
3.4 Data Sources 
Data for this project were gathered from three sources. First, I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with public administrators working for BC Parks, private 
contractors, and members of non-governmental organizations. Yin (2003, p. 89) 
described an interview as “one of the most important sources of case study 
information” because it focuses directly on the case study participants who can 
provide first-hand insights. The study aimed to uncover the participants’ 
perceptions of the implications of an outsourcing model on governance. The 
participants’ perception of equity or performance of BC Parks represents their social 
reality and personal truth. There is no one truth regarding the implications of 
outsourcing on governance, but rather multiple truths. Interviews allowed 
participants to openly express themselves their perceptions of the implications of 
outsourcing on governance.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to allow respondents to share 
their personal experiences, while keeping the interview focused on the topic of BC 
Parks’ outsourcing visitor services’ implications on the principles of governance.
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With participants’ permission, all interviews were recorded and later transcribed for 
a detailed analysis. 
Second, I collected documents to develop a chronology of events and to add 
depth to the identified themes from the interviews. In particular, I collected 
administrative reports from BC Parks, and newsletters and publications from private 
contractors, and NGOs. The document review helped provide the context 
surrounding the information gathered during the interviews (Marshall & Rossman, 
1999). 
Third, I kept a journal to record my observations and interpretations of my 
interactions with research participants. Reflexivity is deemed essential for critical 
self-reflection, because the researcher is the primary instrument of data collection 
and analysis (Stake, 1995; Schwandt, 2001). Commencing with my travels in 
British Columbia and until my thesis was completed; I kept a journal to record my 
ideas, thoughts and reflections about the interviews, data analysis, and the 
research process as a whole. After an interview was complete, I wrote out my 
reflections of the interview, such as my overall impressions and participant’s main 
messages and the body language conveyed. Reviewing my journal entries was 
useful as an outlet to work through emerging themes and later used for reflexivity 
regarding the evolution of my thoughts and themes. Reflexivity is a “very important 
procedure for establishing the validity of accounts of social phenomena” (Schwandt, 
2001, p.224). The trustworthiness of results will be further explored in this chapter.
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3.5 Description of the Case Site
While BC Parks remains under public ownership, the visitor services (i.e. 
camping and day visits) have been operated and maintained by private sector 
businesses, known as Park Facility Operators (PFOs) since the early 1980s. BC 
Parks was chosen because of its unique arrangement of outsourcing front country 
visitor services and serves as an example of privatized parks and recreation 
services in Canada. 
In 1983, under the Social Credit Government, BC Parks began to contract out 
visitor services. Privatization of park services was the solution to decreased 
government appropriations and the pressure to improve efficiency. An internal 
discussion paper entitled The Role of the Private Sector in Providing Park Visitor 
Services circulated through the Parks and Outdoor Recreation Division of the 
Ministry of Lands, Parks, and Housing in 1983. The paper declared the many 
advantages and capabilities of the commercial sector in providing certain park 
services over the BC Parks agency itself. Recommendations included contracting 
out basic services (facilities maintenance, garbage collection, fee collection, 
security, safety, and public relations) and potentially enhanced services (firewood 
provision, visitor programs, transportation and guiding, and food and 
accommodation) because user fees could easily be charged (Parks and Outdoor 
Recreation Division, 1983). The paper clearly articulated that BC Parks would 
remain in full management control and to “prevent private investment in capital on 
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BC Parks property” (Cavers, 2004, p.18). There was no mention of contracting out 
resource management responsibilities.
After the implementation of the outsourcing model, various commentators in  
the 1980s indicated a decrease in quality in BC Parks and noted difficulties with 
contractors. "Park not maintained to traditional standard" represented the 
overarching complaint of BC Parks managers in 1984 (Western Management 
Consultants, 1984)2. In 1986, an internal study conducted by two BC Parks staff 
members noted moderate cost savings had been achieved; however there had been
a decrease in quality of service (Block and Davies, 1986). Another internal 
document from 1988 explored various possibilities to increase involvement of the 
private sector in campsites cautioned BC Parks to more carefully state their mission 
to potential contractors, in order to make sure that private sector service providers 
are aware of their responsibilities to the park system as a whole (Parks and 
Outdoor Recreation Division, 1988).
By 1989, all front country visitor services (such as campground 
management) had been outsourced to private contractors, known as park facility 
operators (PFOs) (FORUM, 2008). Consequently, BC Parks’ staff levels were 
drastically cut; in 1980, there were close to 400 full time park employees and in 
1990, there were 200 full-time park employees (BC Ministry of Environment, 1990). 
An entrepreneurial approach towards park management had been fully adopted by 
                                      
2 An interview with Public Administrator #5 suggested camper dissatisfaction was rooted in 
the type of facilities (i.e. flush toilets rather than pit toilets) rather than the private 
contractor’s maintenance. 
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BC Parks. Marketing strategies such as visitor satisfaction surveys, and referring to 
outdoor recreationists as clients (Ministry of Lands, Parks, and Housing, 1986) 
exemplified BC Parks’ new customer orientation. 
BC Parks evolved from the traditional direct delivery approach to a privatized 
model of park management. Carvers (2004) wrote, “the shift in orientation reflects 
a desire within BC Parks to separate which services were of public benefit and which 
were for private gain” (p. 22). Conservation efforts, such as research activity, 
ranger patrols, and other non-visitor services have always been managed and 
funded by BC Parks. 
Under the NDP Government (1991-2001), the total protected area system 
rose from 350 protected areas covering 4.85 million hectares, representing 5.04% 
of BC, to 807 protected areas covering 11.35 million hectares, representing 11.87% 
of the province (BC Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection, 2001). However, 
while the total number and area of parks and protected areas increased over the 
years, the number of BC Parks staff members and the budget steadily decreased 
(Cavers, 2004).
In 2002, under the new Liberal government, rather than having one year 
contracts for each park, the 245 operational parks were bundled together into 27 
areas with 10 year contracts (FORUM, 2008). Every year, the PFO is required to 
submit an annual business plan. Every three years, the PFO and the BC Parks’ area 
supervisor renegotiate the financial and business plan. Since the shift from the 
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park-by-park model, to the bundle model, PFOs are now typically bigger companies 
running many parks, rather than numerous contractors, each running one park.
On July 27, 2006, Minister of Environment Barry Penner announced the new 
Park Lodge Strategy involving tourism development, ranging from tent-like yurts up 
to 100-room luxury hotels to be built in 12 provincial parks (ENS, 2006). Penner 
explained that the Fixed Roof Accommodation Policy is part of the plan “to capitalize 
on an expected tourism boom leading up to the 2010 Olympic Games” (CBC, 2006). 
Opposition to the Park Lodge Strategy from NGOs and citizens rose quickly. 
The Campaign for BC Parks, (2007) a citizen-led group, outlined their concerns 
regarding a lack of public participation in the Park Lodge Strategy and the 
damaging effects to the environment (construction of buildings, roads and marinas, 
helicopter and float plane traffic, garbage and sewage disposal, and potential water 
supply issues) and to local park municipalities.
BC Parks has a long history of outsourcing services to commercial sectors. 
Privatization is not simply an economic strategy, but a political one as well. The 
professed superiority of the commercial sector in providing services was evident in 
the review of BC Parks history. Cavers (2004) research concluded BC Parks’ 
services were of high quality, yet monitoring had become insufficient. Samson’s 
(1994) third face of privatization is illustrated through 
the economic justification of cuts to BC Parks budgets, of the termination of 
interpretation funding, and the further shift away from government control 
over contracted services (Cavers, 2004, p.53).
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Many academics worry that without monitoring, therein lays a threat to the 
conservation of parks and the ecological integrity of the ecosystems (More, 2005; 
Cavers, 2004).
As for 2007, British Columbia had 893 provincial parks and protected areas, 
which encompass 13.8% of BC’s land base, totalling 13.09 million hectares (BC 
Parks, 2007a; BC Parks, 2007b). BC provincial parks are managed by BC Parks and 
Protected Areas, a branch of the Environmental Stewardship division under the 
Ministry of Environment (BC Parks, 2007c). BC Parks and Protected Areas operate 
with the authority of three pieces of legislation including, the Park Act, the 
Ecological Reserve Act and the Environment and Land Use Act (BC Parks, 2007d).
3.6 Study Participants
In an effort to achieve an understanding of the implications of an outsourcing 
model on governance of BC Parks, government employees of BC Parks, private 
contractors (known as park facility operators), and members of various non-
governmental organizations were interviewed. There exists minimal research which 
has investigated park stakeholders’ perceptions of the repercussions of a parks 
agency outsourcing services.
All participants were introduced to the study and given a letter of information 
and a consent form (Appendix C). 
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3.6.1 Government Employees of BC Parks  
The provincial government has remained in a regulatory role of supervising 
and monitoring the private contractors. Government employees have an in-depth 
understanding and varied perspectives regarding the benefits and consequences of 
outsourcing visitor services to private contractors. I met with six civil servants 
working for BC Parks’ head office in Victoria, BC, which varying levels of years of 
experience with the organization. Each participant signed the consent form and 
declined to be identified in any publications and to the use of attributable 
quotations. The participants did agree to the use of anonymous quotations. It was 
very important to the participant that their identities remain anonymous, which 
suggests to me that they feared being reprimanded for providing negative 
feedback. I concluded that bureaucrats must adopt the standpoint of the 
government in power and repercussions existed for those that did not follow suit. 
To protect their anonymity, I referred to the civil servants as GOV Participant #1 
through 6. Unfortunately, one of the interviews did not record properly. Thus I used 
my extensive notes in my journal post-interview to paraphrase the participant’s 
perceptions.
3.6.2 BC Parks Contractors
When BC Parks began to outsource visitor services, it resulted in displaced 
government employees, who were encouraged to bid for the contracts themselves. 
In the year 2007-2008, BC Parks had 220 contracts with 37 private contractors, 
known as Park Facility Operators (PFOs) (BC Parks, 2008a). PFOs manage park 
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facilities and services at one park, or a group of parks in a specific area (known as a 
bundle). PFOs typically manage BC Parks campgrounds, including selling permits, 
collecting user fees, maintaining the safety and cleanliness of the grounds and 
infrastructure, equipment rental, and other visitor services. There are a few non-
traditional roles in which PFOs manage ski hills, previously owned and managed by 
BC Parks. Out of the twenty-seven bundle areas, twenty-two of the PFOs were 
registered as members of the Park Facility Operators' Society of B.C. Three PFOs 
from the Society were interviewed. Two of the PFOs have been working as a 
contractor for BC Parks since the beginning of the outsourcing model. The other 
PFO had been working for BC Parks for approximately five years. Two of the PFOs 
worked at parks in the Vancouver-Victoria region, whereas the other PFO worked at 
a park much further north. Even though the PFOs all initially agreed to be identified 
in publications and to the use of attributable quotes, during the interviews, the 
participants began to request certain stories and perspectives be kept off the 
record. Therefore I decided to protect the anonymity of the contractors, and I 
referred to them as PFO Participant #1 through 3. 
3.6.3 Members of Non-Governmental Organizations
Non-governmental organizations are founded on a wide array of interests. In 
the realm of parks and recreation, NGOs tend to vary along a continuum of 
interests ranging from wilderness preservation to consumptive and/or motorized 
recreation (see Figure 3) (Eagles, 2007). The continuum served as guide in helping 
select an array of organizations to recruit for my study. 
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Figure 3: Spectrum of interests for parks and recreation NGOs
Wilderness Environmental Low-impact Motorized/ 
Preservation Conservation Recreation Consumptive 
Recreation
(Eagles, 2007)
Wilderness preservation NGOs tend to focus their efforts on protecting large areas 
while allowing minimal human impact (Eagles, 2007). There is a focus on the 
experiential aspects of the environment; seeking a challenging experience in 
backcountry wilderness. Members of wilderness preservation NGOs are often 
young, physically fit and highly educated.
Environmental conservation NGOs’ interests are framed with a focus on 
ecology (Eagles, 2007). Members focus their energies on the health of the 
environment (i.e. ecological integrity) and enjoying low-impact recreation. Members 
tend to be educated and environmental enthusiasts, such as birdwatchers and 
botanists. 
Low-impact recreation NGOs represents the mainstream users of parks: 
families enjoying front-country camping and hiking (Eagles, 2007). These NGOs 
primarily focus on recreation, with an awareness and respect for the environment.
Motorized and/or consumptive recreation NGOs are composed of 
snowmobilers, ATV users, hunters, anglers, and recreational shooters (Eagles, 
2007). Their central concerns regard access, permits, safety and sustainable 
management of the resource.
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In sum, the interests of the various NGO groups range from a focus on 
wilderness preservation (minimal focus on recreation) to consumptive recreation 
(minimal focus on environment). There are a multitude of NGOs active in the 
province of British Columbia. The majority of NGOs use the internet as an avenue 
to connect and communicate with their members and with the public. 
I met with four representatives of NGOs, who covered the spectrum of 
interests for parks and recreation NGOs: Western Wilderness Committee, BC 
Nature, Outdoor Recreation Council of British Columbia, and the British Columbia 
Wildlife Federation (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: NGOs in BC
Wilderness Environmental Low-Impact Motorized/ 
Preservation Conservation Recreation Consumptive 
Recreation
Western BC Nature Outdoor Recreation BC Wildlife
Wilderness Council of BC Federation
Committee
(Eagles, 2007)
The Western Wilderness Committee’s primary mandate is conservation. BC Nature’s 
focus is environmental conservation and they also spearheaded the re-introduction 
of interpretation programs in parks. The Outdoor Recreation Council of BC is an 
umbrella organization which represents twenty-four organizations; in which 
seventeen organizations fit into the low-impact recreation category and the 
remaining seven organizations fit into the motorized and/or consumptive recreation 
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category (Appendix A). The BC Wildlife Federation is an organization of hunters and 
anglers. BC Nature and BC Wildlife Federation are both members of the Outdoor 
Recreation Council of British Columbia.
I also met with one conservationist who was not associated with an NGO but 
was incredibly active and well-respected within BC’s environmental community. I 
would classify the conservationist in the environmental conservation category.
Since the identity of the government employees and PFOs were protected, I 
decided to also protect the anonymity of the members of the NGOs. I referred to 
the NGO participants as NGO Participant #1 through 5. Once again, one of the 
interviews with one of the NGO representatives did not record properly. Thus I used 
my notes in my journal to paraphrase the participant’s perceptions.
3.7 Procedures
My research was part of a larger research project, aimed at better 
understanding how parks, recreation and tourism services are delivered in Canada, 
and its implications on governance. Research was conducted through interviews 
and online surveys of the various park stakeholders (staff, contractors, and 
members of non-profit organizations) of Ontario’s and British Columbia’s provincial 
parks. 
My research solely focused on interviews with government employees, 
private contractors, and members of NGOs associated with BC Parks. I will now 
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explain my procedures used for recruiting, interviewing and following-up with 
participants.
3.7.1 Recruiting Participants
I primarily used the snowball sampling technique (Babbie, 1995), asking 
participants to recommend other BC Parks employees, PFOs, and members of NGOs 
to interview. Due to the political nature of the study, I first interviewed government 
employees of BC Parks, then the PFOs, and finally members of the NGOs.
Dr. Bob Pfister, a Professor at Malaspina University-College in Nanaimo, BC, 
(now known as Vancouver Island University) was friends with one of my advisors 
and agreed to meet with me upon my arrival. Dr. Pfister had previously worked for 
BC Parks in the early 1980s and maintained some contacts within BC Parks. The 
majority of Dr. Pfister’s contacts were retired and had already been interviewed by 
Cavers in 2004. Dr. Pfister also recommended various NGOs and members within 
the organizations whom I could phone. 
Through the help of Dr. Paul Eagles, contact had been established with BC 
Parks before I left for British Columbia. Upon my arrival, I met with a BC Parks 
employee who served as my main contact. From there, the snowball quickly began 
to roll as I was introduced to many government employees. BC Parks employees 
also suggested PFOs to contact as well as which NGOs to speak with, and which 
NGOs not to bother making contact. These suggestions sparked my interest, and I 
contacted all PFO and NGOs mentioned. 
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The PFO first recommended to me agreed to meet and also suggested three 
other PFOs whom I contacted and interviewed. PFO information was readily 
available from BC Parks web page.
Through recommendations from BC Parks employees and PFOs, and a 
comprehensive internet review of the array of NGOs in BC, certain organizations 
were contacted to have NGOs represented along the spectrum of interests. The aim 
was for equal representation across the spectrum in terms of depth of interviews 
not in terms of the number of interviews. 
All participants were contacted (via letter or e-mail or phone or in-person) to 
introduce the study, its purposes and significance, and requested their 
participation.
3.7.2 Interviews
I conducted semi-structured interviews with government employees, private 
contractors and members of NGOs. The stakeholder interviews addressed questions 
related to: (1) goals or expectations of each party; (2) what outsourcing looks like 
and/or how it is viewed by the different parties involved; (3) stakeholders' 
perceptions and/or experiences with respect to its operation, processes and 
outcomes; (4) changes that participants perceive or anticipate as a result of their 
involvement in the contracting; and, (5) any options or improvements that should 
be made with regard to contractor selection, terms and conditions, and 
implementation and monitoring. 
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The interview guide was developed to cover the UNDP principles of 
governance (Appendix B). Hannah’s (2006) interview guide for her research of the 
governance of private protected areas in Canada was used as a basis and structure 
for creating questions. The questions were only used as guides and were not 
followed precisely. The questions were intended to keep the conversation focused 
on the implications of an outsourcing model on governance while allowing the 
participant to express themselves and share stories to illustrate their points of view. 
Interviews were conducted in participants’ office (with the door closed) or a nearby 
coffee shop.
Data obtained through these questions provided insights for planning and 
management of contractors in parks and protected areas. Moreover, the research 
findings added to the body of knowledge surrounding outsourcing public services 
and its implications of governance.
3.7.3 Follow-up
A letter of appreciation was provided to all participants (Appendix C). The 
letter included details about the purpose and benefits of the study. The outcomes of 
the study will be communicated to participants through the parks governance web 
site: http://parksgovernance.uwaterloo.ca/. I will also mail a report detailing the 
findings, as well as a bound copy of my thesis to the BC Parks’ Head Office, the PFO 
Society, and to each NGO.
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3.7.4 Data Analysis
Qualitative research is an ongoing process requiring reflection and critical 
analysis (Creswell, 2003). The case study research involved interviewing 
participants (government employees, contractors, and members of NGOs), and an 
exploration of the setting of BC Parks through document analysis. While the 
purpose of my research was to investigate the perception of the implications of BC 
Parks’ outsourcing model on governance, it was important to first analyze the 
transcripts for the participants’ over-arching themes and then deductively analyze 
the transcripts into the governance principles. I used thematic organization (Labov, 
1982) to investigate the meaning behind participants’ stories.
To analyze the interviews, I began using Stake’s (1995) strategies of direct 
interpretation and categorical aggregation. Direct interpretation involved asking 
myself ‘What did that mean?’ while reading the transcripts. Categorical aggregation 
involved the search for patterns. Following Tesch’s (1990) system of coding, I 
reviewed each transcript thoroughly, while questioning the underlying meaning of 
participants’ words. 
I read through all the transcripts twice, in chronological order to get an 
overall impression of the data while jotting down notes in the columns and 
highlighting phrases that caught my attention. I then focused on one stakeholder 
group at time, since I reasoned members of the group would share similar 
experiences with BC Parks, and thus similar themes would arise. After reviewing 
each transcript from a group, similar topics began to emerge which I clustered 
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together – first for each individual participant of the group, and then collapsed 
similar categories together from the group. Once I felt I had an impression of each 
of the stakeholders’ themes, I delved deeper into each group by re-reading the 
transcripts and further refining the topics, using participants’ words. As I identified 
topics from the data, I wrote memos and had many insightful discussions with my 
advisors and peers. The stakeholder groups shared common experiences with BC 
Parks, which led me to organize the data thematically. 
Thematic organization is the audience’s evaluation of the participant’s 
attempt to convey the meaning of the events in her stories (Labov, 1982). Since 
stories are told with the audience in mind, the participant acts as a performer –
drawing from one of her many personas to best convince the audience (in this case, 
me) the meaning of her story. Qualitative research involves the recognition of the 
active role of the researcher in attaching meaning to the story. The researcher is 
the audience, the interpreter and the narrator. Larson (1997) thus argued that 
“researchers may impose meanings on the lives they study and end up saying more 
about themselves and the things they value than they do about those they study” 
(p.469). My role active role as the researcher is later explored. 
Journal entries and memos were kept for the purpose of reflexivity since I 
was an active participant of the research process (Richardson, 1994). Journal 
entries helped capture my flow of ideas regarding the meaning of the participants’ 
words while reading the transcripts. 
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The document review aided in gaining a deeper understanding of BC Parks, 
the PFOs and the NGOs, as well as establishing a coherent timeline of events. I 
reviewed the BC Parks Legacy Project Final Report (1999), The Recreation 
Stewardship Panel (2002), The Evaluation of the BC Parks Service Delivery Model 
by FORUM Consultants (2008), two of the Western Wilderness Committee 
Educational Reports written by Barlee: “BC Parks -A World Famous Legacy” (2006) 
and “Provincial Parks - How does BC measure up?” (2007), as well as the web sites 
of each organization to review their mission statement and objectives.
Garrison and Massam’s (2001) conducted discourse analysis research on 
environmental policy document produced by the NDP and PC Ontario Provincial 
Governments of the 1990s. They questioned what changes in language use indicate 
an ideological shift with respect to the management of environmental issues. They 
concluded that changes in language use are indicative of an ideological shift with 
respect to the management of environmental issues. Following their lead, I 
conducted a small-scale discourse analysis on the residents of British Columbia’s 
vision of BC Parks (as articulated by the Legacy Project under the NDP 
Government) as well as the Liberal Government’s vision of fish, wildlife and parks.
Discourse analysis research involving written texts assumes intentionality of
language (Garrison & Massam, 2001; van Dijk, 1983). The choice of words and 
structure of the text (i.e. word ordering and collocation of words) can be interpreted 
to understand/reveal meaning. Since policy documents are subject to much peer 
review, it can be assumed the document as representative of the voice of the group 
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who produced it (at a specific point in time and within a particular situational 
context). Furthermore, the frequency of word use is related to the centrality or 
importance of an issue. 
3.8 Trustworthiness
The trustworthiness of the findings is a polemic issue in qualitative research. 
Traditionally, the validity and reliability of qualitative research was challenged by 
quantitative researchers. However, through the acknowledgment that qualitative 
research requires different language and different tools, the concept of 
trustworthiness emerged. Trustworthiness refers to achieving an authentic 
representation of participant perspectives in the findings (Barbour, 1998). There 
were numerous strategies I used in order to address trustworthiness: peer review, 
reflexivity and crystallization (Richardson, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Curtin & 
Fossey, 2007).
Peer review (or debriefings) was used to increase credibility. I consulted with 
my advisors and peers to discuss preliminary and concluded concepts, and received 
helpful feedback regarding the meanings and basis for interpretation (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). I also consulted with a PhD graduate working as a researcher at the 
University of British Columbia who believed my findings “accurately painted the 
picture of BC Parks”.
The process of reflexivity was fulfilled through writing in a journal throughout 
my research. I documented and reflected on my thoughts, beliefs, and emotions 
throughout the research process. 
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Richardson (1994) asserted that data can be considered from many different 
perspectives. Crystallization is a representation of how people, individual selves, 
and their understandings are multifaceted and complex. Richardson then suggested 
we ask if our research has contributed to the understanding of social life and if our 
text revealed the participants sense of lived experience? Furthermore, since stories 
are told with the audience in mind, participants act as a performer – drawing from 
one of her many personas to best convince the audience (in this case, me) the 
meaning of her story (Labov, 1982). Therefore my presence as the audience and 
the manner in which I investigated participants’ perceptions of the governance of 
BC Parks influenced what they had to say. 
Another interesting source for evidence of trustworthiness arose from an 
Evaluation of BC Parks’ (updated) Service Delivery Model (implemented 2003), 
which was commissioned by BC Parks in 2007 and conducted by FORUM Consulting 
Group, Ltd. Once I had finished analyzing the data and elicited my themes, I read 
the report and found invaluable information regarding contract management, as 
well some similar findings to my own research. The Evaluation of the BC Parks 
Service Delivery Model (2008) added to my insights regarding the inner workings of 
the BC Parks – PFO relationship, the outsourcing model, and the implications on 
governance.
3.9 Limitations
A limitation of the research was the extent to which the views expressed by 
the participants I interviewed were representative of the groups they represent. 
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Furthermore, a selection bias was present since I primarily used the snowball 
effect. 
The way my study unfolded, I only interviewed civil servants at the BC Parks’ 
head office in Victoria, BC. With much insistence, the public administrators 
suggested I speak with more and more employees. After six interviews, I 
respectfully explained I had to switch my focus to recruiting and interviewing PFOs 
and members of NGOs. However, that also resulted in a lack of interviews with any 
BC Parks field staff (i.e. area supervisors or park rangers). This limitation suggests 
that the findings are reflective of BC Parks’ public administrators, rather than the 
BC Parks Agency as a whole.
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CHAPTER 4: THE BC PARKS CONTEXT
The document review aided in establishing the context of BC Parks and the 
outsourcing model. This chapter provides an overview and an evaluation of how 
contracting bidding, management, and monitoring functions in BC Parks. The 
finances of BC Parks’ revenue and expenditures are then reviewed. 
4.1 The BC Parks Service Delivery Model
In 2002, under the newly elected Liberal government, BC Parks made 
significant changes to the service delivery model to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness for both the Ministry and the PFOs (FORUM, 2008). BC Parks 
articulated their objectives in making the shift from the park-by-park model to the 
bundle model:
The overall intent of the new delivery model was to enable the PFOs greater 
freedom to operate their own businesses while still maintaining BC Parks’ 
standards and enhancing the visitors’ experience. At the same time it was 
expected that BC Parks would experience financial savings resulting from 
economies of scale in the PFOs’ operations (FORUM, 2008, p.10).
Rather than having one year contracts per park, 245 operational parks were 
bundled together into 27 areas with ten-year contracts (BP Society of Park Facility 
Operators, 2008). Since the shift from the park-by-park model, to the bundle 
model, PFOs became bigger companies running many park services (i.e. five to 25 
campgrounds), rather than the previous small, individual park contractors. 
As of May 2008, BC Parks had about 30 contracts with about 20 PFOs 
(FORUM, 2008, pg.6) There are 27 bundle areas, plus individual contracts at 
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specific parks, since not all park services were able to be bundled together. 
Furthermore, several PFOs operate more than one bundle. However, the BC Parks 
website provided a list of PFOs and contact information for the 2008/2009 season, 
which detailed 27 bundle areas managed by 23 PFOs, as well as 11 PFOs managing 
17 non-bundled areas (BC Parks, 2009a) (Appendix D). There is variance between 
the numbers of PFOs reported by the different documents.
Two other changes were enacted in 2002, regarding monitoring and revenue 
opportunities for PFOs. The style of monitoring shifted from a ‘rules based 
approach’ to a ‘performance based approach’. Before 2002, park area supervisors 
would monitor PFOs using a specific checklist (i.e. are the washrooms clean? y/n). 
Since 2002, the park area supervisors are meant to monitor PFOs using Key 
Performance Indicators to get an overview of the services provided, which will be 
further discussed elsewhere. BC Parks increased investment and revenue 
opportunities for the PFOs by bundling together numerous campgrounds (thus 
increasing their economies of scale) and by increasing the contract length from one 
year to ten years (thus allowing a greater time period to make a return on 
investments in park services). The PFOs were encouraged to propose to BC Parks 
the addition of other recreation and park services in their bundle (i.e. visitor centres 
and rental equipment).
An evaluation of this new delivery model was commissioned by BC Parks in 
2007 to FORUM Consulting Group Ltd., and was managed through a joint BC Parks 
– PFO steering committee. The evaluation assessed whether BC Parks’ 
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aforementioned objectives for the bundle model were being achieved. Four broad 
evaluation questions, which were the terms of reference, provided by BC Parks, 
guided FORUM’s evaluation:
a) Is the current BC Parks service delivery model operating as intended?
b) Is the service delivery model an effective and efficient means of 
implementing MOE and government policy?
c) Is the service delivery model being managed effectively?  Are the right tools 
in place to support it?  
d) Are there adjustments which could be made in the delivery model to increase 
effectiveness and/or efficiency?
FORUM (2008) conducted a review of BC Parks, which enabled me to access 
information regarding contract procurement process, contract management, 
contract monitoring, and other vital information regarding BC Parks. The FORUM 
(2008) document represents a comprehensive overview and evaluation of the BC 
Parks outsourcing model, without which I would have been left with many 
unanswered questions. I will now present an abbreviated version of their findings.
4.1.2 Contract Procurement Process
Since 2002-2003, the contract procurement process has been undertaken in 
three phases. First, BC Park issues “A Request for Expression of Interest (RFEI)” to 
stimulate interest in potential private proponents and identify the pool of 
candidates. BC Parks advertised the RFEI in local and provincial newspapers, and 
directly contacted people they believed would be interested in applying. Second, BC 
Parks used “A Request for Qualifications (RFQ)” to evaluate the suitability of the 
candidates. Finally, BC Parks issued “A Request for Proposal (RFP)” which requires  
proponents to submit an operating plan including a financial proposal. BC Parks 
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then choose the winning bid from the pool of qualified candidates who submitted a 
RFP.
In the Final Draft of the “Evaluation of the BC Parks Service Delivery Model” 
(2008) conducted by FORUM Consulting Group Ltd., they found no legal challenges 
to the RFEI/RFQ/RFP methodology used for procurement. FORUM also noted that 
“while both BC Parks and the PFOs found the three-part process quite complex and 
time consuming, it met government requirements and it achieved the objectives of 
putting the contracts in place as and when required” (p.19). FORUM also concluded 
that there were sufficient numbers of interested and qualified contractors at all 
stages of the procurement process (RFEI - 60 responses; RFQ - 135 responses; and 
RFP – 70 responses). The aforementioned conclusion was significant since operating 
and maintaining many provincial park campgrounds is a specialized skill which 
could have resulted in only a few candidates.
4.1.3 Contract Management
Contract management consists of a written agreement which clarifies each 
party’s roles and responsibilities. The explicit and implicit obligations of the PFOs 
and BC Parks under their contracts are included in the thesis (See Appendix E). 
Contracts are 10 years in length, however, BC Parks has the right to cancel the 
contract, and the PFOs have the right to walk away.
PFOs are charged with the responsibilities of operating and maintaining park 
services and campgrounds, collecting camping and other fees, and accounting for 
their operating performance to government (FORUM, 2008). PFOs provide the 
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visitor experience through a “clean, functional, and safe environment” (BC Parks, 
2008b, pg.6). Their responsibilities include: fee collection, garbage and recycling, 
security, facility maintenance, conducting satisfaction surveys, and ensuring 
cleanliness of facilities and park grounds. The PFO staff members are the first 
responders to complaints, ensure security and safety through soft compliance 
(noise, liquor, violence, vandalism). The PFOs have the power to evict visitors, but 
have no powers to enforce the Parks Act.
The PFOs are required to submit an annual operating plan to BC Parks by 
October 1 each year (including services offered and fees collected) and submit a 
three-year business plan detailing predicted operating costs. The PFOs are 
estimated to employ some 700 employees in their parks operations (FORUM, 
2008).
BC Parks are charged with the responsibilities of conducting performance 
measurement activities and sharing the results with the PFOs so improvements can 
be made, reviewing annual business plans within 30 days and providing feedback, 
maintaining good business relationships with the PFOs, and providing support to the 
PFOs in respect of their obligations when called upon to do so (FORUM, 2008).
While roles and responsibilities are outlined in contractual agreements, a 
strong business relationship, based on trust and understanding is of utmost 
importance. FORUM (2008) noted some tension between PFOs and the BC Parks’ 
staff.
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The PFOs [felt] that BC Parks lacked an appreciation of how the parks should 
be managed on a day-to-day basis and the specific challenges that PFOs face 
as private sector businesses (pg.25).
Some PFOs’ indicated they would not be bidding again on a contract bundle due to 
their negative experiences. FORUM (2008) recommended using the Joint Executive 
Committee, which meets twice a year on which BC Parks and the PFOs are 
represented, to address the concerns to ameliorate the business relationship, to 
thus continue offering high quality experiences to visitors. The PFOs expressed 
frustration surrounding the ambiguity of preventive maintenance, the inability to 
set camping prices, and the constraints surrounding potential investments in capital 
expenditures.
BC Parks’ facilities are estimated to have a replacement value of some $500 
million (FORUM, 2008, pg.34). Capital expenditures on new facilities and existing 
ones are controlled by BC Parks. Routine operating maintenance of the 
campgrounds is undertaken by the PFOs (such as cleaning, lawn mowing, staining 
of tables, replacement of rotten sign/ water posts and sign painting). PFOs are also 
required to do preventive maintenance, however, there was much disagreement 
amongst BC Parks area staff and PFOs regarding what does and what does not 
constitute preventive maintenance. The preventive maintenance issue represented 
the single biggest irritant in the PFOs’ relationship with BC Parks. FORUM 
recommended updating the Facilities Management System to reduce reoccurring 
on-the-ground inspections of preventive maintenance by parks staff. The Facilities 
Management System is not a published document available to the public.
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PFOs’ second biggest irritant was the inability to set overnight camping prices 
according to market demand. BC Parks explained that part of their mandate was to 
provide high quality recreation experiences at an economically accessible price for 
the residents of British Columbia. BC Parks partially addressed these concerns 
through the Statute 2 legislation that changes to how prices are set; rather than 
prices being set by Cabinet, they will now be set by the Minister of Environment 
(MoE, 2008). For the 2009 camping season, discounted rates will be introduced for 
longer-stays to encourage camping in the shoulder season and in underutilized 
parks. In the 2010 camping season, rates will be raised or lowered depending upon 
campground amenities and services, local market conditions, and season variations 
(MoE, 2008). Furthermore, a Park Enhancement Fund was established as a special 
account to keep revenue generated from the sale of BC Parks merchandise to fund 
activities such as interpretative programs, and new or improved park facilities, as 
well as research and restoration activities within protected areas (MoE, 2008).
Since the shift to the Bundle Model in 2003, PFOs have been encouraged to 
financially invest in park services and facilities, to increase their revenue (and thus 
decrease their deficiency payments). The PFOs explained to FORUM their 
frustrations surrounding this new push from BC Parks (see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Circumstances & Consequences for capital investments by PFOs
CIRCUMSTANCE CONSEQUENCE
The PFOs are unable to use the It is difficult for the PFOs to raise 
lands on which the campgrounds are risk capital secured by their
situated as security for bank businesses because they have
financing for additional investments, limited collateral.
since they still belong to the Crown.
While a ten-year period is PFOs are more interested in
reasonable to earn a return on a investment in the early years of
private investment, every passing the contract but their interests
year reduces the potential return tend to decline over time as the
period and therefore increases the payback period grows shorter.
PFOs’ required annual rate of return.
At the end of the contract period, If significant investments are
the PFOs might have no opportunity made by the PFO, the residual
to operate the new facility since value at the end of the contract
there is no guarantee that the PFO might be small or even zero.
will still have the contract in place
after ten years.  
Several PFOs noted that approval Every month that slips by in the
from BC Parks is slow and approval process reduces the time
cumbersome.  available for the PFO to make a
return on the capital employed in
the new attraction.  
(FORUM, 2008, pg. 36)
Despite the bundle shift and the hope for PFOs to invest in parks services and 
facilities, there was little enthusiasm or commitment from PFOs to further invest in
capital park services or facilities.
4.1.4 Contract Monitoring
BC Parks’ land and facilities continue to be under public ownership. PFOs are 
contracted to maintain park facilities to BC Parks’ standards (which are inaccessible 
to the public). BC Parks conducted regular monitoring and reporting activities to 
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ensure the PFOs are meeting BC Parks’ standards (FORUM, 2008, pg. 20). BC Parks 
monitored the PFOs using the following tools:
a) Inspections and Key Performance Indicator (KPI) reports conducted by BC 
Parks independently or with PFOs conducted periodically, several times a 
year;
b) Monthly financial and annual financial statements (includes revenue 
collected);
c) Attendance statistics submitted monthly;
d) Satisfaction surveys conducted every third year for most parks;
e) Comment cards (includes comments cards developed by BC Parks and PFOs); 
and
f) Informal interaction with PFOs and campers.
The first four monitoring and reporting activities will now be reviewed.
4.1.4.1 Key Performance Indicators
The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) evaluate eight areas: visitor 
satisfaction, state of the facilities, financial performance, PFO staff presence and 
appearance, community involvement, legal obligations, provision of additional 
services and the protection of natural and cultural values (Appendix F).
BC Parks and PFOs were more satisfied with the KPI reports rather than the 
former system of check-list monitoring. However, both parties agreed 
improvements to the system were needed. The PFOs raised concerns regarding 
inconsistent implementation of KPI measurements among the different regions in 
BC Parks. FORUM (2008) documented that both BC Parks and the PFOs were 
interested in moving towards a self-auditing system by PFOs supplemented by 
rigorous third party audits (paid for by PFOs).
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FORUM (2008) noted that the PFOs felt that different parks offer visitors 
different experiences and thus should be evaluated accordingly. FORUM noted there 
to be four types of parks in BC: (1) long-stay destination, (2) adventure/wilderness, 
(3) overnight short-stay bedroom, and (4) day-use only. Since visitor expectations 
vary for each category of park experience, FORUM (2008) suggested that BC Parks 
and the PFOs should develop goals and objectives for each category to further 
clarify the PFO’s responsibilities and how best to facilitate such experiences for 
visitors.
FORUM (2008) recommended that the Joint-Executive Committee should 
continue to perfect the KPI methodology to reflect practical and realistic 
measurement. Furthermore, the KPI results should enable BC Parks to compare 
results amongst PFOs (which at present does not exist). FORUM (2008) suggested 
using a ‘Principle Based Evaluation’ to standardize monitoring and allow the 
information to be relayed back to the public. The four possible outcomes of the 
evaluations could be:
 A - This PFO (or park) exceeds BC Parks’ expectations.
 B - This PFO meets all BC Parks’ expectations.
 C - This PFO meets some of BC Parks’ expectations, but not all.
 D - This PFO does not meet BC Parks’ expectations.
The assessment would be based on (1) explicit campground management 
objectives; (2) explicit performance evaluation criteria linked to the campground 
management objectives; and (3) explicit measurement processes linked to the 
evaluation criteria (FORUM, 2008, pg.31). BC Parks and the PFOs need to establish 
an agreed upon list of criteria regarding performance objectives and evaluation 
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criteria which would be applicable throughout the province. Top performing PFOs 
would need less monitoring than poor performing PFOs. Once an improved and 
transparent system of monitoring and evaluation is developed, BC Parks could 
introduce performance based bonuses and penalties for PFOs. As of 2008, no 
bonuses existed for high performing PFOs, and if poor performing PFOs were found, 
BC Parks was limited to sending a “Section 9 letter” which contains a threat of 
cancelling the contract.
4.1.4.2 Financial statements
PFOs are required to submit monthly and annual financial statements to BC 
Parks. However, FORUM (2008) strongly urged BC Parks to develop and implement 
a financial statement template for PFOs and to have the statements audited. 
FORUM (2008) also noted the lack of BC Parks’ capability to analyze and use the 
important information. The PFOs’ annual operating plans were useful documents, 
however, they lacked park-specific detail that BC Parks staff felt was needed. 
Furthermore, in lieu of an explicit guideline regarding a “reasonable level of profit” 
for a PFO to earn, many “acrimonious negotiations” resulted between BC Parks and 
the PFOs (FORUM, pg.26). FORUM recommended developing guidelines to help 
reduce tensions and provide direction for parks staff.
BC Parks sets all park fees, which the PFOs collect. As the PFOs have 
negotiated individual contracts with BC Parks, if the fee revenues are less than the 
agreed-upon operating costs, then BC Parks makes up the deficit, known as 
“deficiency payments” (FORUM, 2008). While most parks run at a deficit, if the fee 
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revenue exceeds the negotiated contract price at a park, the PFO would then return 
a portion of the surplus profit to BC Parks (FORUM). Deficiency payments enables 
PFOs to operate a financially viable business and BC Parks to offer visitor services 
at a relatively low cost to citizens. 
The FORUM Report (2008) included the total deficiency payments made to 
PFOs from 2002-2007 which are outlined in Table 3. 
Table 3: Deficiency Payments 2002-2007 (all figures in millions)                                      
Year Budget Payment Variance Variance 
Total %
2002-2003 1.4 1.6 0.2 17
2003-2004 2.3 3.3 1.0 43
2004-2005 2.4 2.4   0   0
2005-2006 2.5 3.1 0.6 24
2006-2007 3.0 4.4 1.4 47
Five year 
Total 11.60 14.80 3.20 28
(FORUM, 2008, pg.38)
The first column in Table 3 (budget) indicates the amount allocated for PFO 
deficiency payments, while the second column (payment total) indicates the 
amount actually paid to PFOs. 
BC Parks also sent me an internal document of detailed financial information 
regarding deficiency payments made to PFOs which are outlined in Table 4.
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Table 4: Deficiency Payments 2003-2009 (all figures in millions)
Year RFP Negotiated








The first column in Table 4 (RFP Contract Price) indicates the amount actually paid 
to PFOs and the second column (Negotiated Contract Price) indicates the amount 
allocated for PFO deficiency payments. A comparison of Table 3 and Table 4 
revealed variations in the reported amounts of deficiency payments.
FORUM (2008) found many inconsistencies in financial reporting of deficiency 
payments – some years were entered per bundle, other years were done by region. 
The inconsistencies were not “conducive to effective financial analysis for 
performance assessment purposes” (pg.38). FORUM urged BC Parks to collect 
financial information using a standardized template to enable accurate information 
and to allow for comparisons between bundles and years. The new system should 
be automated and web-based. Financial reporting is a key element of BC Parks’ 
accountability to the Ministry of Environment, and ultimately to the taxpayers. 
FORUM’s recommendation is well reflected in the variance between the two tables 
presented above. As a researcher, I found BC Parks’ financial information difficult to 
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obtain, understand, and often conflicted with other government documents, which 
validates FORUM’s findings regarding the lack of consistency in tracking financial 
information.
BC Parks’ revenue and expenses from 2006/07 and 2007/08 were available 
online on the BC Parks web page (BC Parks, 2008f). Detailed financial statements 
are presented in Appendix G, exactly as they appear in the BC Parks Report. The 
ability to review BC Parks’ finances demonstrates a significant level of transparency 
and accountability to citizens. Nevertheless, much more effort is needed in 
explaining the complex financial information to be truly accessible to the citizens of 
British Columbia.
The financial information allows for further comparison with other provincial 
park agencies operating under different management models (which are beyond the 
scope of the current thesis). BC Parks’ revenues, recoveries, capital expenditures 
and operating costs, and number of government employees are now presented and 
discussed.
BC Parks’ revenue and recoveries are summarized in Table 5. The original 
document listed each specific source of revenue.
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Table 5: Revenue and Recoveries
2006/07 2007/08
Total Recreation User Fee
& Permit Revenues 14,005,875 14,363,845
Recoveries 3,639,696 2,884,726
Total Revenue & Recoveries 17,645,571 17,248,571
(BC Parks, 2008f)
Overall, BC Parks’ collected $14,005,875 in 2006/07 and $14,363,845 in 2007/08 
in revenue from user fees and permit sales (see Table 5). Camping fees ranged 
from $10.00 to $24.00 per party, per vehicle, per night (up to a maximum of eight 
persons including children) (BC Parks, 2009b). Persons with disabilities are charged 
no fee. Senior citizens over the age of 65 are charged half-price (BC Parks, 2009b). 
As for recoveries, BC Parks was allocated $3,639,696 in 2006/07 and $2,884,726 in 
2007/08 from other government agencies for specific projects, such as the 
management of the mountain pine beetle (see Table 5). 
PFOs collected and retained $11,937,648 in 2006/07 and $12,283,665 in 
2007/08 in user fees (see Table 6). BC Parks paid deficiency payments to the PFOs; 
$3,782,000 in 2006/07 and $4,541,528 in 2007/08.
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Table 6: Operating Contracts & Commission Costs
2006/07 2007/08
Contract services 
– retained fees 11,937,648 12,283,665
– net deficiency payments 3,782,000 4,541,528
– non-bundled parks 797,723 892,613
Parking fee commission 387,128 338,863
Annual pass commission 11,440 17,203
Sub-total Operating Contracts
& Commission Costs 16,915,939 18,073,871
BC Parks Operating 
Expenditures1 27,001,415 27,100,748
Total operating costs 43,917,354 45,174,619
1 Operating expenditures: salary, benefits, travel, good & services as well as projects 
financed through recoveries (i.e. mountain pine beetle)
(BC Parks, 2008f)
The Year End Report did not specify what specific sources of revenue the PFOs 
retained. After reviewing the information numerous times, I believe the PFOs kept 
the camping, boating, and day-use group reservation fees, since those three 
sources of revenue totalled the “retained fees for contract services” presented in 
Table 6. However an internal document stated that PFOs retained 100% of the 
camping fees, 100% of the septic fees, and 50% of the parking fees) (BC Parks, 
2008b). Once again, there was much inconsistency regarding BC Parks’ financial 
information.
The cost of operating visitor services in BC Parks, was $16,915,939 in 
2006/07 and $18,073,871 in 2007/08 (generated revenue plus deficiency
payments). BC Parks’ operating expenditures totalled $27,001,415 in 2006/07 and 
2007/08 in $27,100,748 (see Table 6).
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BC Parks spent $31,020,000 in 2006/07 and $26,616,223 in 2007/08 on capital 
and compensation expenditures, such as land acquisition, upgrading water and 
sewer systems, road and trail maintenance and campground and day use 
reconstruction (see Table 7). 
Table 7: Capital & Compensation Expenditures
2006/07 2007/08
Capital & Compensation Expenditures 31,020,000   26,616,223
(BC Parks, 2008f)
BC Parks’ expenditures totalled $76,267,354 in 2006/07 and $76,348,842 in 
2007/08 (Table 8).
Table 8: Total Expenditures on BC Parks
2006/07 2007/08
Total BC Parks Budget Expenditures 62,601,138 59,151,111
Total Expenditures on Parks
(incld. Retained fees
& Partner contributions) 76,267,354 76,348,842
(BC Parks, 2008f)
Table 9 followed the exact formatting and presentation used in the BC Parks Year 
End Report (BC Parks, 2008f). FTE is an acronym for “full-time equivalent”; for 
example, two employees working half time equal one FTE. The rangers comprise 
about 35% of the FTE budget for personnel in BC Parks. From what I understand, 
this information indicates there were 188 FTEs in 2006/07 (including 134 rangers 
working the equivalent of 64 FTE) and 193 FTEs in 2007/08 (including 145 rangers 
working the equivalent of 69 FTE). The data shows most park rangers do not work 
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full-time year round, and it is reasonable to assume that the staffing levels are 
increased during the peak season (May to September). 
Table 9: Government Employees
2006/07 2007/08
# BC Parks’ Govt FTEs 188 193
Ranger FTEs 64 69
# Rangers 134 145
(BC Parks, 2008f)
In sum, BC Parks’ Year End Report (2008e) represented a marked level of 
transparency and accountability to citizens regarding the use of tax dollars. 
However, before the operating year 2006/07, I was unable to find a comprehensive 
document regarding BC Parks’ finances. Furthermore, the Year End Report was 
confusing and left me with many unanswered questions. 
The financial figures presented allow for further comparison with other 
provincial park agencies operating under different management models (which are 
beyond the scope of the current thesis).
4.1.4.3 Attendance statistics and Satisfaction surveys
Despite visitor statistics and financial information being ‘collected rigorously’ 
and sent to Victoria, the FORUM Report did not describe the methods used by PFOs 
for counting visitors (FORUM, 2008, pg.21). A senior administrator in Ontario Parks 
mentioned that BC Parks uses axle count measurement on the Sea to Sky highway, 
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which captures both visitors3 and entrants4, thus inflating the visitor use data 
(Eagles, in press; Hornback and Eagles, 1999). Axle count measurements consist of 
pressure sensors on or under the road with a counter attached to capture the 
number of vehicles passing through (Eagles, in press). In the 2007/08 BC Parks 
Year End Report, the attendance statistics were presented (see Table 10). 
Nevertheless, no details were provided regarding the method of recording visitor 
use.
Table 10: BC Parks Attendance
2006/07 2007/08
Visits (in person days)
Day Use Visits 16,942,850 17,081,091
Camping Visits 2,323,110 2,381,099
Marine Visits 205,798 180,663
Total Park Attendance 19,471,759 19,642,854
(BC Parks, 2008f)
The PFO staff conduct satisfaction surveys of campers every year, designed by BC 
Parks (BC Parks, 2008b) (see Table 11). 
                                      
3 a person who visits the lands and waters of a park or protected area for purposes 
mandated for the area
4 a person going onto lands and waters of a park or protected area for any purpose
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Table 11: Campground Satisfaction Ratings (2003-2007)
Percent ranked ‘excellent’ and ‘above average’
Services Standard 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean
Cleanliness of
grounds 93 93 91 93 93 94 92.8
Maintain natural 
surroundings 88 88 88 88 89 91 88.8
Condition of facilities 85 81 81 81 81 83 81.4
Sense of security 84 84 84 82 85 85 84.0
Cleanliness of
restrooms 78 73 71 75 76 77 74.2
Control of noise 79 77 75 73 78 80 76.6
Value for fee 72 60 59 65 67 73 64.8
Availability of 
recreation
opportunities 59 n/a n/a 60 61 61 60.7
Overall Visitor Index5 80 82 80 81 83 84 82.0
Number of
respondents 4,622 4,829 4,395 4,967 4,253
(FORUM, 2008, pg. 33)
Campground satisfaction rates between 2003 and 2007 vary depending upon the 
service. The numbers represent the percentage of visitors who ranked the criteria 
as excellent or above average. No information was provided regarding how the 
satisfaction of services was measured. I took the mean of each criterion to get an 
overall sense of the satisfaction of services. The criteria were ranked in the 
                                      
5 Overall Visitor Index is calculated based on five services: cleanliness of  restrooms, 
cleanliness of grounds, condition of facilities, sense of security, control of noise
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following order of satisfaction: cleanliness of grounds (m=92.3%), maintain natural 
surroundings (m=88.8), sense of security (m=84), condition of facilities (m=81.4), 
control of noise (m=76.6), cleanliness of restrooms (m=74.2), value for fee 
(m=64.8), and availability of recreation opportunities (m=60.7). Clearly, there are 
many happy campers visiting BC Parks. There appears to be a direct correlation 
between BC Parks standard measure and visitor satisfaction (see Table 12).
Table 12: BC Parks standard measure compared with visitor satisfaction 
mean
Services BC Parks Visitor Satisfaction 
Standard Mean
Cleanliness of grounds 93 92.8
Maintain natural surroundings 88 88.8
Condition of facilities 85 81.4
Sense of security 84 84.0
Control of noise 79 76.6
Cleanliness of restrooms 78 74.2
Value for fee 72 64.8
Availability of recreation
opportunities 59 60.7
The satisfaction levels come quite close to BC Parks’ required standards and follow 
the same rank order (except the condition of facilities and sense of security are 
reversed). Comparing these numbers raised a few questions. Most importantly, how 
and why did BC Parks choose to rank the importance of each of these services? 
Why does BC Parks rank the availability of recreation opportunities as the least 
importance criteria in relation to the other eight? Why is value for fee the second 
87
lowest ranked in visitor satisfaction, as well as having the largest deviation between 
BC Parks’ standard and the satisfaction level? These are questions that warrant 
further investigation. 
4.1.7 Evaluation of the Model
FORUM (2008) concluded that considerable strides in efficiency and 
effectiveness were experienced under the new Bundle Model compared to the old 
park-by-park model. In the period from 2003 to 2007, the PFOs’ incurred increased 
operating costs due to the increased cost of labour, fuel and supplies. The new 
Bundle Model proved to be much more resilient to these increases than the park-
by-park model would have been. FORUM also noted the heavy workload spread 
amongst the remaining BC Parks’ staff members who have had “difficulty coping” 
(2008, pg.41).
The themes identified through the interviews will now be explored. It is 
interesting to note that there were similar themes between the FORUM Report 
(2008) and those from the interviews.
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CHAPTER FIVE: PASSIONATE YET POWERLESS
5.1 Outline
The overarching theme I identified from the analysis of the transcripts was 
Passionate yet Powerless, which characterized stakeholder comments on the 
governance of parks in BC. The Park Facility Operators, the public administrators 
working for BC Parks, and non-governmental organization representatives were all 
passionate about parks, yet felt powerless to influence the direction and 
management of BC Parks. The stakeholders were all dedicated to their vision of the 
conservation of and recreation opportunities in BC Parks. However, each 
stakeholder group described the significant challenges it faced in executing its ideas 
for BC Parks. 
The Park Facility Operators undertook a great risk as businesses working for 
BC Parks and their relationship with BC Parks staff was marked by mistrust. The 
public administrators experienced growing pains in terms of reorganization of BC 
Parks with newly elected officials thus creating a sense of powerlessness. The non-
governmental organization representatives strongly disagreed with the direction the 
Liberal Provincial Government set for BC Parks. These senses of being passionate 
yet powerless shaped the participants’ perceptions of governance. 
The theme of passionate yet powerless will now be reported for each 
stakeholder group: the Park Facility Operators (PFO) theme of “Risky Business”; the 
public administrators theme of “Beholden to the Elected Officials”; and the 
89
members of the non-governmental organizations (NGO) theme of “Protecting BC 
Parks from the Liberals”.
5.2 Risky Business: The PFOs’ Perspective on Park Governance
When the privatization model was introduced to BC Parks in the 1980s, many 
displaced parks staff bid on and were awarded park service contracts. PFO 
Participant #1, for example, was a displaced park employee who became a Park 
Facility Operator in order to work in parks and follow his passion. He commented: 
I’ve been on all sides of this. I was a ranger and then dismissed and let go. I 
wasn’t allowed to fulfill my passion. To starting my own business and moving 
forward and making a difference in our parks, and I can go into any park in 
this area and point to all the things that I did in these Parks, which I don’t 
think would’ve gotten done if a Ministry was running it or if another company 
was running it. (PFO Participant #1) 
PFO Participant #1 appeared to be proud of his role in shaping parks in BC, a role 
and level of influence he perhaps would not have had if BC had not adopted the 
privatization model. All of the PFO representatives openly discussed the benefits of 
the privatization model; namely the flexibility and efficiency of private companies 
compared to government. 
Interestingly, the three PFOs interviewed noted they were driven to become 
contractors because of their passion for parks and protected areas, not because 
they were seeking to make money. In PFO Participant #1’s words, he wanted “to 
make a difference by running free interpretation programs with BC Nature (an 
NGO), removing invasive species, and other conservation efforts”. Given his passion 
for conservation, PFO Participant #3 insisted that PFO businesses did not conflict 
with the environmental goals of conservation. He explained that PFOs openly 
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embraced the conservation mandate of BC Parks, which set them apart from other 
campgrounds in BC. Like the other participants, PFO Participant #2 enjoyed 
working outdoors and the positive customer service interactions with visitors. These 
descriptions put a human face on the contractors and reveal motives other than 
profit. Even so, the PFOs lamented their sense of low job security and the 
difficulties they faced interacting with the public administrators. These interactions 
shaped their perspectives on the governance of parks in BC.
5.2.1 Financial Challenges
The PFOs underscored the risk they assumed as contractors working for BC 
Parks. The short operating season of most parks yielded a small time frame to 
make the business financially viable. Furthermore, to the PFOs’ dismay, all prices 
(i.e. camping rates) are set by Cabinet, which compounded the difficulties of 
running the business independently, thereby creating a sense of lack of control. 
Because the service contracts were ten years in length (with financial 
renegotiations every 3 years) and included a cancellation clause, PFOs experienced 
a low level of job security. As a result, the PFOs felt unable to financially invest in 
parks due to the short length of the contract and limited amount of time to make a 
return on their investment. As PFO Participant #3 pointed out:
I’m coming to the half way point with our contract. I have four years after 
this year. So I’ve told you that the info centre was a $15,000 investment. 
Well, all those opportunities now will become dormant. I won’t be looking at 
those kinds of opportunities anymore because it’s going to be four year, 
three years and so on. So what kind of assurances have I got? So that, I 
don’t think that’s really where we want to be. I think we’re just kind of 
getting going here. So really there should be, whether it’s a longer term or 
whether we redo every five years and we’re always looking at a ten year 
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period. I would like to see that change, because I think that would put more 
effort to operators to continue investing.
Interestingly, NGO participant #4 recognized the challenge of operating as a 
contractor: 
And again, the PFOs, it’s not to say that they don’t have a desire or interest 
but they are running a business and ultimately it’s their bottom line that they 
are responsible for and when those contracts are such that, they may or may 
not be there in 5 years their interest in investing resources and tying into the 
business is much more limited, then a government that’s going to be there 
for the long haul. (NGO Participant #4)
These comments suggest the PFO’s hands were tied insofar as each PFO’s need for 
its business to be financially viable within the contract length overrode its desire to 
invest more in parks, especially near the end of the contract term. 
Deficiency payments further added to the risk of undertaking a contract with 
BC Parks. Any increase in a PFO’s park revenue resulted in financial savings to the 
government by lowering the PFO’s deficiency payment, rather than retaining the 
additional revenue. GOV participant #4, one of the public administrators I 
interviewed, recognized PFO concerns about this policy:
That’s one other aspect we’re looking at is we don’t…we’ve got a penalty 
phase built into the agreement. We don’t have a reward phase, you know? 
So every three years, when we renegotiate, they [PFOs] might have 
increased their revenue, right? So they brought in more campers or 
whatever. So we go back to the table and say “oh, your revenues increased 
by twenty percent, so we want to reduce your deficiency by twenty percent”. 
And they’ll say “yeah, but my costs have gone up here, and I’ve worked 
really hard to get that revenue up higher and, you’re not letting me keep any 
of it. You’re taking it all away by reducing my deficiency that you’re going to 
pay, right?” So, that’s our goal, right? We want to try to get rid of the 
deficiencies for the taxpayers, but at the same time, they’ve [PFOs] worked 
really hard to put more money in their pocket over the last three years. And 
now, at the end of that cycle, we’re coming to take it away from them, right? 
Through negotiations. So what we want to try to work on it, again…
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Given the flaws with the deficiency payments, a few of the public administrators I 
interviewed expressed their desire to improve the situation for contractors. They 
indicated the Government’s plan to eventually eliminate deficiency payments to 
make parks fully cost recovery, avoid burdening tax payers, and reward PFOs. 
Various civil servants discussed ways to rectify the situation, largely based on 
financial incentives (PFOs to keep a certain percentage of the extra revenue) or a 
reward system of a longer contract, yet the issues remained unaddressed. 
All told, the present policy made it challenging for the PFOs to operate in a 
business manner. As PFO participant #2 commented: 
If anybody in the system has sort of struggled or faltered is because of that 
risk or a bad deal to begin with the government. It generally isn’t because 
their business practices have been poor or what they propose in the first 
place as far a business case wasn’t sound. It’s a matter of them having been 
impacted by an environment event or the government didn’t disclose 
something in the initial process and it cost the operator a lot of money.
PFO Participant #2 underscored how the high risk and unfair financial deal PFOs 
experience led to a challenging business environment. PFOs were not compensated 
for loss of revenue due to an environmental event, such as a forest fire. So if a 
forest fire occurred and deterred campers, the PFO experienced the associated loss 
of revenue. Conversely, if a PFO attracted more campers and increased revenue, 
the government simply lowered its deficiency payment. Under such a circumstance, 
the deficiency payment remained constant. 
Two of the PFOs interviewed articulated their belief that deficiency payments 
would be unnecessary if BC Parks would raise the cost of camping, which they 
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lamented was far below what the market would bear. PFO Participant #2 shared his 
opinion:
My personal opinion is I don’t believe they [BC Parks] shouldn’t have to run 
under deficiency payments and I really believe that what we’re charging is 
far below market value. And it’s difficult for BC Parks because it’s a political 
position they hold obviously, it’s one that is very close to residents of BC and 
they’re always, they’re out there concerned or negative press that comes 
from the rates. My colleagues that have been in the industry longer have 
mentioned that as soon as rates do increase there’s a down turn in business, 
which I can totally understand because what happens is that there’s a five or 
six year period where rates won’t change at all and then they will change 
fairly significantly. So obviously, that has to change, it has to be very gradual 
and assured that quality increases with the mark up in rate. But I think 
there’s opportunities there to raise that and really to burden the province 
less. And they’re [BC Parks staff] beginning to understand that.  
The comments revealed the flaws associated with BC Parks’ stagnant prices and 
then dramatic increases which resulted in a decrease in visitation. PFO Participant 
#2 believed BC Parks employees were beginning to agree with the PFOs’ point of 
view regarding low pricing. Nevertheless, all three interviews revealed power 
imbalances between PFOs and BC Parks employees.
5.2.2 Power Imbalances with BC Parks Employees
PFO participants were self conscious that the public and government 
employees possibly viewed them as “just maintenance workers”. Consequently, 
they felt undervalued and disrespected by park staff. PFO Participant #1 summed 
up this concern in the following quote: 
And I think that’s where it’s very frustrating, where that trust thing goes, 
because we’ve talked about how passionate we are and then somebody 
comes in and says, “Well, the toilets are dirty right now, so why aren’t you 
cleaning it?” That’s not the only reason that I’m here. 
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In short, the PFOs felt “below” the park staff who oversaw their contracts. 
Evidently, the public administrators were aware of the contractors’ concerns. In a 
PowerPoint training session for BC park rangers, the power imbalance between 
PFOs and parks staff was addressed (PFO Service Delivery Model, 2008). One slide 
read:
• PFOs are BC Parks’ PARTNERS
• PFO staff are not “below us” – hierarchy attitude is not acceptable
The slide information conceded a history of hierarchical attitude between parks staff 
and the PFOs, but also offered evidence of the public administrators’ attempt to 
address and potentially improve the relationship. 
Nevertheless, the PFOs’ comments in the interviews did not reflect any 
change in the relationship. The PFO participants commented on the power of area 
supervisors to “make or break you” depending upon the supervisors’ style of 
management, acceptance of the outsourcing model, and written performance 
reviews of PFOs. Furthermore, the contractors discussed their frustration 
surrounding the political nature of financial negotiations with park staff:
My costs are based on real numbers that I come up with, like estimates on 
labour costs, etc. Their ability to pay me is completely based on political 
numbers that are set in advance usually before we go into negotiations. Then 
I, as a business person, have to decide whether or not I can risk losing this 
job because it’s still essentially buying a job, or do I walk away and find 
something else to do for a living and let them suffer with the consequences. 
(PFO Participant #3)
The aforementioned suggests that PFOs are expected to operate front country 
visitors services at the minimum cost possible and unforeseen increases in 
expenses can’t always be compensated by the government. The cancellation clause 
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in the contract allows either the PFO to walk away or the government to rescind the 
contract. I asked GOV Participant#2 if the cancellation clause had ever been used, 
to which he explained it had only been used once to do a mass cancellation of all 
contracts when switching from the park-to-park model to the bundle model. 
However an internet search revealed a Vancouver-based newspaper ran an 
article regarding the revoking of Gibson Pass Resort’s contract in January 2008 
(Fournier, 2008). Kate Thompson, Ministry of Environment spokesperson, was 
quoted in the article, saying that “Gibson Pass Resort Inc. has had its park-use 
permits revoked… it had about $80,000 owing to two suppliers. A temporary 
operator is in place”. However, Gibson Pass Resort’s lawyer Carey Veinotte said in a 
January 11 letter to the Ministry of Environment “bureaucrats were motivated by 
malice or other improper purpose and must pay $140,000 in deficiency payments 
damages for unilateral reduction of parking fees and the wrongful appropriation of 
Gibson Pass equipment”. The article also noted that Gibson Pass Resort also owned 
a logging company which was in financial crisis. Furthermore, an NDP critic Shane 
Simpson criticized the Liberal Government for not ensuring the financial stability of 
PFOs through oversight and regular audits (Fournier). 
The Province’s article raises further curiosity regarding PFO Participant #2’s 
comments on pg.92 regarding PFOs who have lost their contract due to an 
environment impact or “the government didn’t disclose something in the initial 
process and it cost the operator a lot of money”. So the government can cancel a 
contract if the PFO is not performing up to BC Parks’ standards, as monitored by 
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area supervisors, yet, the PFOs all noted a significant lack in consistency with 
contract monitoring. PFO Participant #1 noted:  
They are “BC Parks” but there’s 9 regions and they are all different. There is 
no consistency. I think that’s what they’re struggling with the most right 
now, is that they don’t have consistency. So it’s mixed messaging to the 
PFOs. That’s why we also formed a Society so that we can chat, if there’s 
problems. 
The PFO Society was initially formed for bulk purchasing (e.g. uniforms, 
equipment), but evolved to serve as a united voice to lobby the BC Parks Agency 
and a forum to discuss issues encountered by PFOs (PFO Background Information, 
2008). The PFOs attributed the lack of consistency in contract monitoring to 
personality differences and the power of area supervisors, all of which directly 
impacted upon the PFOs’ business. The PFOs and public administrators articulated 
the transition in approach to monitoring:
There’s been a shift with respect to the model of operation. Where BC Parks 
have come from the point where they have monitored very, very specifically 
and on a, sort of on a day-to-day basis if you will of the condition of facilities 
and the operation. And with this new model, they wanted a step back from 
that. They wanted the operator to do that. They wanted to monitor the 
trends from the higher level. Which is really good. I can’t say that that’s been 
successful because the area supervisors from BC Parks are very comfortable 
and very knowledgeable of monitoring on a day to day basis and being that 
this is new I’m not sure whether it was training and direction or what it was 
or the personal preference, a lot of the various supervisors really didn’t make 
that transition and they still gravitate into that. They’re very focused on 
facilities. Are they clean, are they not? Are they neat and tidy or are they 
not? They’ll also need to be looking at and need to be looking at and they 
need to be monitoring in a higher level. It’s not even if he’s [PFO staff] 
collecting the right amount of change, but what’s his approach like? Is he 
providing good quality provision? Can he answer questions when they’re 
[visitors] asking? (PFO Participant #2)
While the PFOs welcomed the idea of a micro to macro shift in monitoring, it 
appeared many area supervisors continued to focus on facilities and day-to-day 
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operations. PFO Participant #2 articulated his desire for PFOs to manage and 
monitor the daily operations, with parks staff monitoring higher level trends, such 
as service quality. 
All the PFOs expressed the variance in negotiation styles of area supervisors 
and overall lack of consistency. PFO Participant #2 expressed his gratitude for 
having a progressive area supervisor with whom he renegotiated his contract in 
“non-competitive fashion”. He felt all his business information was shared in a very 
transparent manner. However, other participants thought their area supervisors 
continued to gravitate to the old style of micro-monitoring on the status of the 
facilities. PFO Participant #2 mentioned years ago having “screaming matches” over 
the financial aspects of contract negotiations with parks staff. Under the new 
approach to monitoring, PFOs were expected to monitor the day-to-day operations 
of their business and report back to the BC Parks staff. The public administrators 
described how top performing PFOs need less monitoring and vice versa. GOV 
Participants #1 spoke to the challenging evolution of the relationship between 
contractors and public administrators: 
Right at the beginning, I must admit the relationship was about butting 
heads with the PFOs. There were some growing pains to get through under 
this new model. But for the most part, the philosophy of the PFOs and the 
philosophy of BC Parks has really started to gel well in terms of their interest 
and our interest are very much aligned. We work together to make sure the 
outcomes are achieved on that particular model so it seems to be working.
GOV Participant #4 offered a similar perspective:
Now we’re trying to build what I would call stronger working relationships 
with our contractors.
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Despite efforts by public administers to improve the relationship, PFOs felt 
frustrated with the lack of consistency with monitoring. The PFOs disputed the 
effectiveness and capacity of public administrators to make such changes, which 
further underscored the PFOs sense of powerlessness. The PFOs also articulated the 
public administrators’ lack of business sense, which contributed the sense of 
mistrust.
The Liberal government’s “BC is open for business” mantra resulted in many 
changes to BC Parks. The Government articulated their goal to increase BC Parks 
visitation by 20% by 2010 (as discussed by GOV Participant #4 and #5). The 
Government increased BC Parks’ focus on revenue with Statue 2 – differential 
pricing of campsites based on the quality of the campsite and time of year (peak 
versus non-peak season). Moreover, contractors were strongly encouraged and 
almost expected to invest financially in additional services (i.e. canoe and bike 
rentals). However, the contractors commented on the limited time frame to earn a 
profit on such an expensive investment due to (1) the short operating season, (2) 
the short contract length, and (3) the needed liability insurance policies for 
recreation activities. Furthermore, it deeply frustrated the PFOs that the public 
administrators made these suggestions without exploring the cost-benefit analysis 
of such investments. As previously discussed, the motivation to increase revenue 
was minimized due to lowered deficiency payments: 
Like I said, they expected all that to come forward without ever looking at 
those things as a business model and deciding whether or not you could 
make money in any of those businesses within a provincial park. Most of us 
have looked into these [additional park services] and most of us have tried 
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one or two of them and as a group have decided that that investment is a big 
risk to put out there to make additional money and reduce their costs 
because they’re not money makers. (PFO Participant #3)
They’re built on sort of a military structure you know it’s very authoritarian 
and it comes down the change of command where as we are – we can’t take 
orders like that. We have to make money at this you know what I mean. This 
is our business you know. If it doesn’t make financial sense then we just 
can’t stay yes to you we’ll have to question you on a lot of things or we are 
going to lose our shirts, we’re going to lose our houses.  Right now every bit 
of credit I have is tied up in this system. I can’t sell my house, you know, I 
can’t finance anything else. I can’t – I just basically operate this business for 
the government and with a very limited potential profit margin right now. I 
have financed or mortgaged my life to buy this job. The government 
employees don’t want to make it a nice job for me,  so that’s sort of the 
down side… it’s still better than working in an office. (PFO Participant #3)
Building trust is really important. Really, really important and it’s, that’s 
where there needs to an understanding from BC Parks of the business aspect 
of this. So that they’re not put into a position where they’re prescribing that 
we do something a certain way because that’s where the conflicts come in. 
(PFO Participant #2)
These quotes illustrate the PFOs’ frustration with public administrators whose lack 
of business sense, in their view, led to poor policymaking which negatively 
impacted the government-contractor relationship. Despite the Liberal government’s 
mantra that “BC is open for business”, the conditions for PFO businesses to operate 
effectively were not, according to PFO participants, in place. Interestingly, PFO 
Participant #1 discussed the potential drawback of the government’s plan for PFOs 
to be more business-focused:
Our members are unique. It’s a unique business. It’s a lot of Ma and Pa type 
because if you go past the lower mainland you start heading there are lots of 
beautiful Parks but it’s a very short season and very, very busy in this little 
chunk of the year. And that’s it. It’s hard to run a business in that way. You 
have to be passionate about it. I think Parks is going to see this next - sort of 
go around after the 6 years of this new bundle. Some of our members have 
already told us that they are taking the option to walk away. That’s because, 
BC Parks wants us to run it as a business and we are forward thinking. Trying 
to be progressive. We’re trying to do things for conservation. But somebody 
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who wants to go and park their RV and run a couple of campsites and rake 
and clean and meet the people and happy to talk to the people. They don’t 
want all this paper. They don’t want all this work. That’s not what they’re 
about. They just don’t want the company part of it. (PFO Participant #1)
These comments revisit the PFOs’ passion for parks and the difficulty of operating 
such a business due to the short operating season. PFO Participant #1 disclosed 
that certain PFOs will not renew their contracts, those who had previously enjoyed 
the lifestyle of operating a campground and were not interested in becoming a 
business-focused company with all the associated paperwork. Furthermore, he 
explained that “not a lot of people are in this business anymore”, suggesting a lack 
of operators in BC. He questioned what would happen to the quality of BC provincial 
parks if they’re not managed by people filled with passion for parks, which may 
happen more and more under the bundle. PFO Participants noted they came into 
business to pursue their passion for parks, but were ultimately faced with a high 
risk, low security job and many difficulties dealing with BC Parks staff. 
All three PFO research participants discussed the lack of enforcement of the 
Parks Act regarding parking, vandalism, alcohol and security issues. The PFOs can 
request people to comply with the Parks Act, but have no authority to enforce the 
rules. Furthermore, all three PFOs noted how the majority of park visitors knew 
PFOs didn’t have that authority. The PFOs explained how few park rangers work for 
the BC Parks Agency, and spent the majority of their time in the office or 
monitoring the backcountry, and are rarely to be found in front country parks. PFO 
Participant #3 commented:
If I’m there 100 days of the year, you know on the ground in the parks – if I 
run into even one of the Rangers it’s pretty rare. The PFOs are pretty much 
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the presence. You know, the Park Rangers, most people don’t know what one 
is in my parks now.
PFO Participant #3 continue on to describe his staff’s search and rescue efforts at 
his parks: 
The average year we save two lives. Last year, these two guys had gone in 
and swam and their friends had reported them missing, and we found them 
huddled underneath a tree. That was definitely what you’d consider a Park 
Rangers role, but the Park Rangers aren’t there anymore.
PFO Participant #2 believed the enforcement issue got pushed to the side since 
currently, there appears to be no solution – the government will not hire more park 
rangers, yet refuses to outsource the responsibility. In a PowerPoint presentation 
for training new parks rangers, the PFO staff’s responsibilities regarding 
enforcement were outlined (PFO Service Delivery Model, 2008):
• Security 
– Soft compliance (noise, liquor, violence, vandalism)
– Power to evict
– First Responders (wildlife encounters, accidents)
This internal document reveals that PFOs have security responsibilities within parks, 
yet the interviews demonstrated the PFOs’ perceived lack of authority to carry out 
such responsibilities. 
In conclusion, the public administrators were cognisant of the flaws in the 
outsourcing model, but not fully aware of how mistreated the PFOs felt. The PFOs 
were discouraged by a sense of powerlessness and mistrust. For a strong, working 
relationship built on trust, the PFOs need the public administrators to increase their 
understanding of business principles, to amend the punitive deficiency payments 
model, for area supervisors to stop micro-managing and monitor for higher-level 
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trends, to increase consistency with monitoring and negotiations, to address the 
lack of Parks Act enforcement and overall increase the respect towards PFOs.
5.3 Beholden to the Elected Officials: The Public Administrators’ 
Perspective on Park Governance
Changes in government officials affect the provision and management of 
public sector resources. The transition of elected officials has profound implications 
for the way in which BC Parks are managed, such as the roles and responsibilities 
of civil servants, the level of funding, and the focus and balance between 
conservation and recreation. The public administrators I interviewed from BC Parks 
shared a sense of constant transition and powerlessness due to changes in elected 
officials, directives and initiatives. Nevertheless, the public administrators felt very 
passionate about and dedicated to their job and BC Parks: 
I think normally one of the things that occur historically in Parks, there was 
not a lot of turnover. People who got jobs in Parks loved it. A lot of people 
would sacrifice, I think, moving to other kinds of positions that probably paid 
more, because I think people were committed to what they believe like I 
think it’s not just enjoyment of the work, but I think its people really feel that 
what they are doing is making a contribution to society. (GOV Participant #5)
The public administrators expressed their enjoyment of their work and their 
commitment to the mandate of BC Parks. GOV Participant #5 explained that parks 
employees were serving a higher purpose by ‘making a contribution to society’. 
However, the public administrators experienced much change and angst regarding 
staff, budget, and responsibilities depending upon the elected officials in power. 
GOV Participant #5 noted that in the early 1980s, there were close to 400 
full time park employees. However with the full move towards complete outsourcing 
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of all front country visitor services in 1989 led to job cuts and role changes whereby 
they began to manage contracts, rather than provide services directly. 
Throughout the 1990s, the NDP doubled the size of BC Parks to achieve the 
goal of 12% of the provincial land base under protected areas. The public 
administrator commented that priority was placed on land acquisition.
Under the new Liberal Government, between 2001 and 2005, the 
Environmental Stewardship division’s (under which BC Parks operates) budget fell 
40% ($83.5 million to $50.8 million dollars) and government employees were cut 
by 31% (1298 to 897) (Recreation Stewardship Panel, 2002). Then in 2002/2003, 
one year contracts were eliminated and 245 parks were bundled together into 27 
areas with 10 year contracts (PFO Background Information, 2008). The public 
administrators were then required to work with bigger companies rather than 
smaller Mom & Pop type contractors. This state of constant transition and cutbacks 
led to feelings of powerlessness, which typified the public administrators’ 
perceptions of governance. GOV Participant #4 described his experience:
So land base goes up but your resources go down for staffing and then your 
money, your budget that government’s giving you is going down. So there’s 
no parallel in terms of what governments doing with this system. And then 
you’ve got the facilities that need to be replaced. 
While the size of the protected areas in BC Parks more than doubled since 1990, 
the participants noted their staff and budget steadily decreased and facilities which 
needed replacement. He and other public administrators were irritated by the 
Government’s message of “do more with less”. The public administrators cited 
significant cost savings due to the outsourcing model:
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I think in terms of revenue it’s working okay. You know we’ve seen increases 
in revenue. It just involves a lot of work and discussion. A lot of sort of 
connecting with the PFOs. I’d be interested in hearing how Ontario Parks is 
doing. I think in terms of – there have been a number of studies that have 
been done that have demonstrated cost savings – definitely cost savings. 
Whether the staff moral or that kind of thing is working well, you know, you’d 
have to talk to other people. (GOV Participant #5)
The public administrators were convinced of the increased efficiency of the 
outsourcing model due to their low operating costs of staff and budget. 
Interestingly, after referencing studies which demonstrated cost savings, GOV 
Participant #5 then mentioned “it just involves a lot of work and discussion” 
referring to the effort involved in contract monitoring and management. He then 
questioned if the cost savings came at the cost of lowered park staff morale. It 
seemed that the public administrators believed the outsourcing model resulted in 
an increase in efficiency, but then qualified their statement with a negative 
consequence or perception of the outsourcing model on park staff.
The public administrators expressed their frustration regarding decisions 
made by elected officials. They repeatedly noted their roles and responsibilities 
changed depending upon the political direction. In GOV Participant’s #1 words:  
So what it’s meant for our staff is a shift from “We’re in control, we do it”, to 
one of “We monitor, we report out, we work with the contractor to bring the 
standards to a level that’s needed around here”. It took us a little bit of time 
to get use to the new models, to move from the late 80’s and into the early 
90’s. Then everything worked fairly nicely through the 90’s. Then as we 
moved into the bundle model, we have yet another hurdle to get over again 
as we were changing mindsets. When you move to a new government, you 
have people that are more than willing to jump into that and try it out. You 
have other people that are really hesitant and automatically jump to 
conclusions that it’s not going to work because it’s a change. So those things 
take time so if I was to provide anybody some advice over doing a different, 
another government models in terms of our country’s provisions of services, 
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you need to create a buffer time in there and recognize that you will go 
through growing pains and go through headaches. 
In short, the public administrators explained they were forced to make many 
adjustments over the years, which led to a seemingly constant state of flux. GOV 
Participant #1 noted the power of elected officials to set direction and the public 
administrators’ growing pains associated with such changes, the varying level of 
acceptance and trepidation to change, and the extra time needed to adjust to 
change. The contractors did recognize the public administrators’ struggle over the 
change in responsibilities:
Keeping in mind, I mean some area supervisors do very well at this, but 
there are also area supervisors that are put into this position and it’s not 
really what they signed up for 15 years or 20 years ago. And I give them 
credit. They’re hanging in there. They’re trying to change with the time but 
they really want to be in the field. They want to be a part of the park 
operations, via backcountry or front country. I don’t know if they’re really 
turned on by contract management. (PFO Participant #2)
The PFO participants acknowledged the difficult transition the public administrators 
made, shifting from direct provider to contract monitor. The PFOs questioned 
whether some of the public administrators actually enjoyed monitoring contracts or 
if they would rather be on the ground, directly providing services. The PFO 
participants’ comments reflected the public administrators’ lack of power in 
determining their own role and responsibilities.
Most of the NGO representatives expressed their respect for civil servants 
dedicated to BC Parks. NGO Participant #3 recognized the “tough changes” public 
administrators experienced over time, including staff and budget cuts, which 
impacted upon their visibility in parks and decreased their morale overall. The 
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members of the NGOs also noted the power of elected officials to set the direction 
of and new initiative for BC Parks (such as lodges in parks). NGO Participant #2
explained:
But you have to remember, you have politicians and you have bureaucrats.  
And they are subject to direction from above. I know so many of these 
people and I know that they’re squirming, I believe, under what’s going on in 
parks today. 
NGO Participant #2’s comments revealed how most public administrators disagreed 
with the direction of BC Parks as set by the Liberal government and reflected the 
limited power of BC Parks’ civil servants as compared to elected politicians. The 
relationship between public administrators and elected officials was strained. GOV 
Participant #4 commented:
We’re basically a good news story for government, for the most part.  But 
it’s…the last five years has been really hard to sort of work with the Liberals, 
and get them to see the advantages of B.C. Parks, right? It’s hard when 
you’re competing against logging, and mining interests and other things, so… 
The public administrator participants argued that elected officials were pre-occupied 
by other competing interests (i.e. resource extraction). The public administrators 
struggled to convince the politicians of the benefits and mandate of BC Parks, to 
which politicians seemed indifferent. The public administrators described the power 
of the elected officials to set the direction and priorities for BC Parks. First and 
foremost, they claimed, elected officials allocated funding to each Ministry:  
I think it depends on politically who’s in power, how Parks is perceived in 
terms of a priority. In government, there is always competition for money. 
The Ministry of Health and Education are the two big ones and the population 
is aging so their whole budget has grown astronomically, it’s huge. So if you 
cap the tax rate and you’ve only got so much revenue, where’s it going to 
come from? It’s going to come from the other sectors. (GOV Participant #5) 
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Of course, budget allocations are inherently political. Public goods and services are 
all in competition for the finite amount of tax dollars to be distributed amongst the 
Ministries (i.e. Health, Education, and Environment). If Parks are not perceived as a 
priority by the elected officials, then participants argued funding will remain 
stagnant or decrease. While GOV Participant #5 noted the limited potential for 
funding from taxes, another source of revenue was user fees or cost reductions, 
which the Liberal government actively pursued. 
Participants suggested the emphasis and priority of the goals of conservation 
and recreation changed depending upon the direction of the elected officials in 
power. In the 1990s, they argued, the NDP government more than doubled the size 
of the park system and an emphasis and funds were directed on land acquisition, 
while recreation took the back seat. Since the 2001 election of the Liberal party, 
the focus, they suggested, has shifted: 
There have been concerns that the notion of providing quality business 
services had sort of been pushed to the side in the 1990s while building the 
Parks system from 6% up to almost 14% today in terms of park size.  So the
government now wants to see more around the people side of things, more 
around the business side of things, more around the economic contribution of 
Parks and that. (GOV Participant #1)
The Liberal Party’s focus for BC Parks was visitor management, using a business 
approach and enhancing the economic contribution of parks. Furthermore, many 
public administrators explained that they were under fiscal pressure from the 
elected officials to cut deficiency payments in half and to eventually eliminate 
deficiency payments all together so as not to burden the tax payers.
108
The participants voiced their concern about the Liberal government’s aim to 
generate revenue through BC Parks. GOV Participant #4 divulged that the Premier’s 
Office phoned and announced that the decision had been made that parking meters 
would be installed in certain provincial parks and “to make it happen”, which 
allowed no time for public consultation. GOV Participant #5 expressed his concerns 
with this policy: 
A lot of the changes that have come in Parks since about 2001 come directly 
from sort of the Premier’s Office. It’s been a big push, so the Fixed Roof 
policy is a big initiative. The new challenge is to increase attendance by 20% 
by 2010. 
The plan to eliminate deficiency payments, the installation of the parking meters 
and the proposed Fixed Roof policy reflects the gross power imbalance between 
elected officials and public administrators. GOV Participant #1, however, felt these 
sorts of policies made no difference to his job:
It’s interesting that, it doesn’t matter which, it doesn’t matter what 
governments is in charge. The business of managing Parks is protecting 
remains relatively constant through that process. Your business of twenty, 
thirty, ten years ago, is very similar to that of business of today. We might 
do things in a little bit of a different, but the outcome of what we’re trying to 
manage to remains sort of constant through that. 
It should be noted this perception was distinctly different from his colleagues who I 
interviewed for this study. 
All told, the public administrators’ experience with BC Parks was 
characterized by being passionate about parks yet powerlessness to elected 
officials. The constant reorganization of BC Parks’ staff, budget, and associated 
roles and responsibilities caused the public administrators a great deal of growing 
pains. Furthermore, the majority of the public administrators interviewed disagreed 
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with the direction of BC Parks as set by the Liberal Provincial Government. 
Nevertheless, the public administrators of BC Parks were beholden to the elected 
officials’ policies. 
5.4 Protecting BC Parks from the Liberals: The NGOs’ Perspective on Park 
Governance
The NGO representatives’ passion for BC Parks was palpable. While each 
research participant had specific interests in the management and use of BC Parks, 
it was their deep passion and dedication for BC Parks that held them together as a 
group. NGOs represent a variety of citizen interests in parks. 
In 1991, the NDP Provincial Government announced its plan to double the 
size of BC Parks to reach the UN goal of preserving 12% of one’s land base in 
protected areas (Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, 2000). In 1997, due to 
the vast expansion of the size of the BC Parks system, the Minister of the
Environment of the NDP government appointed a panel of nine experts (including 
NGO Participants #2 and #3) to meet with citizens around the province to offer the 
Government recommendations regarding the long-term vision of the planning and 
management of BC Parks. The NGO representatives I interviewed highlighted the 
BC Parks Legacy Project as the pinnacle of good governance in the recent history of 
BC Parks. As NGO Participant #3 described:
People had strong feelings and to me as I said earlier, it became really clear 
that people in British Columbia have a passion about the parks. They care 
deeply about them. They want to see them properly cared for. They want to 
see them properly managed. They want to ensure they remain public assets, 
a public good. 
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The BC Parks Legacy Project represented the will of the citizens to keep parks 
publicly owned without any commercialization. NGO Participant #2 considered the 
Parks Legacy to be “the most open and comprehensive public participation process 
regarding BC Parks”. The Legacy Project (1999) articulated the residents of British 
Columbia’s vision statement for BC Parks:
British Columbia is distinguished by its globally significant natural diversity 
and magnificent natural landscapes. Publicly owned protected areas are the 
nucleus of this legacy. These lands and waters preserve, in perpetuity, 
representative examples of the province’s natural diversity in naturally 
evolving ecosystems. These special places also protect associated 
recreational and cultural heritage values that embody the close relationship 
that we, as British Columbians, have with our environment. Our identity as a 
people and our sense of place are inherently linked to the long-term 
sustainability of the values that our protected areas system represents (pg. 
iv).
The importance of environmental protection is present throughout the entire vision 
statement. The priority is placed upon “publicly owned protected areas” and 
followed by “recreational and cultural heritage values”. Furthermore the vision 
statement articulated how the identity of BC residents is clearly linked to the 
environment and its long-term protection.
The NGO representatives were in favour of the NDP’s green policies and 
consultation with the public. Thus, despite some minor cutbacks to budget and staff 
to BC Parks, the NGO representatives were largely pleased with the policies and 
actions of the NDP government throughout the 1990s, the predecessors to the 
current Liberal Government.
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5.4.1 “BC is Open for Business”
Accordingly, the interviewed NGO participants felt the governance of BC 
Parks worsened with the election of the Liberal Party in 2001. They rejected the 
Liberal Party’s decision to “open BC up for business”. Since 2001, the members of 
the NGOs observed, in their view, the erosion of environmental standards, the 
protection of sensitive landscapes, and their democratic voice and subsequent 
influence in park governance. To the NGO members’ dismay, the “neo-
conservative” Liberals failed to implement the recommendations of the BC Parks 
Legacy Project, choosing instead to forward significant business-oriented projects 
for BC Parks without public consultation. The NGO members admonished the Liberal 
government for adopting the attitude that “Parks should pay for themselves” and 
generate revenue (i.e. “Parks for Profit”). The policy direction of the Liberal 
government, in their view, changed the face of BC Parks. The sub-themes of the 
NGOs are placed in quotations, since the NGOs were primarily reactive against the 
Liberal Government’s policies.
Because the findings of the BC Parks Legacy Project coincided with a change 
in government, the newly elected Liberal government did not implement the 
majority of the recommendations; it was not their initiative. The fiscally 
conservative Liberal government formed The Recreation Stewardship Panel, which 
investigated potential revenue generation venues in BC Parks (i.e. feasibility and 
potential rates for wood and parking) through consultation with certain NGOs. The 
Recreation Stewardship Panel was instructed to conduct their investigation using 
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the Liberal’s vision for the future of British Columbia’s fish, wildlife and park 
recreation:
Fish, wildlife and park resources continue to be deeply treasured by British 
Columbians and are a cornerstone of the provincial tourism economy. The 
province is renowned for its expanding world class outdoor recreation 
opportunities. Services that support outdoor recreation are supported by the 
users and are delivered through a variety of public, private, not-for-profit 
sector and first nation partners and have direct links to local communities. 
Conservation and protection of British Columbia’s fish, wildlife and parks are 
not diminished by recreational users and are a showcase to the world of 
British Columbia’s commitment to sustainable resource management 
(Recreation Stewardship Panel, 2002, p.11). 
Despite the well-documented citizen held vision of BC Parks, the Liberal 
government set its own vision for BC Parks, which included reductions in budget 
and staff and a move toward a greater privatization of BC Parks. The rhetoric used 
by the Liberal government illustrates the political dogma of neo-conservatism 
(Shultis, 2003). The importance of the economy and fiscal conservatism is present 
throughout the entire vision statement. Moreover, there exists a motif of growth 
regarding the economy (increasing tourism) and outdoor recreation opportunities.
The first sentence of the vision statement has two distinct recognitions: (1) 
BC residents “deeply treasure’ the environment” (fish, wildlife and park resources) 
and (2) the environment’s contribution to the economy. Furthering the neo-
conservatism ideals of reduced budgets and fewer government expenditures and 
staff, the vision statement suggests increased user fees to fund management 
(“services that support outdoor recreation are supported by the users”) and 
partnerships with private and not-for-profit agencies (Shultis, 2003). The odd 
sentence structure of the last statement suggested to me the Liberal Government’s 
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primary interest is in the use function of protected areas over sustainable resource 
management. Thus in spite of internal and external research demonstrating that BC 
residents value preservation over the use function of parks (BC Parks Legacy 
Project, 1999; BC Parks, 1995), the Liberal Government’s vision statement 
reversed the order of priority as expressed by residents. 
NGO Participants #2 and #3 perceived The Recreation Stewardship Panel’s 
report as relatively worthwhile, but lacked the broad scope and public participation 
of the Legacy Project. Members of the NGO community expressed how privatization 
was ideologically driven by elected officials. NGO Participant #3 questioned the 
longer term ramifications of the privatization model for BC Parks:
I think this whole move about contracting out was part of it initially, but 
might have been driven by a budgeting perspective. But I think some of it 
was driven from a philosophical perspective. I think that the government of 
the day was committed to the idea of contracting out, but you know, some 
governments tend to be more in favour of the government taking the lead, 
government doing the bulk and providing the bulk services when it comes to 
things like public assets like BC Parks. But others philosophically tend to be 
more committed to contracting out, believing that’s a more efficient and 
cheaper way to go. There may be efficiencies, but the debate is still open as 
to whether it’s the right way or not in terms of the long-term health, and the 
long term good of the parks system. (NGO Participant #3)
NGO Participant #3 noted how outsourcing services to private companies was 
traditionally valued as a means of increasing efficiency, yet privatization was 
ultimately an ideological push to further shift responsibilities from the government 
to the private sector. His comments suggested he was not convinced contracting 
out was the “right way” of managing the long-term health and good of BC Parks. 
Furthermore, the NGO representatives interviewed stated loud and clear that BC 
Parks have always been understaffed and underfunded: 
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British Columbia has almost 14 million hectares of protected area, yet where 
we are in terms of Rangers where we are in terms of funding, where we are 
in terms of staff, is amongst the lowest of all protected area systems, not 
only in Canada, but in North America. (NGO Participant #4)
The NGO participants expressed their belief that BC Parks had always been 
“hurting” for resources. NGO Participant #3 explained how doubling the size of the 
protected area system in BC Parks was a monumental achievement, yet the NDP 
offered no corresponding increase in budget or staff for park management. The 
situation was further intensified by the election of the 2001 Liberal government and 
its 30% cuts to BC Parks’ staff and budget. NGO Participants #1 asserted that a 
minimal level of staff and funding negatively affected the government’s capacity to 
“properly steward the resources in British Columbia”. The NGO representatives’ 
conviction that BC Parks was chronically underfunded and understaffed reflected 
their passion yet sense of powerlessness to affect the governance of BC Parks.
A repercussion of the Liberal government’s staff and budgetary reduction to 
BC Parks was the elimination of all interpretation programs in the parks. NGO 
Participant #1 pointed out that British Columbia and Mississippi were the only 
jurisdictions in North America without any park interpretation programs. One NGO, 
BC Nature, took the initiative to apply for a grant from Service Canada to hire staff 
and run interpretation programs in a number of BC Parks in cooperation with the 
PFOs. Unfortunately, since interpretation is no longer considered a career job, and 
due to the uncertainty of funding, members of the NGO community noted that the 
quality of the interpretation programs had decreased. NGO Participant #5 believed 
that “interpretation is the heart of the park system”. NGO Participants #1 and #5 
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articulated their position that park interpretation helps foster environmental 
stewardship in visitors, which is a core function of parks, and thus needs financial 
stability from government. All of the NGO representatives commented on how 
interpretation programs helped create memorable experiences for park visitors and 
their hope that government funded interpretation programs would one day return. 
Despite the NGOs passion for interpretation in parks, they were unable to convince 
elected officials of the value and necessity of government-funded programs, 
furthering their sense of powerless.
5.4.2 “Parks Should Pay for Themselves”
The further reduction of BC Parks’ funding and number of employees 
mystified many of the members of NGOs interviewed since they believe that parks 
do pay for themselves. NGO Participants #1, #2, and #3 had reached this 
conclusion from a government funded study regarding the Economic Benefits of 
Parks:
There’s a 2001 report that’s called the “The Economic Value of British 
Columbia’s Provincial Parks” and it looks at for every dollar invested by the 
provincial government is nearly $10 that are producing visitor expenditures, 
largely going into outlining communities that are surrounding parks. So far 
from being an economic drag on the economy, parks, aside from creating 
valuable eco-system services that are really immeasurable in some ways 
through the economic ends, they actually create a lot of money that’s going 
into nourishing local communities. (NGO Participant #1)
The findings of the government funded study indicated parks do pay for themselves 
by stimulating the local economies surrounding parks. Moreover, parks add 
‘immeasurable ecosystem services,’ which relate to functions in the environment 
that are important to all members of society, such as clean water and air. NGO 
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Participant #3 was confounded by the Liberal’s staff and budget cuts to BC Parks 
since he perceived the economic contribution of parks are in line with the Liberal’s 
political direction to stimulate the economy, and thus investing in parks is investing 
in the economy. Nevertheless, under the political direction of “opening BC up for 
business”, the NGO representatives perceived the Provincial Government not only 
requiring parks to be self-sufficient, but also to be sources of profit. However, my 
analysis earlier in the thesis shows that the parks are not financially self-sufficient 
and do not create much profit for the operators. 
5.4.3 “Parks for Profit”
With a focus on efficiency, cost savings and private sector involvement, the 
NGO participant feel the Liberals were pushing the vision that parks should not only 
pay for themselves but are also great sources of potential profit. According to NGO 
Participant #1, such an approach has detrimental effects to the ecological integrity 
of the park. She believed parks were a public good – thus valuable to all members 
of society – and needed to be under the protection and management of the 
government, not private companies. NGO Participant #1 discussed Pinecone 
Provincial Park, which was a proposed area for hydro-electrical independent power 
projects, run by private companies, as examples of the difference between public 
goods and private profit. The proposed hydro-electrical power plant in Pinecone 
Provincial Park would have resulted in splitting a ‘Class A’ wilderness park in half, to 
accommodate the hydro-electrical power house and transmission lines. She 
explained:  
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I think what almost happened in the Pinecone Park, is a real reflection on the 
difference between public and private, that for a private company which 
stood to make a billion dollars from the energy purchase agreement which is 
extremely lucrative, it made perfect financial sense when you’re only looking 
at it through that narrow lens to put a power line through the park and put 
power houses in important wild salmon habitat.  But if you look at that 
through a public policy lens and a public good, then you’d weigh the 
economics in one hand and the public good on the other hand, and when you 
weigh than you’d realize that the public good was more important.  I’m a 
firm believer that there are some things that are too important to give away 
to corporations, that are too important to give away to private stock 
promoters and that’s what a lot of these guys are and I would argue very 
strongly that our rivers and parks are something that are too important to 
give away. 
One’s ideology helps to define perceptions of public goods and service, and the 
roles of the government and the private sector. Ideology can thus be 
conceptualized as the lens in which you see parks and their many values and uses. 
According to the NGO representatives in this study, the Liberals view BC Parks 
through an economics lens while they themselves use an environmental lens. 
Therefore, the Liberal Government’s focus became private profit rather than the 
NGOs’ focus on the health of the public good of parks. NGO Participant #1 viewed 
parks as a public good that ought to be protected ecosystems in which citizens can 
recreate responsibly. Opening up parks for private exploitation of resources, in the 
view of the NGO participants, was not in line with the mandate of conservation and 
recreation. NGO Participants #1 and #2 believed the Liberal government’s focus on 
profit trumped the ecological integrity of parks. Their concerns were validated by 
my discussion with a public administrator working for BC Parks in which GOV 
Participant #1 offered the following observation: 
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I should mention that industry and others are ones that I think we need to 
do a much better job of forming relationships with, and in exchange, we need 
industry, such as forestry and mining, to recognize the importance of the 
protected system so that they can continue to undertake their business. 
GOV Participant #1 was a “negative case”, in this sense, whose opinions differed 
from the majority of the other public administrators interviewed. His comments 
reflected the will of the Liberal Government, and the fears of the members of the 
NGOs and many BC Parks civil servants. 
All of the NGO participants commented on the Liberal government’s “parks 
for profit” vision, which involved installing parking meters in provincial parks, and 
accepting proposals for the construction of resorts inside provincial parks, both 
without consulting the residents of British Columbia. NGO Participant #1 was 
outraged at the Liberal Government’s initiatives for BC Parks, the lack funding and 
staff, and lack of public participation:
The government has turned its back on parks, cut Park Rangers, cut park 
staff, reduced the park budget, and then of course, in 2003 and 2004, 
introduced parking meters into 41 of the most popular Provincial parks with 
no consultation with the public. And about two years ago the BC government 
was contemplating putting in resorts and lodges. Parks for profit. And again 
they did this with no public consultation.
The elected officials’ decisions regarding resorts in BC Parks infuriated the public 
and NGOs as described by NGO Participants #1-4 in the interviews. NGO 
Participants #2 explained how the potential for the commercialization of BC Parks 
was dramatically increased when the Liberal government passed new legislation to 
allow park boundary adjustments to be made by the Minister of the Environment, 
rather than being passed by Cabinet (West Coast Environmental Law, 2003). He 
articulated how the legislation change increased industry’s access to extract or use 
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the parks’ resources (i.e. forestry, mining, tourism) and thus undermined the long-
term protection of parks. 
The privatization of parks further concerned NGO Participants #1 because, in 
her view, it resulted in a decrease in access to information. More and more a 
private company’s information was considered propriety information, she argued, 
which was not publicly available and which lowered the government’s accountability 
to citizens. NGO Participant #1 explained how the Commissioner’s Office certified 
eight environmental organizations’ complaint of systematic discrimination with 
regards to accessing information about BC Parks through Freedom of Information 
requests. The Ministry of Environment was instructed to write a yearly report 
demonstrating timely interactions with environmental groups. But NGO Participant 
#1 noted no improvements.
5.4.4 Diminished Democracy
The NGO representatives in this research project noted a loss of power, 
control and voice in the management of BC Parks due to increasing private sector 
involvement, which, in their estimation, negatively affected the environment and 
reduced public participation and government accountability and transparency. For 
example, NGO Participants #1, #2, and #4 discussed how there were over five 
hundred rivers staked by private companies to develop hydro-electrical independent 
power projects. The NGO representatives referenced a section of Bill 30 introduced 
by Government which took away local municipalities’ zoning authority (BC NDP, 
2006). Furthermore, it affected the public participation process, required by law, by 
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allowing such processes to be conducted by the private companies proposing the 
project: 
We can’t, as an environmental community and even as a public, see each 
one of these projects as a one off. We just don’t have the resources, we don’t 
have the time. It’s something very, very wrong with the process. (NGO 
Participant #1)
NGO Participant #1 expressed her dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the 
process for public input regarding private companies developing hydro-electrical 
projects, given that the rivers are publicly owned as a public good. The privatization 
model of BC Parks negatively affected the process, she argued. My interview with 
GOV Participant # 3, a public administrator responsible for the public participation 
process of Pinecone Burke, was surprised by this opinion:
I was really taken by surprise because I saw my role as being sort of an 
objective facilitator of a process, right. I’m there to make sure the process 
happens, to observe what people have got to say to take that information 
back to the decision-makers and that’s that way a public open house of this 
kind is supposed to run. I give them a chance to say what they want to say 
and I take that information into consideration. What surprised me was that 
people expected the Parks Agency to be acting at the open house as 
advocates for the park. Like they wanted us to be standing up in opposition 
to the proponent’s proposal. To me as a public servant, that seems like a 
completely inappropriate role, but that was a very, very strong public 
expectation at these meetings and as a result park staff came in for quite a 
lot of well, abuse I guess it would fair to say. And then there was a lot of 
criticism about how the process was designed and this is one of things that 
may be relevant to the whole outsourcing discussion possibly, is that we, the 
way our policy is structured at this time, the onus for developing and 
carrying out the public consultation process is on the private proponent. So 
BC Parks doesn’t really have a role in saying, thou shall talk to these people 
in this fashion and report in this manner. It’s go do whatever you feel is 
appropriate and we’ll assess whether or not it’s in fact inadequate. So we 
have an accountability at the end of the day to assess whether or not 
something has been adequate, but we don’t have a role at that front end for 
saying what we think that adequate thing would be, right. So there was a bit 
of a disconnect there and again, the public were very dismayed by that 
structure and they thought that as the responsible government agency,     
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BC Parks, should have a very hard and firm role in dictating what the 
consultation process would be. And I guess what I found is that at the end of 
the day, we were in fact, expected to be accountable to the public for how 
the public consultation process was designed, but we didn’t have a role in the 
front end in designing the public consultation process.
NGO participants argued the public participation process depended upon the will of 
the Provincial Government. The Liberal Government’s policy required the private 
proponent to administer the public participation process, with the BC Parks’ public 
administrators charged with assessing the adequacy of the proponent’s efforts and 
relaying information back to the ‘decision-makers’. However, the NGO participants 
expected the public administrators to be ‘advocates’ for the park, standing in 
‘opposition’ to the private proponent’s suggestion to build transmission lines 
through the park. The civil servants had no role in designing the public consultation 
process, yet the public held the administrators accountable for the process. GOV 
Participant #3 noted the massive disconnect between the public’s expectations of 
the process of public participation and how the Liberal Government had it 
structured. Thus, the NGOs are subject to the authority and will of the elected 
officials. GOV Participant #4 further elaborated on the power of the elected officials 
to dictate public participation processes:
With the NGOs it’s an interesting relationship, because the first level that I 
see is the relationship they have with the government overall. So even 
before you get into the parks business, it’s how do they precede the 
government of the day? So, when we had the NDP in power, it would be a 
different relationship than when you had the Liberals now in power. So, 
that’s the first level is how did the NGOs relate to the government of the 
day? The second level is how do they relate to us in terms of being part of 
the Ministry? I think there’s a number of different ways they approach it. 
(GOV Participant #4)
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The degree of public participation, argued the NGO participants, depended upon the 
elected officials’ policies. The NGOs’ relationships with the elected officials and 
public administrators were subject to the government of the day. Both the 
members of the NGOs and the public administrators believed their relationship 
ranged from collaborative to adversarial, depending upon the specific organization. 
Certain NGOs focused their efforts on collaboration and dialoguing with BC Parks’ 
civil servants and the Minister of Environment. Other NGOs were activist-oriented 
organizations that, through the media, were openly critical of government policies 
negatively affecting the environment. As a result, the latter NGO participants found 
civil servants and elected officials were reluctant to meet with them. Many NGO 
participants believed the wide spectrum of NGOs in BC served a variety of purposes 
and interests and overall positively impacted government policy and practice. Yet 
the NGO representatives enunciated their perceptions regarding an overall lack of 
public participation and their concerns regarding increased private sector 
involvement in the environment under the Liberal Government:
I think the public’s being removed from the picture nearly completely. Yes, 
democracy’s messy, it’s slow sometimes. It’s arduous, and you don’t always 
get the results that you want and sometimes it’s not efficient for business. 
But it’s the best system we have for accountability and transparency and for 
protecting civil rights, and for protecting the public good and you just see 
the, for instance, the environmental assessment process, it was weakened in 
2002, the budget was cut, you had fewer staff that was able to enforce the 
Act, and you also had public participation almost removed - meaningful 
public participation, removed and I think you can see that nearly across 
British Columbia and across, you can see that right across British Columbia 
that the government said that you’re okay for business and that meant 
reducing environment red tape in many places and also getting the public out 
of the way. If the BC government thought it was right for the province, then 
it didn’t matter a good god damn, what people said, it’s happening, and 
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that’s often cloaked in greater efficiency, but it also, usually works against 
democracy. (NGO Participant #1)
NGO Participant #1 believed the Liberal government’s focus on efficiency and 
private sector involvement lowered the tenets of democracy, namely public 
participation, accountability and transparency. Members of the NGOs asserted that 
BC Parks are owned by the citizens of the province and intended for environmental 
protection and appropriate recreational uses, irrespective of the fiscal bottom. Thus, 
under the direction of the NGO described “neo-conservative” Liberal government, 
efficiency trumped democratic processes. Nevertheless, the NGOs’ passion for BC 
Parks brought them together to protest the proposed lodges in parks:
The environmental groups all came together as a sort of parks council. We 
fought that thing and that, I think it was a marketplace that decided that it 
wasn’t a good idea. Because out of the 12 that they took forward, they only 
had four proposals and they’re the ones that we actually fought. So really, 
when you look at the park lodges then, it failed and I have been told by 
government that they won’t carry on with it. So that was, to us, a pretty 
major win. (NGO Participant #2)  
A window of opportunity was when the government introduced parking 
meters. It pissed people off, got them enraged – it just bugged the hell out 
of people. And then another window of opportunity was when they wanted to 
put lodges and resorts again with no public consultation in parks and again 
that pissed people off that they weren’t consulted in. People wrote letters to 
their papers, they talked to their friends, they talked to their neighbours, 
they talked to their mayors. The week when the government made the 
announcement to come out to put lodges and resorts in parks and it caused 
absolutely a media storm in the province, then they cooled their heels on 
that fairly quickly. (NGO Participant #1)  
And so, despite conflicts between different organizations (i.e. acceptability of 
hunting or motorized recreation in parks) and a powerful Liberal Government with a 
vision to further privatize BC Parks and minimize public participation, the NGOs 
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were successfully able to inform and mobilize citizens to end the Fixed Roof 
Accommodation Policy. 
The members of the NGOs’ shared a sense of passion for parks yet felt 
powerlessness and mistrust towards the Liberal Provincial Government. While under 
the NDP Provincial Government, the NGOs agreed with their policies and actions 
and were often consulted regarding park management. However under the Liberal 
Provincial Government, a new vision for BC Parks evolved: parks went to be self-
sufficient through budget and staff cuts, and parking meters, and furthermore, 
requiring parks to generate profit through private resource extraction (enabled due 
to a change in BC Parks Act). The obliteration of the Fixed Roof Accommodations 
policy represented the NGOs’ only example of empowerment under the rule of the 
Liberal Government.
5.5 Conclusion
The PFOs chose to follow their passion for parks by running the front country 
services for BC Parks. However, they felt underappreciated and undervalued by BC 
Parks’ staff; they felt undertaking such a service contract had many risks which 
gave way to a sense of low job security. Furthermore, the contract stipulations 
meant limited potential for PFOs to increase their income. Despite BC Parks’ urges 
for PFO investment in capital expenditures, the PFOs strongly believed the cost-
benefit analysis did not allow this to occur. The PFOs noted the vast power 
imbalance between them and the BC Parks’ staff. Their relationship was 
characterized by a deep sense of mistrust. 
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The BC Parks’ public administrators described their passion for parks and 
they believed their efforts were positively contributing to society. However, they 
were subject to ongoing growing pains due to changes in elected officials causing 
fluctuations in budget and staff levels. The public administrators had begun as the 
direct service providers themselves and evolved into the role of contract 
management of bigger companies, requiring more knowledge of business 
management. The power of the Provincial Government reduced the public 
administrators’ ability to influence the direction and management of BC Parks.
The members of the NGOs had experienced a decade of an NDP Provincial 
Government who doubled the size of the protected areas of BC Parks and welcomed 
public participation and documented the citizens’ vision for BC Parks’ management. 
However, in 2001, a new Liberal Provincial Government was elected who drastically 
cut the budget and staff numbers of BC Parks including funding for interpretation 
programs. Furthermore, the new Government introduced Bill 84 (thus potentially 
increasing private sector’s access to resource extraction), parking meters in popular 
provincial parks, and the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal, all of which without 
any public consultation. The actions of the Provincial Government regarding BC 
Parks greatly differed from that of the documented citizens’ vision for BC Parks. The 
NGO representatives’ moment of hope arose when the Provincial Government 
quietly decided against the implementation of the Fixed Roof Accommodations 
Proposal. The members of the NGOs believed it was their efforts of informing and 
mobilizing citizens against the proposal, which the Provincial Government listened. 
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The interviews revealed the park stakeholders’ sense of passion and 
powerlessness and mistrust, which not surprisingly had implications on how they 
viewed governance. The sense of powerlessness indicates they are not full 
participants in the governance process. Using the findings from the document 
analysis and the themes which emerged from the interviews, I will now analyze the 
implications of BC Parks’ outsourcing model on governance. 
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CHAPTER SIX:                                                                    
PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNANCE IN BC PARKS
6.1 Outline
The purpose of the case study research was to explore the perceived 
implications of an outsourcing model on governance by members of three groups: 
government employees of BC Parks, private contractors, and members of 
conservation and recreation non-governmental organizations. This next chapter of 
the results will present and briefly describe the results of the core research 
questions: (1) What are the stakeholders’ perceptions of the implications of BC 
Parks’ outsourcing model on governance? (2) How do the stakeholder groups 
perceive themselves and each other? and (3) How does the role of monitoring 
within the outsourcing model and the concept of governance?
6.2 Perceived Implications of BC Parks’ Outsourcing Model
First and foremost, I was investigating how the government employees of BC 
Parks, the PFOs, and members of non-governmental organizations perceived the 
implications of BC Parks’ outsourcing model of service delivery on the five principles 
of governance: legitimacy and voice, direction, performance, accountability and 
fairness.
6.2.1 Legitimacy & Voice: Public Participation & Consensus-Orientated 
Decision Making
The principle of legitimacy and voice is characterized by the approaches used 
for public participation and the degree of consensus-oriented decision-making. 
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Public participation means all people should have a voice in decision-making, either 
directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests 
(UNDP, 1997). Consensus-oriented decision-making is the ability to mediate 
differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the 
group (UNDP, 1997). 
When asked about public participation, two of the public administrators 
explained the importance and power of the elected officials in determining the 
importance and processes for public participation and consensus-orientation in 
decision making (as discussed by GOV Participant #4, on pg.121). The processes 
used for public participation under the NDP Government greatly differed from those 
of the Liberal Government. 
The Liberal Government set a policy that private proponents interested in 
developing hydro-electrical projects in parks were to administer the public 
participation process themselves, and public administrators were to assess the level 
of adequacy of the process (as discussed by GOV Participant #3 on page 120). The 
citizens of British Columbia strongly disagreed with this policy for public 
participation and felt the public administrators should be driving the process as 
opposed to the private proponents. NGO Participant #1 was at the public 
participation meetings regarding a proposed hydro-electrical project in a provincial 
park, and asked a BC Parks staff member “Who’s in charge of this process? This 
process about public lands, about public parks and about wild salmon and they [BC 
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Parks staff] said the [private] proponent is.” The quote reflects the disapproval of 
the private company driving the public participation process regarding public goods.
The NGO representatives lamented there were no public participation 
opportunities regarding the introduction of parking meters in parks and the Fixed 
Roof Accommodations Proposal announcement (as discussed by NGO Participant #1 
on pg.118). The NGO members articulated a markedly low level of public 
participation and consensus-orientation decision-making in BC Parks. Conversely, 
under the NDP Government of the 1990s, the NGO members described a higher 
level of public participation as demonstrated by the BC Parks’ Legacy Project (as 
discussed by NGO Participant #3 and 4).
My interviews with members of NGOs and the public administrators revealed 
the level of public participation, degree of influence, and access to information 
greatly depended upon the NGO. The continuum of NGOs varied from collaborative 
and dialogue-focused (i.e. BC Nature) to NGOs who are sharply critical of 
government policy, activist-based and organize protests (i.e. Wilderness 
Committee). Through my interviews, I concluded that the collaborative-focused 
NGOs had higher levels of interaction with elected officials and public administrators 
(as compared with activist NGOs). NGO Participant #2 belonged to a collaborative 
NGO, and commented:
I’m an activist, but I prefer to do it with dialogue, letters and common sense 
rather than, I’ve never stood in one of these protests. I meet with the 
minister of environment and other ministers, depending on the issue.
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Whereas NGO Participant #1 was a member of an activist based NGO, and 
commented:
We’re an activist organization and we don’t hold our punches when it comes 
to criticism on the government. We value strong environmental standards 
over cozy a relationship with government. We’ll be critical where warranted 
and we’ll do it through media, because that’s one of the more effective 
means of communication and educating our members… which can create 
hostile relationships with governments and that makes them much less likely 
to meet with you and share information.
The PFOs’ role in public participation was limited. Their experiences were focused 
on customer service with visitors and working with volunteer groups at the park 
level, within the rules and regulations of BC Parks. PFO Participant #1 shared his 
perspective:
I would say our main focus is just dealing with parks and their partners – lots 
of volunteer groups that want to come out and feel it’s their park. So it’s -
we’re there sitting at the table with them in lots of different meetings. But 
we’re actually not dealing directly, besides BC Nature. That’s probably our 
biggest group that we deal with because they’re very interested in ensuring 
that interpretive programs continue to run.
The PFOs explained that administering public participation was not their role, but 
rather the role of BC Parks. 
6.2.2 Direction: Strategic Vision
The principle of direction is based on the criteria of strategic vision. Good 
strategic vision involves leaders and citizens having a broad and long-term 
perspective on good governance, along with a sense of what is need for such 
development, as well as an understanding of the historical, cultural and social 
complexities in which that perspective is grounded (UNDP, 1997). 
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The Liberal Government introduced their vision for the future of British 
Columbia’s fish, wildlife and park recreation which illustrated their focus on the 
economic benefits of parks and fiscal conservatism (as discussed on pg. 112). 
Furthermore, the Liberal Government proposed and passed the BC legislature 
Statute 84 in 2003, which granted power to the Minister of Environment to adjust 
park boundaries, rather than having such changes done by Cabinet (West Coast 
Environmental Law, 2003). All of the NGO representatives and a few of the public 
administrators expressed concern that Statute 84 would increase the potential for 
private industry to extract park resources (i.e. forestry, mining, and hydro-electrical 
projects) and weakened the protection of parks. Two members of the NGOs in 
particular worried about the “long-term health of BC Parks” under the outsourcing 
model and under the Liberal Government (as discussed on pg. 113).
Public Administrator #1 left me with the impression he did not feel powerless 
or a sense of mistrust towards the Liberal Government since his vision of BC Parks 
was in line with the Liberal mandate (pg. 118). All interviewed public administrators 
(except one) expressed their apprehension regarding the Liberal Government’s 
changes regarding BC Parks, such as the introduction of parking metres, the Fixed 
Roof Accommodations Proposal without prior public consultation and the 
amendments to park legislation.
The PFOs and public administrators perceived the shift to the bundle model in 
2003 resulted in BC Parks wanting more business-focused, with more sophisticated, 
larger companies running the bundles. 
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Now we sort of come into this new model 5 years ago where we asked for a 
more sophisticated, business-like operator. So they have bigger bundles of 
parks, they have more revenue that they’re capturing within their contracts. 
They have to hire more staff, have more infrastructure and resources, so you 
truly need to be a good business person to be able to run that type of 
operation. (GOV Participant #4)
However, PFO Participant #1 feared it could potentially result in PFOs without the 
deep passion for parks (as discussed on pg. 99). Despite the Liberal’s “open for 
business” mantra, the PFOs felt there existed many constraints to successfully 
operating their businesses and the limited potential for increased personal revenue 
which was compounded by the BC Parks’ staff lack of business sense (discussed on 
pages 98-99 by PFO Participants #1 and #2).
This research revealed that the strategic vision for BC Parks is under debate 
by the stakeholder groups. The park staff appeared to be willing to accept the 
current model, but were concerned for the future of BC Parks under the direction of 
the Liberal Government. The PFOs wanted the current outsourcing model to 
continue with refinements that would enable them more flexibility and autonomy to 
run their business successfully. The NGO representatives wanted (1) increases to 
the BC Parks’ budget, (2) more government employees, (3) an increased park staff 
presence in parks, (4) strengthened legislation for the protection of parks, (5) no 
commercialization in parks; and (6) limit or remove extraction of park resources by 
private industry. 
6.2.3 Performance: Responsiveness, Effectiveness, Efficiency
The UNDP (1997) judges performance according to three governance 
criteria: responsiveness to stakeholders, effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 
133
Responsiveness occurs when institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders 
using a proactive manner regarding complaints and public criticisms. Effectiveness 
involves the capacity to realize organizational objectives. Efficiency refers to making 
the best use of resources or the capability of acting or producing effectively with a 
minimum amount or quantity of waste, expense or unnecessary effort (UNDP, 
1997).
6.2.3.1 Responsiveness
The public administrators and the PFOs expressed their belief regarding a 
high level of responsiveness, which was attributed to the PFOs’ focus on customer 
service: 
If it is a complaint about a day-use site, or it’s a complaint about a 
campground, we ask that the PFOs respond. The PFOs need to manage that 
as part of the models, part of the business delivery model. We’ll hear about it 
if it’s not done to customer satisfaction. And again, it goes back to my 
comments that PFOs want to keep their customers, because the more 
customers they have, the better the business. The more money they make. 
So I think there’s a combined interest to ensure that customer satisfaction is 
acknowledged and dealt with. (GOV Participant #1)
It has to be timely. We represent our company. We represent the province. 
So we’d want to handle this in the most professional way possible (PFO 
Participant #2)
GOV Participant #1’s comments revealed the perception that the PFOs’ focus on 
customer service resulted in increased profit – however the PFOs debunked those 
statements as myths in their interviews and this was confirmed by the FORUM 
Report (2008). The PFO’s comments revealed the pride in his job and to be 
representing the province, and the importance of timely responses to visitors. 
134
Conversely, some of the NGOs and two of the PFOs’ discussed the inaccessibility of 
the BC Parks’ Agency staff. The PFOs commented: 
Yeah, I’d say that we handle over 99% of the interactions with the public. BC 
Parks does not have a person to get in touch in my town and people, unless 
they already know the person, they can’t get in touch with them.  I’m the 
contact. Even if it’s an issue with BC Parks that they have to deal with, 
basically they come to me and I pass it on for these groups (PFO Participant 
#3).
We’re the ones that are dealing face to face, on the phones talking to people 
(PFO Participant #1).
It appeared the BC Parks staff were much less accessible to the visitors and the 
public in comparison to the PFOs. 
6.2.3.2 Effectiveness
BC Parks employees conduct Key Performance Indicators assessments and 
satisfaction surveys, as well as collect monthly and annual financial statements, 
attendance statistics, and comment cards. The public administrators, the PFOs and 
the FORUM Report (2008) referenced the high level of visitor satisfaction and low 
operating cost as evidence of effectiveness. GOV Participant #1 said;
The public, through the satisfaction surveys that we do, are still very 
satisfied. The ratings are as high, if not higher, than when we were doing it. 
The majority of the NGO members interviewed commented on the high quality of 
visitor services provided by PFOs. NGO Participant #3 described how “there are 
some great PFOs who put a lot of heart and soul into their work and [that] the 
public sees that”. Nevertheless, the members of the NGOs did not believe BC Parks 
had a high level of effectiveness. Every NGO representative noted the limited 
amount of government staff and budget allocations for BC Parks. NGO Participant 
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#1 (as discussed on pg. 115) posited there were too few staff members and too 
little budget to effectively steward the resources of BC Parks (which may suggest 
the resource protection goal may remain unfulfilled). 
Furthermore, NGO Participants #1, 2, 3 were upset when the Liberal 
Government cut BC Parks’ budget, which resulted in parks with low levels of 
visitation being shut down. NGO Participant #1 lamented:
you saw in the [Liberal Government’s] first term that some parks that 
weren’t Front Country, that didn’t have PFOs were just closed down, that the 
water taps were turned off, the garbage cans were taken away and the park 
was shut because they weren’t seen – if they couldn’t squeeze a buck out of 
that particular park, they didn’t see it as having a value. There was quite a 
bit of outrage about that and government backed off that a little bit because 
I think they underestimated how strongly British Columbians feel about the 
importance of our park system.  
Many NGO Participants also commented on the lack of government funded 
interpretation programs and considered this an indication of a lack of effectiveness. 
NGO Participant #5 said:
Interpretation programs create stewardship of parks’ inherent ecological 
value and helps to make sure we have something to pass on to our children 
that’s intact, an environmental legacy for future generations.
The lack of interpretation programs in BC Parks will be further explored in the next 
chapter.
6.2.3.3 Efficiency
The public administrators and the PFOs interviewed adamantly expressed 
how BC Parks’ outsourcing model has resulted in significant cost savings compared 
to the traditional direct delivery model by government employees:
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Financially, we’re probably better off. We probably saved the taxpayers a lot 
of money in terms of using the private sector to deliver. Now, there was a lot 
of work put into. (GOV Participant #1)
The public administrators and the PFOs reported the outsourcing model to be 
efficient and effective due to low levels of government staff and budget, and the 
flexibility of the private sector (compared with government’s regulations). 
Furthermore, since the switch from the park-by-park model to the bundle model in 
2002, the PFOs have increased their economies of scale which has been conducive 
to increased efficiency, as noted in the FORUM Report (2008). 
Despite the initial claims of increased efficiency; the public administrators 
also explained the drawbacks of the outsourcing model in regards to efficiency. 
Many public administrators indicated that there was an immense amount of time 
and effort spent by government staff in monitoring the PFOs, which negated cost 
savings: 
A challenge that came out of that [switching to the bundle model], was more 
time required because now PFOs had to be bigger, more financially more 
mature business people because there were more operating now on very 
much a bigger area and all complexities that go with that. So just managing 
your personality HR issues was a big, you know, a big time commitment. So 
that drove costs up.  
As for the NGO representatives, most of them hesitantly agreed that the 
outsourcing model had resulted in increased efficiency. Yet explained how efficiency 
came at the cost of decreased accountability, limited staff and budget, and 
potentially the long-term health of the parks system (as discussed by NGO 
Participants #1 on pages 122-123 and NGO Participants #3 on pg.117).
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6.2.4 Accountability: Accountability & Transparency 
The governance principle of accountability is based on accountability and 
transparency to stakeholders. Accountability is the requirement that officials answer 
to stakeholders on the disposal of their powers and duties, act on criticisms or 
requirements made of them and accept responsibility for failure, incompetence or 
deceit (UNDP, 1997). Transparency is the sharing of information and acting in an 
open manner (UNDP, 1997).
The NGOs asserted that the elected officials had demonstrated a very low 
level of transparency by announcing the installation of parking meters in BC Parks 
and the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal with no warning or any prior public 
participation (pg.123). 
The PFOs reported high levels of accountability and transparency with the 
government, since their financial information was shared with the public 
administrators. PFO Participant #2 discussed his financial information was shared 
with his area supervisor in a: 
very transparent fashion in the sense that BC Parks are very interested in as 
much detail as possible. And again, I’m lucky that nobody’s playing games 
with me because you feel a bit vulnerable. 
The PFO’s comments demonstrate that all financial information regarding his 
company is given to BC Parks.
However, a few NGO representatives and the PFOs and many public 
administrators explained that such financial information is considered proprietary 
information and is not openly shared with the other stakeholders. PFO Participant 
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#1 explained that “BC Parks shares the [visitor] statistical information but they’re 
not supposed to release any financial information of a company”. This regulation 
upset NGO Participant #1, she expressed that: 
If you have a private company that is managing a public good but you don’t 
have access to the records, then how do you hold a decision-making body 
accountable if you can’t see the records and to be able to reflect and on 
whether they’re making wise choices that are in the public good for public 
parks or for our wild rivers?
The NGO representatives also commented on an overall lack of transparency. NGO 
Participant #4 discussed the lack of transparency regarding proponents’ request for 
access to crown lands for larger developments:
So we’re trying to be a little bit of a watchdog in that regard because so 
many of these things are coming forward and there really isn’t a clear public 
process for people to input into them. A lot of times, unless you were right 
there in the local community you didn’t even know that they were happening. 
Our members would like to have knowledge and awareness that things are 
being proposed in various areas of the province so that they could have 
input. Sometimes with the postings online, there’s incomplete information for 
the link to the components, or information it’s not active or not working 
properly or there will be amendments made and the amendments aren’t 
posted, so missing information. 
These comments reflect a very low level of transparency, and the watchdog role of 
NGOs (however, the role is inhibited due to a lack of transparency). 
FORUM’s (2008) final report included strong recommendations to improve, 
standardize and implement online financial tracking information of the PFOs, to 
enable comparisons, and further enhance accountability to the Ministry of 
Environment and the taxpayers.
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6.2.5 Fairness: Equity & Rule of Law
Fairness deals with equity amongst stakeholders and the overall application 
of the rule of law. Equity is just treatment, requiring that similar cases are treated 
in similar ways. Application of the rule of law refers to legal frameworks being fair 
and enforced impartially.
The PFOs and the public administrators agreed that BC Parks represented an 
equitable situation for the residents of BC. GOV Participant #2 said:
We recognize that camping has got a social element to it. It is subsidized by 
government. It is still extremely good value for money. Our top rate right 
now I think is $24 or $25 per night. When you compare that to any other 
form of overnight accommodation it is still significantly cheaper than just 
about any other form of holiday.  
Furthermore, the low cost of camping and low or no cost of entry to parks meant 
BC Parks were financially accessible to BC residents. Senior citizens were charged 
half price and people with disabilities’ fees were waved. 
There was a lack of consensus amongst NGO representatives regarding the 
perception of equity in BC Parks. The participants expressed: (1) the desire to 
abolish user fees in BC Parks; (2) negative experiences with senior citizens taking 
advantage of the discounts; and (3) equity was not discussed.
All of the PFOs and many the members of the NGOs asserted a low level of 
rule of law in BC Parks since the PFOs are not given the legal authority that gives 
them full enforcement capability and there is an insufficient number of park rangers 
to  enforce the Parks Act (as noted by PFO Participant #3 on pages 100-101). The 
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public administrators did not address rule of law or the enforcement of the Parks 
Act in the interviews.
6.2.6 Overall Perceptions of Governance
The stakeholders’ perceptions of governance were rooted in a sense of 
powerlessness and mistrust. The research demonstrated that perceptions of 
governance differed with each stakeholder group. To portray an overall sense of 
each stakeholder group’s current perception of governance, I assigned one of three 
levels of satisfaction with BC Parks’ adherence to the governance principle (low, 
medium, or high) presented in Table 13. The levels of satisfaction were drawn from 
the interview data. Certain principles of governance were not discussed explicitly 
with a stakeholder group, thus no level of corresponding satisfaction was assigned.
Table 13: Stakeholders’ perceptions of governance in BC Parks
Principles of PFOs Public NGOs
Governance Administrators
Strategic Vision Medium Medium Low
Efficiency High High Medium
Effectiveness High High Low
Responsiveness High High Low
Public Participation - Medium Low
Consensus-Orientation - Medium Low
Accountability High Low Low
Transparency High Low Low
Equity High High Medium
Rule of Law Medium - Low
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The stakeholder groups varied in their perceptions of the governance principles 
which demonstrates the value and importance of the principles of social 
constructionism; there is no one, objective and ultimate truth for all participants, 
but rather participants constructed their perceptions of the governance of BC Parks 
based on the co-created subjective meanings of their experiences. Interviewing 
three park stakeholder groups (as opposed to one group) yielded much richer data 
to better explain and understand the governance of BC Parks.
6.3 Stakeholder Relations
The second focus of my research was to determine how the stakeholder groups 
perceived their role in BC Parks and how they perceived each other. 
6.3.1 Government employees 
The government employees of BC Parks perceived their role as monitoring 
the PFOs to ensure they were providing a high standard for visitor services and 
recreation opportunities in BC Parks. The public administrators described their 
satisfaction with the performance of the PFOs based on high levels of visitor 
satisfaction as evidenced by the annual survey. The NGOs were perceived as 
commentators and watchdogs to government’s policies and actions.
6.3.2 PFOs
The PFOs described themselves as the “face of BC Parks”. Since park 
employees were rarely found in front country parks, the PFOs described the 
importance of their role in providing visitor services. The private contractors in BC 
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felt undervalued by the BC Parks employees and were frustrated regarding the lack 
of business sense in park employees. The PFOs work in collaboration with many 
NGO wanting to volunteer or recreate in the parks they managed. BC Nature and 
the PFOs hired and paid park interpreters to offer free environmental education 
programs to the public. 
6.3.5 Members of NGOs
The members of the NGOs positively regarded BC Parks employees. NGO 
Participant #2 described BC Parks employees as “the finest in North America”. 
Many of the NGOs sympathized with the difficult changes the park employees’ had 
experienced over the years (budget and staff cuts and reorganizations). While most 
of the NGO members also admired the good work of the PFOs, they also described 
the inherent flaws of business within a public model. The NGOs articulated how a 
business cannot remain stagnant and the PFOs can only see until the end of their 
contract. 
The members of the NGOs compared and contrasted in their specific agendas 
for BC Parks and their approach to interacting and influencing government. The 
collaborative-focused NGOs can at times sit down with government and work out 
agreements. However, the activist-based NGOs often expressed their criticisms of 
government policies through the media to inform citizens, without the worry of 
ruining their relationship with government. The NGO representatives believed each 
organization had its role to play in BC Parks. And when they joined together (such 
as ending the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal) they were a force to be 
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reckoned with. The NGO representatives perceived their role as holding the 
government accountable for their actions, and to influence the direction of BC Parks 
to ensure environmental protection, equitable recreation opportunities and 
interpretation programs in parks.
6.4 The Role of Monitoring
The final focus of my research was to investigate how the role of monitoring 
fits within the BC Parks’ outsourcing model as well as the concept of governance. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, an agency’s decision to outsource services does not 
relinquish the responsibility of management (Domberger & Jensen, 1997). BC Parks 
retains ownership of the lands as well as overseeing the management and delivery 
of visitor services in parks. The governance of BC Parks remains the responsibility 
of the BC Parks Agency, thus monitoring contractors is of pivotal importance.
BC Parks uses Key Performance Indicators to monitor the performance of 
PFOs. The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) evaluate eight areas: (1) visitor 
satisfaction, (2) state of the facilities, (3) financial performance, (4) PFO staff 
presence and appearance, (5) community involvement, (6) legal obligations, and 
(7) provision of additional services and the protection of natural and cultural values 
(Appendix E). 
The FORUM (2008) Report concluded that both government employees and 
the PFOs perceived the KPI system of monitoring to be superior to the previous 
check-list type of monitoring. The FORUM Report suggested the Joint-Steering 
Committee continue to improve the system of monitoring by: (1) outlining the 
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expectations for each type of park experience6; (2) develop a report card style of 
evaluation using agreed-upon and explicit objectives; (3) moving towards PFO self-
audit with third party audit too; and (4) standardizing financial templates for PFOs 
to submit required information which would enable comparisons.
The FORUM Report (2008) indicated the PFOs and the public administrators’ 
intent to move towards a self-auditing form of monitoring daily operations (as well 
as scheduled third party audits). On one hand, I believe PFOs’ self monitoring their 
daily operations in conjunction with the report card style monitoring has much 
potential to build trust and ameliorate the PFO-Government relationship. On the 
other hand, it further removes the BC Parks’ staff from parks and decreases their 
connection to the visitors. BC Parks’ staff must ensure sufficient level of monitoring 
in order to be accountable to the citizens of British Columbia regarding the state of 
provincial parks and the provided visitor services. 
                                      
6 (1) long-stay destination, (2) adventure/wilderness, (3) overnight short-stay bedroom, 




The research findings are compared to the literature addressing privatization 
as well as the governance of parks and protected areas. The research findings 
revealed the importance of and the need to investigate the policy-administration 
literature to understand the governance of parks and protected areas. Furthermore, 
the idea of public-service motivation in contractors as a mitigating factor is 
explored. In conclusion, the role of political ideology and civic engagement are 
explored, as well as a reconceptualization of efficiency in BC Parks.
7.2 The Politics of the Governance of BC Parks
Governance is about power (who has influence?), relationships (who 
decides?), and accountability (how are decision-makers held accountable?) (IOG, 
2007). According to participants, elected officials of the BC Provincial Government 
had considerable leverage over the management of BC Parks and its public 
administrators. The biggest imbalances appeared to involve contractors, public 
administrators, and elected officials. NGO members were able to inform and 
mobilize citizens to act against government policies and actions, to which elected 
officials in the Liberal Government responded (i.e. dropping the Fixed Roof 
Accommodations Proposal). Given that elected officials are supposed to reflect the 
will of the people, sensitivity toward civic engagement ought to be particularly 
important in managing public goods and services. These imbalances and instances 
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of mistrust speak to governance as a whole insofar as they influenced perceptions 
of and satisfaction with the current operating model. It suggests that in BC Parks, 
the elected officials hold the power while the public administrators, the PFOs and 
the members of the NGOs are not full members in the governance process.
Based on my findings, I propose the five principles of sound governance 
(Graham, et al., 2003) be re-arranged to demonstrate the influence of the elected 
political party to set the direction and management of parks and protected areas. 
From what I gathered from the interviews I conducted, the ideology of elected 
officials sets the direction for parks, which then guides and prioritizes the other 
governance principles. The current Liberal Government’s strategic vision that “BC is 
open for business” resulted in a focus on efficiency, which lowered public 
participation and transparency (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: The Governance of BC Parks
While Graham et al.’s (2003) principles intuitively fit together, it is important to 
note that my research findings clearly demonstrated each UNDP (1997) principle as 
a distinct concept which needs investigation.
7.3 Implications of Outsourcing Model
The implications of an outsourcing model on parks and protected areas are now 
examined.
7.3.1 Direction
Harland et al. (2005) asserted that if basic services are outsourced, 
government staff can focus their efforts on the core competencies of the strategic 
vision of the agency. While BC Parks has a dual mandate of conservation and 
recreation, I focused my research on visitor services. Government staff spent most 
of their time in contract monitoring and management. To assess Harland et al.’s 
1. Performance
2. Fairness
3. Legitimacy & Voice
4. Accountability
DIRECTION
(neo-conservative ideology of Liberals)
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findings for the case study of BC Parks, I believe both the responsibilities of 
recreation and conservation need to taken into account.
If many public services are outsourced, it can reduce government control, 
known as “privatization by stealth” (Harland, et al., 2005, pg. 839). Despite all 
front country services being outsourced in BC Parks, government control was not 
reduced as indicated by the sense of inferiority of PFOs to government employees. 
However in BC Parks, government control was reduced due to constant re-
organization, staff and budget cuts and shifts in roles and responsibilities which 
resulted in decreased staff morale. 
There exists minimal research regarding the implications of outsourcing 
government services on a public agency’s direction. I believe more research is 
needed regarding the impact of elected officials on the direction of public agencies 
and the relationship between politicians and administrators.
7.3.2 Performance: Responsiveness, Effectiveness, Efficiency
7.3.2.1 Responsiveness
Customer service responsiveness was ameliorated under the outsourcing 
model (by the PFOs and public administrators). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) 
attribute the private sector’s superiority in responsiveness due to their focus on 
client satisfaction which was driven by their motivations for profit and contract 
renewal. In BC Parks, Osborne and Gaebler’s argument is incongruent. There is 
minimal potential for an increase in contractors’ profit. And the contractors 
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interviewed demonstrated their motivation for contract renewal to continue their 
passion for and careers in parks.
The findings suggested a decrease in government-related responsiveness 
issues due to the inaccessibility of BC Parks staff. This came as no surprise given 
that the use of the current management model resulted in the replacement of park 
staff employed by the government with park staff employed by the PFOs. So park 
visitors only see PFO staff during their visit.
This research shows a general lack of responsiveness by the current Liberal 
government in regard to provincial parks. The government has no procedure to 
enable the continuous monitoring of the success of the current park management 
model, other than by complaints, overall visitor use data, and the demands for 
deficiency payments. Evidently, the park profile in the current government is low, 
thereby giving the parks little attention at the cabinet table. One wonders if the 
current management model is inherently designed to give an overall low level of 
responsiveness.
7.3.2.2 Effectiveness
Monitoring privatized services is essential in ensuring effective service 
delivery (Marvel & Marvel, 2007; Van Slyke, 2003; Glover 1999a). Conversely, the 
PFOs described their irritation regarding BC Parks’ micro-management style of 
monitoring. The FORUM (2008) report indicated that the PFOs and the public 
administrators were moving towards BC Parks staff monitoring higher level trends, 
(such as visitor use trends) and a PFO-self-auditing system. This move may help 
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strengthen the trust between PFO and BC Parks staff but potentially create a further 
disconnect between BC Parks staff with the parks and the visitors. 
Glynn and Murphy (1996) asserted that effectiveness includes not only the 
individual experience, but also the achievement of broader impact regarding the 
societal objectives of parks. The public administrators, the PFOs and the FORUM 
Report (2008) referenced the high level of visitor satisfaction as evidence of 
effectiveness. The NGO members (except one) also commented on the high quality 
of visitor services provided by PFOs. The NGO representatives however, were 
unconvinced of the effectiveness of BC Parks in achieving broader social impacts. 
The NGOs noted the lack of government-funded interpretation programs 
represented a core function of BC Parks as a means of fostering environmental 
stewardship in citizens. 
Furthermore, the public administrators alluded to the negative impact on 
staff morale and effectiveness regarding the difficulties of constant agency re-
organization, low levels of staff and budget, large area of lands to manage, and the 
labour intense responsibilities of contract management (which was also noted by 
two members of the NGOs, and in the FORUM Report, 2008). 
Through my interviews and document analysis of budget allocations, it 
appeared to me that government is focused on running BC Parks with the absolute 
minimum level of cost to the consumer and the government. The outsourcing model 
appears to be effective in fulfilling this goal. However, the PFOs only operate in 
some of the BC parks, those that have sufficient tourism volume to justify the cost. 
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The vast majority of the parks have no PFOs and no on-the-ground government 
staff, so in these cases, it is questionable whether or not the model is effective.
7.3.2.3 Efficiency
For the outsourcing model’s promise of improved efficiency to be fulfilled, the 
conditions of competition, the incentive for profit, and government capacity to 
manage contracts must all be present (Van Slyke, 2003; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; 
Kettl, 1993).
The element of competition is present during the initial bidding of service 
contracts for BC Parks. However, once the contract is in place, the PFOs maintain a 
monopoly over the bundle of parks for 10 years, with prices set by BC Parks. It 
appears the element of competition is markedly different in a government service 
contract compared with the private sector. Contract bidding represents the only 
time for competition amongst PFOs.
The PFOs must meet the BC Parks’ standards as well as document and 
account for all of their expenditures. Every three years, the PFOs and government 
employees meet to assess how closely the PFO has stuck to their financial 
management plan and negotiate the proposed financial plans for the next three 
years. Thus, aside from the contract bidding, the element of competition 
metamorphosizes into a struggle to keep costs low in order to keep the contract.
My research findings revealed that the current contract model is designed to 
lower the desire of the contractors to attain higher levels of financial return. Since 
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an increase in revenue (i.e. more campers) results in a decrease in deficiency 
payments, it effectively eliminates the PFOs ability and desire to earn a profit above 
the agreed upon contract with BC Parks. The FORUM Report (2008) addressed this 
concern as well, citing the need for penalties and bonuses in the PFOs’ contracts. 
Thus, theoretically, it can be argued that the PFOs’ lack of incentive for profit is a 
flaw of the BC Parks’ outsourcing model. However, the interviews uncovered 
motivations other than profit, such as a passion for parks and serving the public 
good. This finding can be classified as public service motivation, which mitigated 
the lack of profit incentive and will be further explored elsewhere. 
Statute 2, which granted the Minister of Environment (rather than Cabinet) 
the authority to set prices in BC Parks, increased the potential for efficiency. Prices 
in BC Parks now vary depending upon the season (i.e. charge less during shoulder 
season) and the quality of the campsite (i.e. charge more for prime campsites and 
vice versa). McCarville (1990, 1992) noted that perception of high quality increases 
participants’ willingness to pay for increased cost.
The FORUM Report (2008) reported varying levels of success with regard to 
BC Parks’ managerial capacity for contract management. The contract procurement 
was affirmed as successful. Despite the outlined contract responsibilities, the 
monitoring, and the business relationship between government and improvements 
over the years, there were still many areas for growth to ensure the smooth 
operation of the outsourcing model. The areas of improvement included: 
standardized tracking of the PFOs’ financial information, addressing BC Parks’ lack 
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of capability to conduct financial analysis, re-defining the Preventive Maintenance, 
updating the Facilities Management System, incorporating bonuses and penalties in 
the PFOs’ contract, and most importantly, ameliorating the government-PFO 
business relationship. 
FORUM Consultants Ltd. (2008) concluded that the new bundle model for 
service delivery was far more efficient and effective than the previous park-by-park 
model due to specialization and increased economies of scale (Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse, 2002). The terms of reference provided to FORUM by BC Parks 
(presented on pg. 65) clearly demonstrated the high level of priority placed on 
efficiency and effectiveness. The four questions that guided the FORUM research 
focused entirely on the level of efficiency and effectiveness of BC Parks. The 
evaluation did not take into consideration the other principles of governance. Eagles 
(2009) asserted that the principle of efficiency is the highest-valued in parks 
governance, which supported my findings. 
Many public administrators indicated that there is an immense amount of 
time and effort spent by government staff monitoring the PFOs, which lowers the 
perceived attained levels of efficiency as indicated by Marvel and Marvel (2007) and 
Sclar (2000). Nevertheless, the high cost of contract management by government 
staff members does not appear in most discussions of private sector operations of 
government services. For a full understanding of the financial efficiency of this 
model, all costs should be included, which is not done well in BC Parks. The limited 
empirical research demonstrating the magnitude of cost-savings in park agencies 
154
due to outsourcing furthers the assertion that the privatization movement is 
inherently ideological, rather than solely based in economic rationalizations (Van 
Slyke, 2003; Samson, 1994).
7.3.3 Fairness: Equity & Rule of Law
7.3.3.1 Equity
In theory, a focus on efficiency should be problematic for equity (Crompton & 
Lamb, 1986). While the main rationalization for using an outsourcing model is to 
increase efficiency, surprisingly participants reported that BC Parks had maintained 
an appropriate level of equity; likely due to the low cost of camping. These research 
findings suggest that an outsourcing model does not result in an increase in cost to 
users. Perhaps BC Parks is a more efficient model, meaning BC Parks can afford to 
keep prices low to ensure cost equity. 
My visceral reaction regarding equity and users fees aligns with Greswell’s 
(2004) assertion that transportation and equipment costs represent the significant 
barriers to people with low-income recreating in parks (as opposed to the cost of 
user fees); thus trumping More and Stevens (2002) contention that user fees 
discriminate against people with low income from accessing parks. Furthermore, 
with the steady trend of decreased government appropriations to parks and 
protected areas and world-wide adoption of user fees (Sickle & Eagles, 1998), I 
urge academics and practitioners to acknowledge that user fees are here to stay, 
and to shift the debate and research towards effective differential pricing.
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Park, et al. (in press) conducted 228 highly-structured interviews in a U.S. 
National Forest campground to investigate perceptions of equity and user fees. The 
questions centered on the relative importance of six criteria in determining 
perceptions of social equity and price acceptability judgments: public input, 
frequent users favouritism in decision process, price subsidy, fee level, frequent 
user benefits, revenue distribution. The most significant predictor of social equity 
judgment and price acceptability of user fees was “the extent of public input” 
regarding the establishment of user fees. Park et al. believed that: 
this result implies that public input may contribute to efficiency, 
transparency, accountability and responsiveness of decision related to user 
fees. Public input is thought to build an understanding of the decision making 
process of the authorities (Eisenberger, Fasolo, & Davis- DaMastro, 1990; 
VanYperen, Van den Berg, & Willering, 1999). This result is consistent with 
Lauber and Knuth’s (1999) statement that public input may be used to hold 
the government accountable, facilitate good decisions, promote fairness, and 
promote acceptance of government decisions (pg.8)
The vast importance of public input is clearly articulated by this study. Furthermore, 
Park et al. contend public participation can positively affect other areas of 
governance, such as efficiency, transparency, accountability and responsiveness.
Interestingly, the “price subsidy’’ variable was not a significant predictor of 
social equity or price acceptability of user fees. Participants “did not support free 
use by low income users nor do they believe that fee waivers should be provided to 
allow access for those who are unable to pay” (Park, et. al., pg.9). The findings 
differ from previous research regarding price subsidies for economically 
underprivileged people (Christensen & Dustin, 1989).
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7.3.3.2 Rule of Law 
To my knowledge, there is no literature regarding rule of law in an 
outsourcing model in parks and protected areas. This research concluded there is a 
significant problem with the rule of law in BC provincial parks.
The public administrators were interviewed first, and the issue of 
enforcement did not come up. I was also surprised that the issue did not arise in 
the FORUM Report (2008) given that it came up in every PFO interview. I can only 
speculate as to why the enforcement issue was not brought up by the public 
administrators or the FORUM Report. In my opinion, the enforcement issue also 
represents a lack of effectiveness, since BC Parks has outsourced to PFOs to 
provide safe recreation opportunities, but have not transferred over all of the 
authority to do so. 
The safety of individuals in provincial parks is the responsibility of the 
government, unless clearly transferred to the private sector and they willingly 
accept it. My review of the service contract between a PFO and BC Parks revealed 
no PFO acceptance of liability (Appendix C). Yet, a BC Parks internal document 
(2008b) and my interviews concluded PFOs are indeed charged with the safety of 
park visitors in front country visitor services. Interestingly enough, the campground 
satisfaction surveys from 2003-2007 reported 84% of visitors ranked “security” as 
excellent or above average. Nevertheless, the PFOs are setting a dangerous 
precedent by conducting the role of park rangers, without the needed level of 
authority.
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The issues of outsourcing, underfunding, enforcement, safety and ageing 
infrastructure in BC Parks, brings to mind the Cave Creek Disaster of 1995, where 
fourteen people died when a viewing platform collapsed Paparoa National Park, New 
Zealand. While The Royal Commission of Inquiry concluded multiple flaws with the 
actual platform, the “root causes” of the collapse were determined to be a 
systematically and seriously underfunded and under-resourced Department of 
Conservation. The report of the Commission concluded that given the Department's 
state, "a tragedy such as Cave Creek was almost bound to happen" (Commission of 
Inquiry, 1995, pg.113).
I am stating loud and clear that the enforcement issue in BC Parks needs to 
be addressed. BC Parks must examine the PFOs’ lack of authority and the lack of 
clearly stated responsibilities surrounding visitor safety, and the lack of funding 
needed to assign park rangers to the field to serve as enforcement officers of 
safety. I hope that BC Parks can learn from the tragedy of Cave Creek and address 
the issue before a serious incident involving death and a lawsuit emerges. 
7.3.4 Legitimacy & Voice: Public participation & consensus-orientated 
decision-making
Hodge and Greve (2007) noted that outsourcing has the potential to lower 
public participation. However, I would argue that the ideology of the elected 
officials has more impact on public participation (and all the governance principles) 
than does outsourcing services. My findings confirmed the Liberal Government’s 
focus on the economic benefits of parks and fiscal conservatism resulted in a 
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reduction in the level of public participation and consensus-orientation in decision 
making. In BC Parks, public participation is either non-existent (manipulation and 
therapy) or tokenism (informing and consulting) (Arnstein, 1969).
This research did not attempt to directly deal with park visitors as a 
stakeholder group. However, the research appears to show that in this 
management model, besides satisfaction surveys, the park visitor is simply a 
consumer of a service, rather than an active participant in management. This 
suggests that under this current model and Government, the park visitor, who is a 
citizen of BC, is not involved in the development or implementation of BC park 
policy unless a member of an influential NGO.
7.3.5 Accountability: Accountability & Transparency
How can the public hold BC Parks accountable if they are not first 
transparent? Low levels of transparency were evident in the decisions to introduce 
the parking meters, the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal, the NGOs’ 
complaints regarding poorly administered requests for Freedom of Information, and 
the available financial and administrative information. 
Furthermore, as a researcher, I had great difficulty in accessing basic 
information about the agency regarding budget and staff information (before 2006) 
and at times, the information sources would conflict with each other. This 
suggested BC Parks has a low level of capability (likely due to a shortage of staff) 
to collect, collate and provide information, resulting in a low level of transparency. 
This research contradicts More’s (2002) assertion that government agencies are 
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open to public scrutiny about finances. In addition, the private sector contracts 
reduced an already low level of transparency, since PFOs’ finances are classified as 
proprietary information.
I argue that the elected officials’ decision to not follow through with the Fixed 
Roof Proposal reflected a nominal level of accountability since they acted upon 
citizen criticism that such accommodations did not belong inside parks.
Domberger and Jensen (1997) believed accountability was enhanced in a 
privatized model due to the review of standards, performance monitoring, and the 
establishment of policies and mechanisms for redress. In BC Parks, the 
aforementioned procedures were established and re-evaluated, however little was 
shared with the public. 
Australian professors Hodge and Coghill (2007) evaluated accountability in 
three privatization case studies: electricity provision, urban passenger rail transport 
and urban road infrastructure. They asserted that accountability is a complex 
concept with multiple dimensions. They concluded four types of accountability were 
present in a privatized state, (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Accountability Pyramid in a Privatized State
(Hodge & Coghill, 2007)
At the top of the pyramid rests the legal means to enforce accountability when the 
other mechanisms fail (Hodge & Coghill, 2007). In the middle of the pyramid are 
the “hard” and “soft” mechanisms which ensure public accountability in a privatized 
state. The bottom of the pyramid represents the behaviours and ethics of the 
individual people working as service providers, which can be influenced by the 
organizational culture of the work environment. Nevertheless, this diagram does 
not include the complexity of accountability such as the relationships between the 
stakeholders, and the political processes of operating these mechanisms. Hodge & 
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7.4 Stakeholders involvement in the governance of BC Parks
Using Graham et al.’s (2003, pg.3) diagram of the agents involved in the 
governance process, I have redrawn the diagram to depict the stakeholders’ 
involved in the governance of BC Parks (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Stakeholders involvement in the governance of BC Parks
The depiction of the stakeholders involved in governance has been drawn to denote 
their relative influence in BC Parks. Elected officials hold the most influence by 
setting the direction for the management of BC Parks. Public administrators carry 
out the will of the Government and monitor contractors. The PFOs have the least 














can inform and mobilize enough citizens to lobby elected officials for change, the 
elected officials have proven they will listen to the citizens. The media plays an 
important role in the governance process: sharing information between the 
different sectors.
The majority of the PFO-NGO interactions are on the park level (i.e. 
volunteer groups and coordination of interpretation programs). The relationship 
between the Government (public administrators and elected officials) and the NGOs 
vary depending upon the NGOs’ approach (i.e. activist versus collaborative). 
7.5 Practical Recommendations
There exist innumerable reports filled with recommendations on how to 
improve BC Parks7. With a plethora of ideas already present, it suggests to me the 
problem lies in the implementation stage. Furthermore, projects can become 
derailed with the change of government, as evidenced by the Legacy Project. 
Therefore, I only offer a few concrete recommendations to the agents involved with 
BC Parks, in regards to visitor monitoring, relations between stakeholders and a 
caution regarding the increase in the Minister of Environment’s power.
7.5.1 Visitor Monitoring
A senior administrator in Ontario Parks suggested BC Parks uses vehicle 
counters on the Sea to Sky highway, which offers no distinction between entrants 
and visitors, thus creating inflated park visitation figures. I strongly recommend the 
                                      
7 B.C. Parks’ Legacy Report (1999), The Recreation Stewardship Panel (2002), FORUM 
Report (2008)
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methods of counting visitors in BC Parks be improved. Hornback and Eagles (1999) 
recommend park managers count both entrants8 and visitors9, but clearly report the 
data as separate types of use. 
Collecting data regarding entrants through axle count measurement 
increases park managers’ awareness of and responsiveness to issues such as traffic 
control, enforcement, transportation and infrastructure (Hornback & Eagles, 1999). 
However, visitor impact is best captured by measuring the length of stay (the total 
number of days that visitors stay in the park) known as visitor days (Hornback & 
Eagles, 1999). Thus if a camper stays at a park for five nights, the recorded use 
would be five visitor days. And if a family of three stays at a park for five nights, it 
would yield fifteen visitor days (Hornback and Eagles, 1999). Permit sale data (i.e. 
camping and rental equipment) is much more accurate than vehicle counters at 
capturing visitor days,  which further enables a rich set of data analysis for trends 
and visitor capacity issues (Eagles, in press).
I wonder if the methods of counting visitors and entrants will be improved. I 
worry that it is in the politicians’, public administrators’, the PFOs’ and even the 
NGOs’ best interest to continue reporting inflated figures of visitor use which 
suggest higher levels of efficiency and justification for increased resources for 
management. My hope is that the public administrators and the NGOs will pursue 
the true impact of visitors and entrants. BC Parks requires proper methods of 
                                      
8 a person who visits the lands and waters of a park or protected area for purposes 
mandated for the area
9 a person who visits the lands and waters of a park or protected area for purposes 
mandated for the area
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counting visitors and entrants to conduct visitor trend information, assess impact of 
use, and allow for comparisons with other park systems. 
7.5.2 Stakeholder Relations
The PFO-Public Administrator relationship was marked by mistrust. Despite 
the outsourcing model being in place for 20 years, the PFOs continue to feel 
undervalued by BC Parks. Thankfully, my research found evidence of BC Parks 
working towards ameliorating the relationship. As indicated in the FORUM Report 
(2008), I believe the joint BC Parks - PFO steering committee will be integral in 
improving the relationship.
The members of the NGOs specified how they were reactive to government 
initiatives. However in the book Protected places: A history of Ontario's provincial 
parks system (Killan, 1993) there are many examples where the Ontario NGOs 
were proactive in improving park policy and management. I encourage the 
members of the NGOs to envision how they want BC Parks to be managed, and to 
lobby the public administrators and the elected officials for their desired changes. 
The NGOs should remember the power of working together, as demonstrated by 
the successful lobby against the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal. 
Interestingly, throughout all the interviews (except with two NGO members) 
there existed a complete acceptance of the privatization model. It appeared the 
public administrators, the PFOs and most members of the NGOs have put 
themselves into a conceptual box with a lack of recognition of other management 
models.
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7.5.3 Minister of Environment
Since the election of the Liberal Government in 2001, the power of the 
Minister of Environment has dramatically increased. The Minister can now remove 
areas from parks (Statute 84, 2003) as well as set the prices for BC Parks (Statute 
2, 2008) whereas previously these decisions were made by Cabinet. The NGOs 
representatives expressed their reservations regarding the Minister of Environment 
having the ability to change park boundaries in order to allow resource extraction. 
Some of the public administrators expressed the increase in flexibility regarding 
prices allows for increased flexibility to offer discounts for underutilized or off-
season parks, and to charge more for prime campsites and popular parks. With the 
Minister of Environment’s significant level of influence over BC Parks, the role of 
transparency and the NGOs’ watchdog role are now more important than ever.
7.6 Research Recommendations
The governance literature noted the role of government; however, I found no 
discussion regarding the respective roles of public administrators and elected 
officials, which was a major finding in my research. The role of and potential for 
public service motivation is also explored.
7.6.1 The Policy-Administration Dichotomy
My review of the governance of parks and protected area literature yielded 
no discussion regarding the different roles and interactions between the two major 
players within government: the public administrators and the elected officials. To 
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understand the governance of parks and protected areas, irrespective of the 
management model, the politics of administration must be explored.  
Pervasive in the 1920s and 1930s, the academic literature advocated 
mutually exclusive roles for politicians and public administrators: the separation of 
public administrators from political activities and politicians from the 
implementation of public policy (Svara, 2001). Today, the public administration 
literature has discounted the aforementioned ideas and coined it “the myth of the 
dichotomy”.
While the myth of the policy-administration dichotomy has largely been 
debunked, Kettl (2000) noted that privatization efforts to increase efficiency 
approximates the terms of the dichotomy, due to a break in dialogue. However, in 
BC Parks, under the outsourcing model, visitor services are administered by the 
contractors, monitoring is conducted by the civil servants, and policy is set by the 
governing body. However, not everything can be written in policy or a contract. 
Thus the public administrators are left to interpret policy and the contractors are 
left to deliver visitor services on the ground. Feedback loops are present through 
the contractors to the public administrators, and then to elected officials. Thus, I 
argue that dialogue isn’t necessarily broken due to contract monitoring. Svara 
(2001) questioned the appropriateness of certain services being outsourced:
unless it is reserved for services that can be appropriately defined without 
ongoing broad based administrative input and appropriately delivered without 
continuous political oversight, the strict separation of policy makers and 
service deliverers can lower the quality of governance and service (p.180).
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As it stands, I believe BC Parks does require what Svara (2001) described as broad 
based administrative input and continuous political oversight – which raises 
concerns regarding the appropriateness of outsourcing visitor services. 
Furthermore, a major flaw of the privatization of BC Parks was the decrease in the 
public administrators’ level of independence and influence in the operations of the 
parks. The political power of park administrators comes from the visitor whom they 
serve. In BC, the park agency is no longer directly connected to the park visitors 
and thus to the citizens of BC and therefore, the agency has low levels of political 
power.
Svara (2001) proposed a complementarity model of politics and 
administration, which features interdependent relationships among elected officials 
and government administrators, each having distinctive roles but also needing to 
come together to effect sound governance and to promote the public interest. 
Elected officials maintain political control by setting direction and continuous 
oversight. Public administrators maintain professional independence by asserting 
their perspectives in the formation of policy and adhering to professional standards 
in implementation. Svara put forth a model of potential policy-administration 
situations (see Figure 8). 
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Elected officials: Degree of Control
*Reciprocating values that reinforce the position of other set of officials:
(1) Politicians respect administrative competence & commitment
(2) Administrators are committed to accountability & responsiveness
(Svara, 2001, pg.179)
I believe BC Parks currently fits into Svara’s (2001) typology of Political Dominance, 
characterized by high degree of political control and low level of public 
administrators’ independence. The Political Dominance in BC Parks was epitomized 
by the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal. The politicians’ mantra set the 
direction for BC Parks which opened them up for business and profit. Meanwhile, 
the public administrators were “squirming” under the politician’s direction and 
decisions. I suspect that if the politicians had sought the public administrators’ 
professional perspective, it would have been suggested that lodges do not belong 
inside of parks and would have predicted the negative feedback from citizens.
Furthermore, the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal and the installation of 
parking meters were announced without any public consultation or any forewarning 
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of such a possibility for BC Parks (pg.96), which conflicted with public 
administrator’s professional standards in implementation. 
The high degree of political control and low level of administrators’ 
independence negatively impacted transparency and public participation. It was 
public outrage, a media storm, and a lack of companies submitting proposals (as 
mentioned by NGO Participant #2 on pg.115) which resulted in the end of the Fixed 
Roof Accommodations Proposal.
Further research regarding the governance of parks and protected areas 
must take into account the political culture of the area. I propose conducting 
collaborative research with political scientists to better understand the politics of 
administration, and to interview politicians since they are powerful stakeholders in 
the governance process. I recommend using Svara’s (2001) model of policy-
administration to increase understanding of the potential power imbalances in 
place, in order to properly conceptualize the governance of parks and protected 
areas.
7.6.2 Public Service Motivation
Jolley (2008) wrote a think piece regarding the lack of literature of public 
service motivation (PSM) in private contractors performing public sector tasks. 
Public service motivation encompasses a dedication and commitment to public 
institutions and organizations (Perry & Wise, 1990). The public administrator 
literature supports that a strong PSM serves as a “mitigating factor to protect[ing] 
and promot[ing] the public interest” (Jolley, 2008, pg. 5). Thus Jolley pondered the 
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level of PSM in private sector contractors in government contracting. Investigating 
the level of PSM in private contractor is a needed area of research since a major 
concern of anti-privatization proponents fear contractors providing public services 
are dominated by selfish, profit-hungry motivations (Jolley). 
A “contracting regime” is characterized by long-term, cooperative, and 
interdependent relations between government agencies and private contractors 
(Smith, 1996; Kettl, 1993). Private contractors are “governmentalized” when they 
share the goals of the public sector organization with the public administrators 
(Kettl, 2002). The importance of public service motivation among contractors:   
“(1) increases with the complexity of the task, (2) has an inverse relationship with 
the number of contractors available, and (3) increases with the establishment of 
contracting regimes” (Jolley, 2008, pg.9) (Figure 9).  
Figure 9: Importance of Public Service Motivation
Least Important Public Service Motivation Most Important
(Jolley, 2008, pg.9)
Over the years, maintaining and operating BC Parks has become more 
complex (namely due to the park-by-park to bundle shift and increase in 
campground management and business-sophistication). According to FORUM’s 
(2008) evaluation, there exists a healthy pool of eligible and interested contractors; 
however PFO Participant #1 believed that fewer contractors are interested in 
continuing with BC Parks. And finally, a contracting regime is developing in BC 
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Parks due to increased contract length, the interdependence between government 
and contractors and the push for a good business relationship based on trust. Thus, 
in my opinion, the importance of PSM in private contractors is of medium to high 
importance in BC Parks. I do believe the PFOs I interviewed all had high level of 
PSM, which BC Parks needs to further recognize by instituting rewards for good 
work into the contracts.
7.7 Concluding Thoughts
I questioned whether privatization’s focus on efficiency lowered public 
participation and transparency. BC Parks has operated under the outsourcing model 
since created under the Social Credit Government in the 1980s, the NDP 
Government in the 1990s and the Liberal Government in the 2000s. Under the 
direction of the NDP Government, the members of the NGOs reported high levels of 
satisfaction with the principles of public participation and transparency whereas low 
levels satisfaction under the Liberal Government. Thus it is the ideology of the 
elected officials which has the greatest impact on the governance principles. The 
ideology of the Government sets the strategic vision for the management of BC 
Parks and the focus and importance of the remaining governance principles.  
Strategic vision in BC Parks, under the high degree of political dominance, was set 
by the neo-conservative Liberal Government, which valued efficiency and 
effectiveness, and thus lowered public participation, accountability and 
transparency.
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I wondered whether overall good governance is even possible, since often an 
emphasis on one principle then lowers another. Furthermore, satisfaction with the 
principles of governance greatly depends upon one’s prioritization of the principles. 
Various cultures and societies value different principles of governance and it 
changes over times. And elected officials are supposed to represent the masses of 
people. Thus for governance to be truly representative, there needs to be civic 
engagement in the management of public services. 
Since 1989, BC Parks has outsourced all front country visitor services to 
private contractors in the name of increased efficiency. Yet BC Parks has 
conceptualized efficiency as operating at the lowest cost possible which has resulted 
in strained relationships with contractors, loss of government funded interpretation 
programs, heavy workloads for public administrators, and a disconnect between the 
agency and its constituents. Efficiency refers to making the best use of resources; it 
is “the relationship between inputs and outputs and the amount of effort, expense, 
or waste involved in delivering a service” (Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p.80). In BC 
Parks, high efficiency has come at the cost of lowered transparency, public 
participation and rule of law. I urge all stakeholders involved with BC Parks to 
expand their focus beyond efficiency and to take all of the principles of governance 
into consideration.  
I speculate that the BC Parks’ outsourcing model creates a disconnect 
between the park visitors and the BC Parks agency. What happens when visitors 
share their concerns and ideas with PFO staff? PFOs appear to have little power in 
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making any changes. Do the PFOs inform BC Parks? And if so, does BC Parks take 
that information into consideration? I wonder if the visitors feel disconnected to the 
agency or if they are indeed satisfied with interacting with the PFO staff? Without a 
doubt, for parks to survive and thrive, there needs to be a strong constituency of 
supporters. Bushell et al. (2007) explained that “political support for parks only 
exists if sufficient numbers of satisfied park visitors are influential enough to affect 
societal decision-making” (pg.9). Based on my research, I conclude that a major 
flaw of the outsourcing model is the disconnect between the BC Parks agency and 
the park visitors.
7.8 Reflections
As a qualitative researcher, it is impossible to let go of the lens through 
which I see the world. Journaling, however, did aid in my reflexivity and 
mindfulness of my own ideologies. Even as I defend my thesis I question the 
validity of my themes. It was my own passion for parks (and my vision for their 
management) and my own disbelief at the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal 
which drove me to investigate the governance of BC Parks. I ask myself what the 
theme “passionate yet powerless” truly captures since Larson (1997) asserted that 
“researchers may impose meanings on the lives they study and end up saying more 
about themselves and the things they value than they do about those they study” 
(p.469). I take solace in Laurel Richardson’s (1994) concept of crystallization and 
that my research findings contributed to the understanding of social life and 
represented the participants’ sense of lived experience. In keeping with the tenets 
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of crystallization, I acknowledge that only a partial understanding of the 
governance of BC Parks was obtained from this research and this understanding 
was reflected from many different perspectives.
The nature of my investigation and approach to analysis unveiled rather 
interesting findings, such as humanizing the face of private contractors in BC Parks, 
the power dynamics between PFOs and BC Parks staff, the low level of rule of law, 
and the reconceptualization of efficiency as operating at the lowest possible cost. 
Overall, I’m grateful for the opportunity to have expressed my perception, of 
the government employees, the PFOs and the members of the NGOs’ perceptions of 
the governance of BC Parks.
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Appendix A
Outdoor Recreation Council of British Columbia
Low-impact recreation Motorized/Consumptive Recreation
BC Camping Association BC Federation of Drift Fishers
BC Nature BC Federation of Fly Fishers
Canadian Parks and Wilderness BC Off-Road Motorcycle Association
BC Spaces For Nature BC Snowmobile Federation
Friends of the Stikine Society Four wheel Drive Association of BC
Recreational Canoeing Association of BC Council of BC Yacht Clubs
Trails Society of BC BC Fishing Resorts & Outfitters Assn.
Hike BC
Federation of Mountain Clubs of BC
International Mountain Bicycling Association
Guide Outfitters Association of BC
Pacific International Kayak Association
Okanagan – Similkameen Parks Society
Sea Kayak Association of BC
Backcountry Horsemen of BC
Horse Council of BC





Questions for Government employees of BC Parks
1. It is my understanding is that your job title is ‘                       ’?
a. Can you walk me through a typical day at work?
2. How does BC Parks monitor private contractors?
a. Do you keep annual reports?
b. Can I see a copy of a contract? 
c. How many people in the agency are dedicated to monitoring private 
contractors? 
3. How much interaction do you have with NGOs?
a. How influential are NGOs on your decision-making? 
b. Can you think of a story to illustrate what we’re talking about?
Questions for Park Facility Operators
1. It is my understanding is that your job title is ‘                       ’? 
a. Can you walk me through a typical day at work?
2. Could you describe your interactions with BC Parks?
a. How often do you meet with BC Parks employees?
b. What kind of information do you have to relay to BC Parks about your 
organization? (i.e. Finances? Visitor statistics?)
3. How much interaction do you have with NGOs?
a. How influential are NGOs on your decision-making? 
b. Can you think of a story to illustrate what we’re talking about?
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Questions for Non-Governmental Organizations
1. It is my understanding is that your job title is ‘                       ’? 
a. Can you walk me through a typical day at work?
2. How much interaction do you have with BC Parks? And how much interaction 
do you have with park facility operators?
a. How much influence do you think your organization has had on BC 
Parks policies in the past ten years?
b. Can you think of a story to illustrate what we’re talking about?
Questions for all participants
1. How do you feel about the current privatized arrangements for visitor 
services?
a. Do you feel your opinion is widely held in your organization? 
2. What are the advantages to the current arrangements?
a. During your time affiliated with this organization, what’s been the best 
thing?
3. What are the disadvantages to the current arrangements?




For the second half of the interview, I’d like to discuss you with you five main 
concepts, broadly referred to as governance… so things like public participation, 
equity, efficiency, accountability, and so on.
LEGITIMACY
1. I’m curious, as a citizen, what does public participation mean to you?
2. Can you comment on the public participation process for BC Parks?
a. Who attends the meetings?
b. If you could name the best (or worst) example of public participation 
regarding BC Parks, what would it be?
3. How are decisions made? 
a. Who gets to input their ideas?
FAIRNESS 
1. It is my understanding that BC Parks has outsourced all visitor services to 
private contractors. 
a. Based on this reality as you perceive it, does it represent an equitable 
situation for citizens?
2. Are all visitors treated in the same manner?
a. Is that a good thing? (i.e. People with disabilities? Low-income 
families?) Should everyone pay the same amount for services? 
3. Does BC Parks stick to its announced major policies?
a. Can you think of an example?
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PERFORMANCE
1. The academic literature on contracting suggests the main reason for 
outsourcing services is to increase efficiency and cost-savings. 
a. In your opinion, has this happened with BC Parks? 
b. Are people getting more bang for their buck?
2. Do the private contractors follow the guidelines provided by BC Parks?
3. How does BC Parks respond to complaints and public criticism?
a. Does BC Parks acts on participants' suggestions?
b. What’s the most positive (or negative) story to illustrate your ideas?
ACCOUNTABILITY
1. How are the policies of BC Parks communicated with the public?
2. How can information regarding decisions (and the reasoning behind them) be 
accessed?
3. How is the public kept informed about major expenditures? 
DIRECTION
1. Do the provincial parks in BC have management plans? 
a. Are they accessible? How? To whom?
b. Are they implemented?
2. How do you feel about the direction BC Parks is taking?
3. What do you want to see happen in the future of BC Parks?
4. What do you believe is likely to happen in the future of BC Parks?
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PRIVATE/PUBLIC ISSUES
1. Are there any conflicts between environmental goals of protection and 
economic goals of revenue-generation?
a. Can you think of an example?
2. Is there tension between public and private interests?
CONCLUSION
1. What does the privatized model mean to you?





Dear                                                        ,
I am a graduate student in the Recreation and Leisure Department at the University of 
Waterloo. I along with three faculty members are currently conducting research regarding 
people’s perceptions of the characteristics and performance of visitor services in provincial 
parks in British Columbia. As part of this research study, we are conducting interviews with 
government staff of BC Parks, park facility operators, and members of non-governmental 
organizations. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose to participate, it will involve an 
interview of approximately one to two hours in length to take place in a mutually agreed 
upon location. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so wish. 
Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative 
consequences by advising the researcher.  With your permission, the interview will be audio 
recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis. 
All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not appear 
in any thesis or report resulting from this study, unless you have given your permission to 
be identified in any publications and quotations attributed to you. Data collected during this 
study will be retained for two years in Dr. Paul Eagles’ locked office. Only researchers 
associated with this project will have access. The electronic data will be saved for five years 
on a secure server at the University of Waterloo. Afterwards all the data will be destroyed. 
There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study.
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist 
you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me on my cell phone at 519-
568-9774 or via email at blmccutc@uwaterloo.ca, or my supervisor, Dr. Paul Eagles at 
eagles@uwaterloo.ca, 519-888-4567 Ext. 32716.
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance 
through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, the final 
decision about participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from 





Department of Recreation and Leisure Studies
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON
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CONSENT FORM
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being 
conducted by Professors Paul Eagles, Mark Havitz, Troy Glover and graduate students 
Bonnie McCutcheon and Windekind Bueau-Duitschaever of the Department of Recreation 
and Leisure Studies at the University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask any 
questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any 
additional details I wanted.
I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be audio recorded to ensure 
an accurate recording of my responses. I am also aware that excerpts from the interview 
may be included in the thesis and/or publications to come from this research, with the 
understanding that I may choose whether quotations are anonymous or attributed. I was 
informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the 
researcher.  
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of 
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.  I was informed that if I have any comments 
or concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact the Director, Office 
of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567 ext. 36005. 
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study.
YES    NO    
I agree to have my interview audio recorded.
YES   NO    
I agree to be identified in any publications resulting from this study.
YES    NO    
I agree to the use of attributed quotations.
YES    NO    
I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of this 
research.
YES   NO
Participant Name:       ____________________________  (Please print) 
Participant Signature: ____________________________
Witness Name:           ____________________________ (Please print)
Witness Signature:     ____________________________
Date:                          _____________________________
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Appendix D
PFOs operating in BC Parks 
(BC Parks, 2008a)
Bundle Area PFO #PFOs
Cariboo - Bowron Lake BC Parks Cariboo Region 1
Cariboo -Cariboo G & P Kleenery Ltd. 2
Kootenay - East Kootenay Park Services Ltd. 3
Kootenay - West & North West West Kootenay Park Management 
Inc.
4
Lower Mainland - Fraser Valley Sea to Sky Park Services Ltd.1 5
Lower Mainland - Lower Mainland Peace Park Management Ltd. & SSG 
Holdings Ltd.
6
Lower Mainland - Sea-to-Sky Sea to Sky Park Services Ltd. 1 -
Lower Mainland - Sunshine Coast Swens Contracting 7
Okanagan - Boundary Kaloya Contracting Ltd. 2 8
Okanagan - Manning/ 
Similkameen
Gibson Pass Resort Inc. 9
Okanagan - North  Okanagan Quality Recreation Ltd. 10
Okanagan - South Okanagan Kaloya Contracting Ltd. 2 -
Omineca – Hwy 16, 27 & 97 Quartz Contracting 11
Omineca - Mt Robson Design By Nature Park Services3 12
Peace - Liard Kootenay Forest Resources 13
Peace - North & South Peace Mariah Recreation Management 
Services
14
Skeena – QCI Old Massett Village Council 15
Skeena - Smithers/ Hwy 37 Northwest Escapes Ltd. 4 16
Skeena - Terrace/ Rupert Northwest Escapes Ltd. 4 -
Thompson - Kamloops Brandywine Environmental 
Management Ltd.
17
Thompson - Merritt L. Lemkay and D. Baker 18
Thompson - Shuswap no pfo 18
Thompson - Wells Gray Blackwell Park Operations Ltd. 19
Vancouver Island - Mid Island R.L.C. Enterprize Ltd. 5 20
Vancouver Island - North Island R.L.C. Enterprize Ltd. 5 -
Vancouver Island - North Island R.L.C. Enterprize Ltd. 5 -
Vancouver Island - South Island 
Gulf Islands
K2 Park Services Ltd. 21
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Non-bundled Parks
Park Name PFO #PFOs
Barkerville Caleb and Rose Higgins 22
Newcastle Island Snuneymuxw First Nation 23
Cypress Cypress Mountain 24
Mount Seymour Mount Seymour Resorts 25
Alexandra Bridge Yale First Nation6 26
Emory Creek Yale First Nation6 -
Kilby Kilby General Store & Farm 27
Prophet River Wayside ? -
Andy Bailey The Northern Rockies Regional 
District
29
Kiskatinaw Alex Crabbe 30
Buckinghorse River Wayside Buckinghorse Lodge 31
Nisga'a Memorial Lava Bed Park ? -
Babine Lake – Pendelton Bay Burns Lake Community Forest Ltd. 7 34
Jackman Flats Design By Nature Park Services3 -
Omineca ? -
Rearguard Falls Design By Nature Park Services3 -
Ethal F. Wilson Memorial Burns Lake Community Forest Ltd. 7 -
* The seven subscripts indicate a PFO managing more than one area.
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Appendix E
Components of the Contract 
(FORUM, 2008, p.22-24)
The contracts between BC Parks and the PFO essentially describe:
 The obligations of the PFOs and of BC Parks; and
 How the PFOs get paid for meeting their obligations.  
The main expectations of the contract methodology are that it should:
 Reflect the main components of the parties’ activities and obligations;
 Compensate the PFOs fairly for their efforts and contributions;
 Provide incentives for good PFO performance;
 Compensate BC Parks fairly for the concessions granted to the PFOs;
 Remain fair and transparent to both parties;
 Be accountable and explainable to the public;
 Reflect the PFOs performance in meeting BC Parks’ expectations; and
 Be predictable for BC Parks and the PFOs’ for budgeting and planning 
purposes. 
PFOs’ Obligations
The explicit operational obligations of the PFOs under their contracts are as follows:
 Operate and maintain the facilities described and defined;
 Offer the facilities to users (day and overnight visitors);
 Collect and retain additional fees - revenues arising from the additional 
facilities;
 Collect and remit to government Park Act and Pass fees in accordance with 
Schedule “D” of the contract;
 Offer pay parking passes to visitors;
 Permit exempt visitors to use the parks free of charge;
 Control operating areas (as defined) to ensure safety and orderly use, 
including
o Regulation of entry, movement and activities;
o Eviction where necessary; and
o Arrangements with police to regulate public safety and conduct.
 Keep books and records;
 Allow an audit if requested by BC Parks;
 Pay moneys to BC Parks when due;
 Pay all taxes, costs and charges for operating the operating areas;
 Deliver receipts and other evidence for payment on demand by BC Parks;
 Observe, abide by and comply with all laws, the agreement and Parks design 
and facility standards;
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 Keep the operating areas in a safe, clean and sanitary manner;
 Not permit hazard or nuisance;
 Not remove or destroy any natural resource without BC Parks written 
consent;
 Not construct, install or repair facilities except for the purposes set out in the 
Annual Operating Plan (as approved by BC Parks);
 Pay all accounts and expenses as they become due;
 Ensure users do not perform unsafe or hazardous activities; and
 Take reasonable precautions to suppress fires.
The contracts contain explicit administrative clauses related to performance and 
maintenance covering the following:
 Deliver an Annual Operating Plan to BC Parks by October 1 each year, 
including services offered and fees collected;
 Deliver a (“rolling”) three-year Business Plan each year including services, 
planned repairs and replacements, additional facilities, advertising, reports to 
be completed, organizational structure, staffing and financial projections;
 Complete all inspections, diagnostic procedures, maintenance items (OM) 
and condition assessments proposed in the business plan;
 Report PM items (as proposed in the Plan) within 30 days of completion.  
(There are also rules related to PM under-spending);
 Convince BC Parks as to capacity, quality, revenues and cost controls;
 Provide a security deposit, in an amount agreed in the contract, as a 
guarantee of the PFOs obligations under the contract; and
 Maintain Commercial and CGL insurance as specified.
Under Section 9 of the agreements, BC Parks may suspend all or part of the 
agreement or terminate it under certain conditions.  The PFOs are therefore obliged 
not to allow any of the following circumstances to occur, which may give rise for 
termination “for cause”:
 Non-payment of moneys due to BC Parks;
 Failure to comply with the terms of the agreement;
 Insolvency or assignment of creditors;
 An act under the Bankruptcy Act;
 Appointment of a receiver-manager; or
 A winding-up order.
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BC Parks’ Obligations
The explicit obligations of BC Parks under the contracts are to:
 Grant a Park Use Permit to occupy the Operating Areas (as defined) for 
specific purposes for a period of ten years;
 Offer the PFO first right of refusal to operate additional services;
 Review the Annual Business Plans within 30 days of receipt and ensure 
compliance with the contract; and
 Accept or reject any proposed PM item.  
Among BC Parks implicit obligations, derived partially from the obligations of the 
PFOs, are the following:
 To maintain good business relationships with the PFOs;
 To perform performance measurement activities so that both BC Parks and 
the PFOs will know exactly where they stand with regard to BC Parks’ 
standards and expectations and where improvements should be made; 
 To allow the PFOs  to establish agreed-upon levels of performance whereby 
their compliance with BC Parks’ expectations is transparent and explicit; and
 To provide support to the PFOs in respect of their obligations when called 
















by BC Parks staff
No. of letters received. Nature of 
complement or complaint. 
Timeliness of any required 
actions by Operator.
Satisfaction surveys Performance levels at, or above, 
provincial standards. Overall 
satisfaction results for the 
(campground/day use site).
Staff on-site contact 
with
park visitors
Personal interviews with park 
visitors. Appropriateness of 





Number of letters received. 
Nature of complement or 
complaint. Timeliness
of any required actions by 
Operator
Phone Calls received 
by BC Parks staff
Number of phone calls received 
by BC Parks staff. Nature of 
complement or complaint. Were 
follow up actions completed by











Roads Surface condition of road. Drainage 
structures free and clear of debris. 
Vegetation controlled appropriately on
road edges and ditch lines. Shoulders 
maintained to road standards.
Grounds Lawns cut and trimmed. No garbage 
laying around. Campsites cleaned and 
maintained. Beach areas free of litter. 
Danger trees assessed, modified and/or 
removed.
Buildings Condition of interior for paint and 
cleanliness/odour. Condition of 
components (plumbing, electrical,
toilets, partitions). Exterior of building for 
paint and condition of siding, trim, doors 
and windows. Roof condition (shakes, roof 
cap and vents in place). Building 
environment (danger trees).
Trails Trails brushed back to standards. 
Drainage structures in place and being 
maintained. Condition of tread surface. 
Condition of bridges or boardwalks.
Water Water posts secure. Water taps not 
leaking. Drains in place and functioning. 
Water testing being done. Valves boxes 
covered.












Camping targets Number of camping parties compared to 
3-year average. Number of camping 
parties compared to projections in the 
Annual Operating Plan
Partnerships Has the Operator followed the Business 
Plan/Annual Operating Plan? Has the 
Operator accessed or examined other 
possible sources of funding e.g. 
employment grants?
Day-use targets Number of day-use parties compared to 
3-year average. Day-use parties 




Is there a marketing/advertising plan in 
place as outlined in the Annual Operating 
Plan? Does the advertising promote any 
additional services offered?
Park User Fees Are park user fees correct? Is the 
Operator following fee policies and 
regulations correctly? Is the necessary 
information being recorded




Staff Presence & Appearance
Performance 
Indicator 






Does overall staff appearance meet BC 
Parks' and park visitors' expectations? Is 
there a company policy in place for staff 
dress code? Do staff uniforms meet BC 




Appropriate level of staff on shift for size 
of operation and as outlined in Annual 
Operating Plan. Signs displayed in 
appropriate locations directing public on 
how to contact staff. Appropriate 
supervision for size of operation and as 
outlined in Annual Operating Plan.
Training Training plan in place. Does the training 
plan cover all aspects (e.g. emergencies, 
public relations,  maintenance, security, 
ecological integrity, environmental 
stewards,
etc.) of the operation? Is there a set out 











First Nations Has the operator delivered what is 
detailed in the Annual Operating 
Plan regarding First Nations? Has 
the effort to involve First Nations 




Has the operator delivered what is 
stated in the Annual Operating Plan 
regarding community events? What 
steps have been taken to 
encourage community events? 
What, if any, feedback did you 
receive from the local community?
Volunteers Is the operator supporting the use 
volunteers in its operation? Has the 
operator made steps to talk with 
volunteer groups? Have any 
comments or concerns been 
received from volunteer groups?
Clubs/ 
Organizations
Has the operator delivered what 
was detailed in the Annual 
Operating Plan? Have you received 
any feedback from clubs or 
organizations conducting 
appropriate activities in
the park operating area? Are their 
efforts being assisted?
Publications Do brochures and park information 





Legal Obligations of Agreement
Performance 
Indicator 








Are the insurance/WCB and performance 
guarantee requirements being met? Have 
there been any WCB infractions and have 
you been notified? Is the performance 
guarantee adequate for the risk?
Statistics Are you receiving monthly records of all 
visits five (5) days following the end of 
the month? Are PSPS reports and 
statistics being submitted on time? Are 
financial records being submitted on time? 
Are you receiving Complaint/Occurrence 
Reports immediately after a serious 
personal injury/death or major property 




Is there Evacuation Plans in place for all 
Operating Areas? Are written plans in 
place for all emergency situations? Do 
these plans provide direction for staff? Is 




Number of evaluations completed. Reports 














Has the operator delivered what was 
stated in the Annual Operating 
Plan/Business Plan? Have there been 
adverse impacts to the park
environment? Has the public
provided any feedback?
Standards Does the service meet industry
standards? If facilities were




Is the service being offered 
extending the length of stay within 
the campground? Is the service 
attracting more visitors to the park? 





Protection of Natural and Cultural Values
Performance 
Indicator 






Has the Operator developed special 
procedures and standards to address 
Special Provisos as outlined in the 
Agreement? Is the Operator adhering to 
the Annual Operating Plan where it 









Are there safeguards in place to stop 
public from entering sensitive areas? Has 
the Operator developed a public 
education program around the 
protection/stewardship of the natural 
and cultural values? Have special 






Has the Operator developed special 
procedures and standards to address 
natural and cultural value concerns 
expressed in the Agreement or in the 
Annual Operating Plan? Are the
special procedures and standards
being followed? Are any operator
activities adversely affecting natural and 
cultural values?
Park Act and 
Policy
Is the operator enforcing the Park Act as 
it pertains to general protection of 
natural and cultural values? How many 
warnings have been issued?
Staff Is the Operator 's staff aware of
natural and cultural values in the
particular Operating Areas? Has any 
specific training been given? Has the 
Operator developed special work 





2007/08 BC Parks Year End Report. (BC Parks, 2008f).
Revenue
2006/2007 2007/2008
Camping fees 11,628,362 11,988,378
Boating fees 304,804 275,988
Day use parking fees 902,727 695,986
Annual parking pass 74,195 69,253
Day use group revenues 4,482 19,299
Maquinna hotsprings 15,918 15,540
Film revenue 6,180 9,186
Backcountry permits 4,995 4,536
Misc. Fees and licences 2,516 7,713
Sub-total Rec. User Fees $12,944,180 $13,085,880
Non-ski Park Use Permit Fees 484,969 831,452
Ski hill revenue 576,725 446,513
Sub-total Park Use Permit Fees $1,061,695 $1,277,965
Total Recreation User Fee
& Permit Revenues $14,005,875 $14,363,845
Recoveries
2006/2007 2007/2008
Mountain Pine Beetle 1,940,146 1,585,595
Fuel Management 423,290 239,739
Act Now Wild at Heart n/a 91,037
Other 844,052 135,315
Sub-total Recoveries Within Govt $3,207,488 $2,051,686
Tree Removal (stumpage) 98,305 355,319
Tatshenshini River Rafting 58,279 50,682
Liard Hotsprings 61,883 54,505
Empire Valley Ranch 18,000 18,000
National Park Establishment 71,241 177,219
Skagit Valley Interp 23,689 32,205
Other 100,811 145,110
Sub-total Recoveries External to Govt 432,209 833,040
Total Recoveries $3,639,696 $2,884,726





Salary, benefits, travel 13,167,629 13,579,976
Goods & services 5,647,756 5,515,671
Tree removal expenditures 98,636 212,830




– retained fees 11,937,648 12,283,665
– net deficiency payments 3,782,000 4,541,528
– non-bundled parks 797,723 892,613
Parking fee commission 387,128 338,863
Annual pass commission 11,440 17,203
Sub-total $16,915,939 $18,073,871
Total operating budget $31,581,138 $32,534,888
Total operating costs $43,917,354 $45,174,619
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Capital & Compensation Expenditures
2006/07 2007/08
Land Acquisition 3,900,000 5,220,178
Compensation Funds Received 327,653
Compensation Paid 10,300,000 8,000,000
Sub-total Acquisitions & Compensation $14,200,000 $12,892,525
Myra Trestles 3,776,455
Campground & day use area 
Reconstruction 4,939,431
Water & Sewer Systems 2,253,452
Road & Trails 2,020,179
Other 
(includes above 3 categories for 06/07) 9,920,000 734,181
Sub-total Facilities $16,820,000 $13,723,698




Total BC Parks Budget Expenditures $62,601,138 $59,151,111
Total Expenditures on Parks
(incld. Retained fees 





Donations to land acquisitions $1,330,000 $4,558,000
Total value of land acquired $7,630,128 $9,832,800
Number of Park Use Permits issued 1,146 1,069
# BC Parks’ Govt FTEs 188 193
Ranger FTEs 64 69
# Rangers 134 145
Ha protected1 11,874,463 12,044,112
# BC Parks 
with interpretation programs 16 23
Attendance at interpretation programs2 56,243 108,842
1 Hectares protected captures all formally established Class A, B and C parks, recreation 
areas, conservancies, ecological reserves and protected area designations under the 
Environment and Land Use Act at the end of each fiscal year. These numbers do not include 
wildlife management areas or other conservation lands managed by the Ministry of 
Environment for the benefit of fish and wildlife, nor do they include Government-approved 
areas that have not yet been formally designated.
2 06/07 Interpretation numbers only included July & August interpretation attendance, did 
not include May and June interpretation programs for school children. 07/08 numbers are 
also higher because they include roving interpreters in campgrounds (not tracked in 2006).
